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 1 
SUMMARY 
 
This thesis elucidates some of the ways in which concerns about the status of ‗the book‘ 
at the end of the nineteenth century both inform and are, in turn, informed by the 
representation of books in the period‘s fiction. Focusing on the work of Oscar Wilde, 
Robert Louis Stevenson, M.R. James and E.M. Forster, I argue that their fiction places 
a discursive ‗idea‘ of the book at the centre of a range of socio-political debates in 
which literary texts participate and which they also help to shape. In particular, I argue 
that the fragmentation of dominant nineteenth-century print-cultural institutions forms 
an important context for these authors‘ preoccupation with the ability of the written 
word to refract ideas and experiences it purports accurately to reflect. In Wilde‘s work, 
for example, books are simultaneously the facilitators of panoptic surveillance and sites 
upon which, by asserting their right to a wholly subjective interpretation of text, readers 
can resist such surveillance. Stevenson‘s adventure fiction is underscored by similar 
anxieties about the insidious formative influence of fiction – anxieties that lead him to 
adopt a range of metafictional strategies, designed to draw the reader‘s attention to the 
book as the product of a specific marketplace. James and Forster‘s fiction goes further, 
using books as the symbol of a wider epistemological crisis that underscores turn-of-
the-century reading practices. Ultimately all four writers reject, in different ways, a 
utilitarian conception of books as repositories for knowledge about the world, to which 
readers‘ own subjectivities must become subordinate in order to ensure a ‗right‘ 
reading. Instead, they foreshadow modern reader response theory, presenting books as 
sites upon which ‗ideas‘ – the product of a dynamic interaction between text and reader 
– are continually shaped and reshaped as they circulate within the ideologically-charged 
materiality of a particular historical moment. 
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 4 
Introduction 
This thesis examines the representation of books in the imaginative literature of late-
nineteenth-century Britain. It investigates the ways in which such representations 
reflect and engage with changes in the perception of the book within the wider context 
of the period‘s literary history, the ways in which these relate to concurrent changes in 
perceptions of reading, as well as the extent to which authors‘ perceptions of these 
shifting attitudes affect the nature of their own literary productions. Such an enquiry 
might profitably be made of any given period of literary history – certainly of any point 
since the ‗rise of the novel‘ in the late eighteenth century. I share, for example, many of 
the same central objectives as Andrew Piper‘s Dreaming in Books (2009), a study of 
the book as represented in early-nineteenth-century European and American 
romanticism. Like Piper‘s, my work is informed by Jerome McGann‘s idea that there is 
‗no such thing as an unmarked text‘, a statement which encapsulates the idea that the 
textual meaning of a work of literature is inevitably mediated by the material conditions 
governing its production, distribution and consumption – and that this is something that 
nineteenth-century writers always recognised. I also share Piper‘s concern that, while 
book history has covered effectively the ways in which ‗literature‘s meaning was 
shaped by the printed book […] we have overlooked in the process the ways in which 
literature contributed to shaping the identities of books and the bookish identities of the 
individuals who used and consumed them‘.1 Although it takes as its point of departure a 
different period of literary history, therefore, my work is underscored by the same 
central question as Piper‘s: ‗How did literature make sense of the book so that it in turn 
made sense to its reader?‘2  
                                                 
1
 Andrew Piper, Dreaming in Books: The Making of the Bibliographic Imagination in the Romantic Age 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2009), p. 10. 
2
 Ibid. pp. 10-11. 
 5 
In this introductory chapter, I will use a striking passage from Thomas Hardy‘s 
novel, Tess of the D’Urbervilles (1891) as a focal point through which to introduce 
some of the ways in which representations of books within late-Victorian fiction 
provided a means of working through the changing cultural status of the book within a 
rapidly evolving print culture, before moving on to articulate some of the wider 
intellectual and methodological questions that a study of books in fiction might help 
literary critics and historians of the book alike to address. 
 
i. Tess’s absent novels 
 
‗Why didn‘t you tell me there was danger? Why didn‘t you warn me? Ladies 
know what to guard against, because they read novels that tell them of these 
tricks; but I never had a chance of discovering in that way, and you did not help 
me!‘3 
 
This is Thomas Hardy‘s Tess addressing her mother, upon returning from Alec 
d‘Urberville‘s house a ‗fallen woman‘. The reference to novel reading at this point in 
the story emphasises a textual encounter (or rather the absence of one), which will have 
a devastating effect upon subsequent narrative developments. In presenting reading as a 
biographical intervention with the ability to confer autonomy on those who have access 
to novels, however, the extract also has relevance for female readers of Hardy‘s novel. 
The central position of the taboo subject of rape marks out Tess of the D’Urbervilles as 
precisely the kind of novel Tess regards as able to intervene fortuitously in a young 
woman‘s education: energising the book in the reader‘s hands, its evocation of books 
                                                 
3
 Thomas Hardy, Tess of the D’Urbervilles (London: Penguin Books, 2003), p. 82. 
 6 
like itself signals the volume‘s ability to have a very real effect on the course of its 
(female) reader‘s life. It makes available to the reader what Tess feels she has been 
denied: knowledge enabling the recognition of dangers faced by young women in a 
world of sexually-aggressive men. Hardy‘s novel is a potent example of the kinds of 
issues at stake when books appear (or even, as in this case, conspicuously fail to 
appear) in fictional narratives. It demonstrates how even the most apparently 
inconsequential representation or even mention of books in fiction can signal a text‘s 
situation within specific contemporary debates concerning the role(s) of books in the 
wider culture in which that fiction was produced and circulated. 
Tess‘s assertion about novel reading is significant on three counts. By depriving 
her of knowledge of ‗what to guard against‘ it is the indirect cause of her ‗fall‘: an 
absent reading act thus implicitly underpins subsequent narrative developments. At the 
same time, her assumptions about the ability of books to intervene in the lives of 
individual readers reflects the text‘s interaction with contemporary literary debates by 
signalling its position in an ongoing controversy concerning the kinds of books to 
which (young female) readers could and should gain access. Finally, as I will argue, an 
examination of Hardy‘s participation in those debates helps to determine the ideological 
position the text adopts and the way in which authors‘ reactions to the shifting cultural 
position of books help to determine the kinds of texts they produce.   
Tess‘s outburst is just one in a longstanding metafictional tradition of 
representing novel reading within the novel itself. What is interesting in this instance, 
however, is that while, since the mid-nineteenth-century, novel reading was typically 
construed as pernicious – particularly for women – Tess maintains an equally 
pernicious role for the absence of novel reading upon its protagonist. Jacqueline 
Pearson has shown how discourse on the novel in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
 7 
centuries ‗tended to think in terms of a binary opposition between ―good‖ and ―bad‖ 
books‘, with novels tending to be placed in the latter category.4 Anti-novel sentiment 
was rife and its dangers to the female reader everywhere discussed: 
 
It seems there was hardly any crime, sin or personal catastrophe that injudicious 
reading was not held to cause directly or indirectly – from murder, suicide, rape, 
and violent revolution, through prostitution, adultery and divorce, to pride, 
vanity, and slapdash housewifery.
5
  
 
Later-nineteenth-century discourse on the novel tends to be less all-encompassing in its 
condemnation, but novel reading remained a source of anxiety for many writers, even 
within novels themselves. The hypothetical consequences of reading novels in Tess is 
in diametric opposition to the tragedies that beset the heroine of Mary Elizabeth 
Braddon‘s The Doctor’s Wife (1864) for whom novels, especially racy French novels 
‗that she might have better left unread‘, make life unendurable by setting up a more 
attractive fictional alternative.
6
 Even so, Braddon‘s portrayal of the female reader 
remains ambivalent. After all, the narrator assures us, Isabel Gilbert ‗did not feed upon 
garbage, but settled at once upon the highest blossoms in the flower garden of fiction‘ 
(Braddon, 28). Such a remark appears to locate the novel within a tradition of defences 
of the novel within novels. Perhaps the most celebrated of these is Jane Austen‘s 
Northanger Abbey (1818), which satirises the potential vagaries of obsessive and naïve 
devotion to novelistic convention, whilst simultaneously emphasising the fact that a 
                                                 
4
 Jacqueline Pearson, Women’s Reading in Britain, 1750-1835 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), p. 6. 
5
 Ibid. p. 8. 
6
 Mary Elizabeth Braddon, The Doctor’s Wife (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 27. Further 
references are to this edition and appear in the body of the text. 
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pleasurable immersion in fiction is not problematic in itself. At the same time, the fact 
that Isabel reads these works ‗over and over again, and wrote little extracts of her own 
choosing in penny account-books, usually employed for the entry of butcher‘s meat and 
grocery‘ implies that excessive fondness for fiction has led her away from the proper 
feminine sphere of domestic management (Braddon, 28). Such a remark suggests that 
there are plenty of ‗respectable‘ novels that the female reader might read without 
incurring harm and that it is the way in which novels are read that is at fault. Yet, the 
way in which novels metaphorically colonise the books which Isabel, in her role as 
angel of the house, should be consulting, maintains a persistent stereotype of novel 
reading as one that can lead women astray from their ‗proper‘ sphere.7  
A novel contemporaneous with Hardy‘s, Marie Corelli‘s The Sorrows of Satan 
(1895), continues the early-nineteenth-century concern with the novel‘s capacity to 
corrupt the female reader by making her other than the pure protectress of virtuous 
familial domesticity. In that novel, Lady Sybil Elton describes how reading has made 
her a ‗contaminated creature, trained to perfection in the lax morals and prurient 
literature of my day‘.8 The kind of details that, in Hardy‘s novel, would have spared 
Tess her ordeal, are condemned in Corelli‘s text on the basis that they lead to 
immorality in life. It is novel reading that renders Sybil – for whom there is ‗nothing in 
the rôle of marriage that I do not know, though I am not yet twenty‘ – a ‗fallen‘ woman 
(Corelli, 204). Indeed, Sybil‘s reading eventually results in her literal damnation. Her 
suicide note is a veritable biographia literaria of corruption: ‗All the fashionable fiction 
of the day passed through my hands, much to my gradual enlightenment, if not to my 
                                                 
7
 For a full literary-historical discussion on the conceptualisation of the female novel reader within the 
fictional narratives of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see Pearson, Chapter 7 and Kate Flint, The 
Woman Reader 1837-1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), Chapters 9, 10 and 11. 
8
 Marie Corelli, The Sorrows of Satan (London: Methuen, 1895), p. 202. Further references are to this 
edition and appear in the body of the text. 
 9 
edification […] and little by little the insidious abomination of it filtered into my mind 
and stayed there.‘ (Corelli, 405; Corelli‘s emphasis) For Tess, however, the novel‘s 
capacity to ‗enlighten‘ is also the very thing that, by alerting her to the dangers of men, 
would have allowed her to avoid the ‗corruption‘ Corelli fears, ensuring that apparently 
‗corrupt‘ texts are also, potentially, the most ‗edifying‘.9 
Such an argument would have carried especial weight in the context of late-
Victorian book production. During the second half of the nineteenth century, changes in 
publishing, distribution and readership had a far-reaching effect not only on the forms 
taken by books, but also on the manner in which those books were obtained and 
consumed. These led, in turn, to fiercely-debated changes in the ways in which books 
were perceived as commodities in a literary marketplace. As a device that both reflects 
and comments upon the connection between ‗ladies‘ and ‗novels‘ in the period, whilst 
linking both to social and material conditions that disenfranchise her as a reader, Tess‘s 
outburst provides an illuminating example of how fiction can interact with such debates 
to conjure an historically locatable idea of the book.  
 The three-volume novel, consolidated by the success of Scott‘s historical fiction 
earlier in the century, had evolved during the Victorian period to become the standard 
format for fiction in book form. Since the publication of Scott‘s Kenilworth (1821), the 
prohibitive cost of 31s 6d for a new triple-decker ensured that the vast majority of 
readers had little choice but to rely on circulating libraries for new novels. 
                                                 
9
 Space does not permit a detailed consideration of whether what exactly happens to Tess constitutes 
rape, deception, ‗corruption‘, seduction or simply an uneasy and uninformed acquiescence to sexual 
temptation. Such distinctions are impossible to disentangle from the various revisions undertaken by 
Hardy between the late 1880s and 1919, not least because ‗what exactly happens‘ is made impossible to 
determine amongst a series of revisions that continually change the exact circumstances of the experience 
Tess undergoes. Tim Dolin provides an excellent account of Hardy‘s revisions in Hardy, Tess, pp. lii-
lxvi. My contention here, however, is that, whatever the narrative facts governing Tess‘s ordeal, the 
significance of Tess‘s pained chastisement of her mother regarding the way in which knowledge has been 
concealed from her remains in force as a means of using her ordeal (whatever it might be) to illustrate a 
wider point about female reading and sexual autonomy.  
 10 
Consequently, the ‗triple-decker‘ became a reliable commodity for publishers, for 
whom the circulating libraries would provide a ready market.
10
 The most notable 
circulating library was Charles Edward Mudie‘s ‗select‘ library, founded in 1842. 
When, in 1864, Mudie‘s was in danger of bankruptcy, publishers came to his aid and, 
from the mid-1860s onwards, publishers actually attained a major shareholding in the 
company, consolidating a mutual interest in maintaining the three-volume form.
11
 
 Other means of procuring novels were, of course, available. ‗Railway‘ novels, 
sold on the platforms of stations, provided access to cheap editions, usually of older 
titles. At mid-century, authors such as Dickens, Thackeray and Trollope achieved 
success with the monthly part-issue of new novels. From the late 1850s onwards, the 
abolition of the ‗taxes on knowledge‘12 precipitated a surfeit of new magazines aimed at 
middle-class families, with the result that the first appearance of novels was 
increasingly in the form of serialisation within the pages of respectable (and affordable) 
weekly periodicals.
13
 The circulating library, however, monopolised the first 
appearance of novels in book form. As Simon Eliot reminds us, ‗[n]o other novelist was 
able to make the cultural and economic success out of monthly parts that Dickens 
achieved, though many tried‘ and the form had all but died out by 1880.14 Moreover, 
‗serialization did not inhibit later publication as a three-decker novel: indeed, by the 
                                                 
10
 On the origin of the three-decker as the dominant form of the novel in the nineteenth century, see John 
Feather, A History of British Publishing (Beckenham, Kent: Croom Helm, 1988), pp. 150-52. For a 
detailed discussion of the importance of the circulating libraries to both the prosperity and the ultimate 
downfall of the three-volume form, and on book production and distribution in the period more generally, 
see Guinevere L. Griest, Mudie's Circulating Library and the Victorian Novel (Bloomington and 
London: Indiana University Press, 1970) and the first chapter of Peter Keating, The Haunted Study: A 
Social History of the English Novel 1975-1914 (London: Fontana Press, 1991). 
11
 See David Finkelstein, ‗The Secret: British Publishers and Mudie‘s Struggle for Economic Survival‘, 
Publishing History, 34 (Autumn 1993), 21-50. 
12
 Advertisment, stamp and paper duties – abolished in 1853, 1855 and 1860, respectively. 
13
 For an account of the rise and extraordinary success of these publications and of magazine serials more 
generally, see the case studies in Deborah Wynne, The Sensation Novel and the Victorian Family 
Magazine (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001). 
14
 Simon Eliot, ‗The Business of Victorian Publishing‘ in The Cambridge Companion to the Victorian 
Novel, ed. Deirdre David (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 37-60 (48). See also John 
Sutherland, Victorian Fiction: Writers, Publishers, Readers (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 87-106. 
 11 
1870s and 1880s it was commonly the case that a novel, serialized in twelve monthly 
episodes in a magazine, would also appear as a three-decker when its run in the 
magazine was about three-quarters through.‘15 Ultimately, therefore, success for new 
fiction in volume form continued to depend upon the libraries‘ patronage.16  
Such dominance lent the libraries tremendous power over the content of new 
works. A subscription to a library made the establishment‘s stock available to an entire 
family of readers and certain subjects were out of the question if the blushes of younger 
family members (or rather their parents) were to be spared.
17
 By the end of the century, 
librarians‘ decisions on the morality or otherwise of a text began increasingly to draw 
accusations of moral and artistic philistinism. George Moore‘s pamphlet Literature at 
Nurse (1885), for example, savagely attacks the stifling effect of the libraries on new 
authors and argues that the necessity of keeping certain literary works from the eyes of 
young people should not hinder an artist‘s right to present and discuss controversial 
issues in the manner they deemed most suitable. Moore insisted that the libraries‘ 
influence had created a dominant literature characterised by a stultifying 
conventionality as a democratic pantheon of individual authors with individual ideas 
became subservient to the moral ideals of one institution or even of one man.
18
 If 
literature was to say anything at all about life as it was actually led, or to address any of 
the less savoury aspects of human existence, it would have first to transcend the 
unfortunate constraints that the libraries imposed – constraints which entailed the 
circulation not of ‗literature‘, but of ‗morals‘.19 
                                                 
15
 Eliot, ‗Business of Victorian Publishing‘, p. 49. 
16
 For examples of quite how stringent publishers could be in upholding the three-volume form, as well 
as the libraries‘ importance as the primary distributor of a novel in book form, see Griest, pp. 54-56.  
17
 See Kate Flint, ‗The Victorian Novel and its Readers‘ in The Cambridge Companion to the Victorian 
Novel, ed. David, pp. 17-36 (24). 
18
 In this case, Mudie, at whom Moore‘s complaint is primarily (and personally) addressed. For a full 
discussion of the Mudie-Moore dispute, see Griest, pp. 148-155. 
19
 See Griest, p. 215. 
 12 
In the latter decades of the nineteenth century, however, the appearance of a 
greater number of cheaper one-volume first editions and a veritable tidal wave of new 
periodicals began to spell the end for the three-volume novel by offering alternative 
vehicles for fiction. Book buying began to become more common, whilst a much wider 
choice of journals and newspapers ensured that the libraries ceased to be the dominant 
distributor of printed materials. The 6s one-volume first-edition, emergent during the 
mid 1880s and firmly established by the 1890s, was made possible by reductions in 
publishing costs and made new novels available to the public by direct purchase. 
Authors adopting such a medium did not need to cater for an entire household of library 
subscribers and thus were not susceptible to the censorship of the likes of Mudie and 
W.H. Smith. Moore was one of the first authors to publish his fiction in 6s first editions 
and he did so in explicit defiance of what he saw as the censorship of a tradesman 
‗scarcely competent to decide the delicate and difficult artistic questions that authors in 
their struggles for new ideals might raise‘.20 Moore had taken offence when Mudie 
refused to stock his first novel, A Modern Lover (1883), on the grounds of its open 
treatment of its heroine‘s extra-marital affair. Rather than agree to Mudie‘s suggestion 
that he write in three volumes on less controversial themes, Moore determined ‗to issue 
my next book at a purchasable price, and so enable me to appeal direct to the public‘. 
His message to the librarians was clear – ‗I, at least, will have done with you‘ – and 
others were implicitly encouraged to follow suit (Moore, 4). 
By the time Tess was published at the beginning of the 1890s, the idea of one-
volume first publication had become increasingly common.
21
 As the pattern for 
                                                 
20
 George Moore, Literature at Nurse (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1978), p. 3. Further 
references are to this edition and appear in the body of the text. 
21
 Keating notes that, while the number of new adult novels rose steadily from 755 in 1886 to 1,315 in 
1894, only 184 of those published in the latter year took the traditional three-decker form. For the 
circulating libraries, which had hitherto controlled the market, this entailed a significant and continuous 
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acquiring new works shifted from public borrowing to private purchase, ‗the breaking 
down of the thirty-one and sixpenny safeguards‘ called for by Moore became 
increasingly a reality. Authors came more and more to disregard the concerns of the 
‗British Matron‘ and began to talk ever more candidly about issues such as divorce, 
pre-marital sex, free love and the radical ideas of the ‗New Woman‘, in works no 
longer kept in check by the libraries‘ careful demands. With every new novel 
published, it seemed, at least in theory, to be increasingly ‗in the power of a young girl 
to buy an immoral book if she chooses to do so‘ (Moore, 22). 
As literature evaded the watchful eye of its prudish ‗nurse‘, the issues Moore 
raised came earnestly and widely to be discussed. In 1890, for instance, the New Review 
published ‗Candour in English Fiction‘, a forum article containing pieces by Walter 
Besant, Eliza Lynn Linton and Hardy. The article addressed the dilemma facing authors 
who wished to reconcile the impulse to shield minors from unsuitable texts with an 
artist‘s determination to represent ‗human nature as it is‘.22 Linton voiced the 
fundamental issue:  
 
To whom ought Fiction to be addressed? – exclusively to the Young Person? or 
may not men and women, who know life, have their acre to themselves where 
the ingénue has no business to intrude? Must men go without meat because the 
babes must be fed with milk? (‗Candour‘, 11)  
 
                                                                                                                                              
increase in the competition, which eventually led to Mudie‘s ultimatum to publishers, issued in 1894, 
stating that it would no longer pay more than 4s per volume for new fictional works and that book 
publishers must wait a year before reprinting in cheaper editions those works sold to the libraries – an 
ultimatum that killed off the three-decker by terminating its viability as a commercial enterprise 
(Keating, The Haunted Study, p. 32). 
22
 Eliza Lynn Linton in Walter Besant, Eliza Lynn Linton and Thomas Hardy, ‗Candour in English 
Fiction‘, New Review, Vol. 2, No. 8 (Jan 1890), 6-21 (10). Further references to this forum appear (as 
‗Candour‘) in the body of the text. 
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Hardy echoes Linton‘s sentiments, calling for ‗a sincere school of Fiction‘ (‗Candour‘, 
15) and lamenting the fact that ‗English society opposes a well-nigh insuperable bar‘ to 
the discussion of the ‗sexual relationship as it is‘ (‗Candour‘, 17). He is in no doubt that 
it is ‗the magazine and the circulating library‘ that are responsible for this ‗insuperable 
bar‘. Their obsessive desire ‗to suit themselves to what is called household reading‘ 
ensures that they ‗do not foster the growth of the novel which reflects and reveals life‘. 
Instead, the novelist is forced to maintain a less contentious reflection of the 
relationships between the sexes, in order to protect the innocence of younger family 
members (‗Candour‘, 17).  
Debates about literary propriety, of the kind embodied in the New Review, had 
been going on throughout the period. Deborah Wynne notes, for example, that during 
the 1860s ‗[t]he sensation novel became legitimate reading for the middle classes 
largely because of its magazine context, where readers were addressed as educated and 
domestic family members, rather than sensation-seekers after cheap thrills.‘ At the 
same time, this context also rendered the serialised sensation novel controversial 
precisely because it ‗combine[d] the ―respectable‖ and ―scandalous‖‘.23 In literary 
terms, the sensation narratives not only dramatised criminal occurrences and behaviour 
unsuitable for reading within the domestic sphere but, dangerously, were also a version 
of lower-class literary forms. However, as Wynne points out, ‗[t]he crudity of the 
crimes and passions represented in popular Sunday newspapers, and the fictional 
versions in ―penny dreadfuls‖, was toned down considerably in the sensation novel‘. 
Moreover, the genre‘s debts ‗were not limited to the popular culture of the working 
class. Its success also depended upon its reworking of popular domestic novels‘. Wynne 
cites Winifred Hughes, who observes that the genre attempted to balance ‗the opposing 
                                                 
23
 Wynne, p. 1. 
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realms of romance and domesticity‘.24 In doing so, the magazines‘ role as literary 
nurses, policing the reading of the middle-class Victorian family, was still in force. 
Indeed, Hardy‘s reference to ‗the magazine and the circulating library‘ is further 
evidence that serial publication became imbricated in, rather than overcame, the moral 
constraints of the three-decker.  
Unlike the debate surrounding sensation literature, which questioned whether 
such fiction was suitable for the domestic context for which it was explicitly written, 
the New Review forum contemplates the validity of requiring that fiction be exclusively 
tailored to that context at all. Moreover, Hardy‘s proposed resolution of the situation 
differs wildly from his fellow contributors‘. For Besant, frank discussion of 
unconventional sexual relationships was only acceptable when the work emphasised 
‗that such Love is outside the social pale and is destructive of the very basis of society‘ 
(‗Candour‘, 9). Such a recognition mitigates candid discussion by legitimating only 
those representations that emphasise clearly the immorality of the behaviour portrayed. 
Linton‘s suggestion that certain works be confined to a ‗locked bookcase‘ and rendered 
unobtainable for underage readers is similarly founded on swapping old restrictions for 
new.  
In dividing literature into works which budding adults should be free to read and 
those which they should not, Linton echoes Moore‘s suggestion that ‗young people 
should be provided with a literature suited to their age and taste‘ (Moore, 21). Whilst 
advocating a less restrained fictional analysis of human relationships, Moore shares 
with Besant and Linton the idea that candour is unsuitable in works dealing with a 
readership that might include younger readers. In so doing, they fail fundamentally to 
change the terms of the debate in which they are engaged. The need to protect the moral 
                                                 
24
 Ibid. p. 10. 
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innocence of young readers (and young women in particular) remains central; all that is 
called into question is the extent to which such an aim is to interfere with the scope for 
presenting adult readers with the artistic expression of contentious ideas.
25
 Hardy, on 
the other hand, detects a fundamental hypocrisy in those ‗adults who would desire true 
views for their own reading [but] insist […] upon false views for the reading of their 
young people‘ (‗Candour‘, 17). Ultimately, he foregrounds the importance of ‗candour‘ 
in fiction, regardless of the eventual reader‘s identity: ‗all fiction should not be shackled 
by conventions concerning budding womanhood, which may be altogether false‘ 
(‗Candour‘, 20). 
 It is significant, therefore, that Tess‘s outburst to her mother places the heroine‘s 
inability to access certain books at the very root of the tragedy subsequently played out. 
Her recent experiences leave the reader in little doubt what kind of subject matter the 
‗novels‘ in question might have contained. Yet, far from corrupting the young woman, 
a fortuitous encounter with a more candid examination of human sexual relations is 
offered as a means not of encouraging impulses better suppressed, but of preparing her 
for the possibility of having to fight to protect her maidenhood. An apparently 
inconsequential remark about novel-reading ensures, therefore, that this is, on one level, 
a work profoundly concerned with demonstrating what happens when young women 
are not allowed to read certain kinds of books – a reading for which the New Review 
article, written at the same time as Hardy was working on Tess, prepares us.  
The question of Tess‘s working-class origins and the fact that her outburst 
specifically mentions the privileges of ‗ladies‘ also create a useful intertext with Sybil 
                                                 
25
 Felicity A. Hughes has observed in her commentary on Moore‘s pamphlet, that ‗the proposed solution 
[to the dilemma of literary candour] is not that adults should allow formerly prohibited topics to be 
discussed in front of the children, but that [the] child should be excluded so that adults can discuss such 
matters among themselves‘ (Felicity A. Hughes, ‗Children‘s Literature: Theory and Practice‘, ELH, Vol. 
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Elton in The Sorrows of Satan, revealing the class issues at play in Tess‘s complaint. 
Hardy‘s and Corelli‘s novels take up a position within several contemporary debates 
which themselves respond to perceived changes in the conditions in which books in 
general, and novels in particular, were obtained and consumed. Most obviously, both 
texts raise issues of literary propriety. Yet, they adopt very different positions 
concerning the kinds of knowledge fictional texts should offer, and exemplify those 
positions with two very different young female readers. While Tess‘s situation signals 
the corruption that might ensue should certain kinds of readers be denied certain kinds 
of knowledge, Lady Sybil‘s situation points to the corruption that might ensue should 
young ladies be given access to the same kinds of knowledge. Concomitantly, Lady 
Sybil claims that the suppression – rather than, as Tess argues, the free dissemination – 
of such books will protect ‗the old-fashioned types of the modest maiden and the 
immaculate matron‘ (Corelli, 372).  
In fact, as an adolescent girl whose mother is accused of hiding from her the 
kind of information that ‗ladies‘ get from novels, Tess represents the failure of precisely 
the middle-class safeguards which suppression, in literature, are intended to enact. 
Rejecting the novel on behalf of Murray’s Magazine, for instance, Edward Arnold 
wrote to its author:  
 
I know well enough that these tragedies are being played out every day in our 
midst, but I believe the less publicity they have the better, and that it is quite 
possible and very desirable for women to grow up and pass through life without 
the knowledge of them.
26
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Illustrating how women of high and low class are kept alike in the dark by a literary 
conspiracy of silence, Tess‘s reference to ‗ladies‘ foregrounds her working-class origin 
as an exacerbating factor in her ignorance. Yet the absence of candour within novels 
that middle-class young ‗ladies‘ might read, ensures that ‗ladies‘ labour under the same 
burden of ignorance as Tess – a young woman whose class totally denies her access to 
novels. In this way, the passage locates restrictions upon novelistic candour within a 
wider nexus of class and gender discrimination, which imbricate with each other as they 
converge on Tess. It tacitly criticises the double standard involved in the ‗fallen 
woman‘ formulation, absolving Tess of any responsibility in her ‗fall‘ from virginity. 
Her inability to make an informed decision means that the well-meaning censor is, in 
his way, as culpable as Alec. 
In emphasising its radicalism, my reading of Hardy‘s contribution to the New 
Review disagrees fundamentally with Patricia Ingham‘s, for whom Hardy‘s stance is 
characterised by an attempt ‗to placate critics he has […] declared irrelevant‘: ‗he 
doubles back on himself by apparently accepting that naturalistic accounts of sexual 
relationships should be censored for moral subversiveness. They should not and would 
not ―exhibit lax views of that purity of life upon which the well-being of society 
depends‖.‘27 The passage Ingham quotes seems to imply that, despite his plea that 
literature be allowed faithfully to represent ‗the crash of broken commandments‘ 
(‗Candour‘, 18), Hardy actually shares his fellow novelists‘ insistence that some form 
of pragmatic reticence is still essential. It is worth quoting the original passage in full, 
however, so that Hardy‘s statement might be viewed in context: 
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There should be no mistaking the matter, no half measures. La dignité de la 
pensée, in the words of Pascal, might then grow to be at last recognised in the 
treatment of fiction as in other things, and untrammelled adult opinion on 
conduct and theology might be axiomatically appealed to. Nothing in such 
literature should for a moment exhibit lax views of that purity of life upon 
which the well being of society depends; but the position of man and woman – 
things which everybody is thinking but nobody is saying – might be taken up 
and treated frankly. (‗Candour‘, 21) 
 
It is not difficult to see how Hardy‘s final reassurance that ‗lax views‘ on the subject of 
‗purity of life‘ should be avoided at all cost could be taken as a ‗doubling back‘ on his 
argument for absolute artistic freedom. Neither can it be denied that there is a world of 
difference between the totalitarian insistence on ‗no half measures‘ and the later 
concession to conventional notions of ‗purity‘. Nevertheless, the outraged reviews of 
Tess would suggest that Hardy‘s idea of what constituted ‗lax‘ morals was not the same 
as many of his readers‘.  
In fact, Ingham ignores the notoriously unstable use of the term ‗purity‘ in 
Hardy‘s work. On the title page of the first edition, the narrative is offered as that of ‗A 
Pure Woman / Faithfully Presented‘. As Mary Jacobus has emphasised, ‗[t]o invoke 
purity in connection with a career that includes not simply seduction, but collapse into 
kept woman and murderess, taxes the linguistic resources of the most permissive 
conventional moralist‘.28 Indeed, since the mid-1980s, poststructuralist readings of the 
novel have led to an increasing critical consensus that Hardy‘s subtitle is intended 
deliberately to confound and challenge the conventional meaning of the word ‗purity‘ 
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without attempting to provide an uncomplicated alternative. John Goode has suggested 
that the term ‗faithfully presented‘ is intended to evoke a similar ambiguity, 
deliberately drawing attention to the novel‘s challenge to conventional perceptions. For 
him, the subtitle offers a double challenge, ‗first to the moral values it expects to 
encounter and contest, and secondly to an aesthetic judgement – what is ―pure‖, what is 
―faithful‖?‘29 Peter Widdowson agrees, arguing that the phrasing suggests an anti-
humanist manoeuvre on Hardy‘s part, an attempt at ‗discrediting the notion that there is 
an ultimate reality, or true essence, outside of history and discourse – such as ―human 
nature‖, for example, or even perhaps: pure woman‘.30 Ultimately, the novel is not 
‗attempting to offer us a ―knowable‖ character, but rather one which […] parades the 
misrepresentation that ―characterisation‖ involves by subjecting to irony the falsifying 
essentialism of ―faithfully presenting a pure woman‖‘.31 For Widdowson, the opening 
description of Tess as ‗pure‘ and of the novel as a ‗faithful‘ presentation cannot be 
reconciled with a text that openly contradicts conventional notions of both. Instead, the 
novel‘s subtitle (and the novel itself) is seen as a deliberate attempt to call into question 
accepted definitions of ‗purity‘. 
For Jacobus, to label Tess ‗a pure woman‘ is to regard her ‗as somehow immune 
to the experiences she undergoes‘. The heroine is rendered ‗pure‘ only because of her 
inability to understand what has happened to her; exonerated of responsibility, she is 
stripped of ‗tragic status – reduced throughout to the victim she does indeed become‘.32 
I would argue, however, that any such exoneration is part of the point that the novel 
makes about the sensibleness of allowing young women untrammeled access to 
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‗candid‘ literature. Tess is not devoid of understanding of what has happened, once it 
has happened. In short, she is not robbed of understanding, but of autonomy since, as 
she herself notes, she has been denied the knowledge that would have helped her to 
understand in advance that such things could happen: knowledge of ‗what to guard 
against‘. Access to novels, even to texts as notoriously unstable as Tess, would 
nevertheless have given the novel‘s own heroine an enhanced view of the world in 
which she is to participate. In being allowed angrily to voice such an idea for herself, 
Tess‘s eventual victim status serves, paradoxically, only to emphasise what might occur 
if women are not allowed to read unfettered. A chance to react to a textual 
representation, however unstable, could help prepare a young woman like Tess for a 
similar situation in the narrative of her own life. Such an encounter, though 
hypothetical and imagined, would arm her with the power to retain precisely the 
‗purity‘ that conventional moralists wished to guarantee – but which also led them to 
censor and suppress the knowledge essential to retaining it. Between Tess and the New 
Review, Hardy offers a choice to those who wish to uphold the moral censorship of 
literary works: allow young readers to read more candid accounts of human 
relationships, at the cost of any ‗purity‘ of imagination that ignorance might lend; or 
allow them to remain unenlightened, but in danger of losing that ‗purity‘ in life. 
Returning to the New Review essay in light of these criticisms therefore, we 
must perform our own ‗doubling back‘ by extending to that essay Widdowson‘s notion 
of a post-modern Hardy who evokes apparently settled meanings in order to confound 
them. If we read the novel‘s challenge to the accepted definition of ‗purity‘ back into 
the essay, which precedes it ‗as a trailer for the novel‘,33 Hardy‘s reference to that 
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‗purity of life upon which the well-being of society depends‘ seems increasingly 
ambiguous. Tess exemplifies in her outburst the point which Hardy had already made at 
length in his New Review essay – books are not vessels in which the definition of 
female purity is offered as a fait accompli; rather, they are spaces in which the 
definition of female purity is able to be discussed openly and reshaped by means of the 
(female) readers‘ responses to narrative example, even one that radically posits a 
‗fallen‘ woman as ‗pure‘. Thus, Tess‘s outburst takes up a position in a contemporary 
debate about the way in which books actively participate not simply in mirroring, but 
also in creating and enforcing contemporary socio-political realities, as well as the role 
played in that process by the material conditions governing the consumption of novels. 
The extent to which this is the case can be gauged from an anecdote, told by the 
publisher Harold Macmillan, and recounted by James Gibson:  
 
[A] woman had come up to Hardy while he was talking to Sir Frederick 
Macmillan (Harold‘s uncle: 1851-1936) and asked him, ‗What did Tess mean to 
you, Mr Hardy?‘ After a moment‘s reflection, Hardy turned to Sir Frederick and 
said, ‗I don‘t know what she meant to you, Sir Frederick, but she was a good 
milch-cow to me.‘ No doubt the woman, failing to recognise Hardy‘s irony and 
her own insensitiveness in asking him such a question in a public place, went 
away convinced that Hardy was concerned only with money.
34
 
 
The woman, seeking to confirm the ‗truth‘ about Tess by recourse to authorial 
intentionality is as misguided as those critics and early reviewers who sought textual 
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evidence to establish her definitively as either a victim of circumstance or a free agent 
in her fate. The passionate essay he had written for the New Review demonstrates a 
commitment deeper than the merely financial and makes Hardy‘s claim to have been 
‗concerned only with money‘ difficult to take seriously. Yet, his response is significant 
in its implication that, whatever Tess ‗meant‘ to her creator, her story is ultimately to be 
understood as a product arising out of the late nineteenth-century book market: as a 
book amongst other books.  
 
ii. The ‘idea’ of the book 
Discussing the ‗anti-novel literature‘ of the eighteenth century, Jacqueline Pearson 
registers her agreement with E.J. Clery‘s suggestion  
 
that arguments about the novel were really about larger issues, ―unregulated 
social and economic forces, and the erosion of established hierarchies of value 
and authority‖, displaced on to a more manageable canvas, and that relocating 
these arguments on to the novel disguised a culture-specific issue as one 
allegedly of timeless universality, [such as] female sexuality.
35
  
 
Yet, notes Pearson, while such debates ‗may have been about more than the novel‘, 
they were nevertheless ‗also about the novel‘.36 Tess‘s outburst situates Tess of the 
D’Urbervilles‘s presentation of novels within a wider debate about the ability of novels 
to corrupt the woman reader, providing an intertext for contemporary debates about 
how the material conditions of book distribution and consumption govern not only what 
was written but also what was read and by whom.  
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In Tess‘s outburst, therefore, the novel frankly recognises its own stance in a 
debate about novels taking place beyond the text. It reminds us, as William Gass 
remarks, that ‗[n]ovels are books and books are objects, and therefore they exist like 
other objects – they are a space in a space‘.37 Hardy‘s novel illustrates how fictional 
evocations of books are not mere props in a game of literary mimesis. They are a means 
of taking part in a debate about what a book is, what it can and should do, and why all 
of these things are demonstrably important and pressing questions. Read alongside 
contemporary debates about the availability of books (and novels in particular), Tess 
demonstrates the way in which to speak of ‗the book‘ is not simply to evoke a tangible 
object but also a contentious ‗idea‘. This is doubly so in Tess‘s case, since the novels 
she evokes are hypothetical, whilst her assertions about the significant, tangible 
influence of a specific kind of novelistic candour marks out Tess as just the kind of 
novel she wishes she had: the physical book is present in Tess‘s outburst only as an 
‗idea‘ of the kind of book that does physically exist in the hands of Tess‘s readers. It 
throws into relief the way in which the fictional book always represents not the mimetic 
equivalent of a real physical object but a specific, historically-locatable concept of 
which it is the symbol – so much so that mention of ‗novels‘ can evoke the concept 
without the physical volumes themselves ever actually appearing as a material object 
‗faithfully presented‘. Drawing attention to the kind of books its protagonist has not 
read, Tess illustrates how an apparently physical object is transformed, through literary 
representation, into an idea.  
In speaking of the fictional book as an ‗idea‘, my study has affinities with other 
work that has sought similarly to examine the history of ideas through an analysis of 
their representation at a given point in literary or art history. Broadly speaking, studies 
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on the representation of ‗ideas‘ within fictional narratives demonstrate how, by 
redeploying ‗ideas‘ in a specific fictional context, literary texts can contribute to 
debates about those ideas and play a role in their cultural evolution. Robin Gilmour, for 
instance, in his examination of the literary treatment of ‗the gentleman‘ in the Victorian 
period, finds that works by Thackery, Dickens and Trollope are linked by the their 
fascination for ‗the image of the gentleman and its relation to the actual and ideal 
possibilities for the moral life in society‘. However, he is keen to stress such 
‗fascination‘ does not yield, in their work, to a direct reflection of an already existing 
‗idea of the gentleman‘. Rather, fiction participates in an ongoing discussion of the 
issue, arising directly out of a cultural context in which ‗the nature of gentlemanliness 
was more anxiously debated and more variously defined than at any time before or 
since‘.38  
For Gilmour, to investigate an idea as manifested in the period‘s literature is not 
to show how that literature agrees or disagrees with dominant concepts already in 
existence beyond the text. Rather, it is to attempt to elucidate the ways in which literary 
representation participates in forming those concepts, reflecting their ambiguous nature 
and suggesting new cultural formations in an attempt to come to terms with 
contemporary socio-political change: ‗behind the […] anxious debates about who did 
and did not qualify as a gentleman […] there lies the struggle of a middle-class 
civilisation to define itself and its values, a process in which the novelists were 
intimately and sympathetically involved‘.39 Lucy Bending has expressed a similar aim 
in her recent investigations into representations of bodily pain in the period‘s writing, 
professing to deal ‗not with the idea of pain as an ultimate sensation, but with 
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arguments over the meaning and interpretation of pain as they appeared in many 
different forms of literature‘. As Bending points out, ideas (like pain, like the gentleman 
– like ‗the book‘) are not simply ‗a given‘ for those who encountered them, ‗but instead 
[were] part of a complex and unstable system of signification, manipulable by those 
with power, and powerfully inflected by such diverse categories as class, race, gender, 
and, in the case of the decadents of the 1890s, desire.‘40  
In their notion that fictional narratives not only reflect contemporary debates 
about ideas but also participate in and shape those debates, studies of fictive ‗ideas‘ – 
that is, ideas as they inhere in fictional narratives – have an affinity with the 
poststructuralist thought of Michel Foucault. In The Order of Things (1966), Foucault 
argues that discourse about an object produces, rather than mirrors, the significance of 
its material ‗reality‘: that ideas cannot exist outside of discourse, which taxonomises 
materiality by ‗grouping and isolating […] concrete contents‘ into a transitory 
coherence. Underpinning Bending‘s argument about literary representations of bodily 
pain is an insistence, similar to Foucault‘s, upon representation as taxonomic – 
expressing ‗as though already there‘ a concept whose meaning has ‗no existence except 
in the grid created by a glance, an examination, a language‘.41 
In speaking of the ‗idea of the book‘, therefore, the title of my study is intended 
to suggest the importance of the representation of books to a wider understanding of 
literature and culture at the end of the nineteenth century – as well as the importance of 
a wider understanding of the period‘s literature and culture to the comprehension of the 
importance of the representation of books in that period. To paraphrase David Trotter‘s 
work on literary and artistic representation of mess, I hope to show not only that 
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literature is a force to be reckoned with in the proper understanding of books, but that 
the representation of books is a force to be reckoned with in the proper understanding 
of literature: in the pleasures it makes possible, in its instructiveness.
42
  
Foucault‘s contention that the significance of objects relies on the discourses 
that categorise and define those objects in certain ways has affinities with Jerome 
McGann‘s conception of a book as a ‗socialized‘ entity.43 For McGann, the reader-
centric ‗universe of literature is socially generated and does not exist in a steady state‘, 
since each reader will react to a text in a different way.
44
 Moreover, since ‗literary 
works typically secure their effects by other than purely linguistic means‘, the text to 
which the reader reacts is itself unstable, in that each edition is physically different.
45
 In 
light of this, the reading of texts in general (and literary texts in particular) must be 
thought of not in terms of the direct communication of an original authorial intention, 
but as a process of ‗continuous socialization‘ that constitutes the taming of the infinite 
‗universe of poiesis‘ attendant on each act of reading – a conjunction unique in its 
specific material, historical and psychological conditions.
46
 In pursuing the question of 
the cultural position of the book at the end of the nineteenth century, this thesis draws 
on the fundamental assumption that the literary text is, as McGann proposes, a 
‗socialized‘ entity, whose meaning is inseparable from its interpretation, at a given 
historical moment, by a reader inevitably encountering it in a historically-specific 
material form.  
McGann‘s idea has affinities with the ‗reconceptualization‘ that John D. Cox 
and David Scott Kastan propose in their study of early English drama. They hope to 
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shift ‗the emphasis [of theatre studies] from drama as the timeless achievement of 
sovereign authorship to drama as collective activity that ties the play to history‘; for to 
‗maintain that the text of a play (or a text, for texts, too, change over time) is real and 
performance merely ephemeral is to mistake the effect of a quark for the thing itself‘.47 
As an approach to literature, it might be said that book history, as McGann construes it, 
becomes for the study of the printed text what theatre studies has to the interpretation of 
dramatic works – a discipline that enhances the meaning of the text by emphasising that 
the construction or reconstruction of that meaning is grounded in material practices as 
historically-specific as the discursive practices identified by poststructuralism.  
While I draw upon McGann‘s work in order to conceptualise ‗ideas‘ of the book 
circulating in the late nineteenth century, I hope to combine the literary treatment of 
‗ideas‘ with the book historian‘s awareness of texts as material ‗things‘. To this end, I 
draw on recent work examining the way in which ‗ideas‘ are inescapably bound up with 
‗things‘, as well as how this inescapable connection is found (and, indeed, made) in the 
period‘s literature. In short, I aim to examine literary representations of the book as an 
example of literature‘s capacity to expose what Elaine Freedgood has termed the ‗ideas 
in things‘.48 
Freedgood argues that while the Victorian novel ‗showers us with things[,] […] 
the protocols for reading the realist novel have long focused us on subjects and plots; 
they have implicitly enjoined us not to interpret many or most of its objects‘.49 In an 
attempt to reverse the trend, she presents readings of three literary objects ‗with obvious 
imperial and industrial histories‘: mahogany furniture in Jane Eyre (1847), calico 
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curtains in Mary Barton (1848) and negro-head tobacco in Great Expectations (1860-
61): 
 
These objects are largely inconsequential in the rhetorical hierarchy of the text – 
they do not ascend to metaphorical stature; they suggest, or reinforce, something 
we already know about the subjects who use them. But each of these objects, if 
we investigate them in their ‗objectness,‘ was highly consequential in the world 
in which the text was produced.
50
  
 
In practice, this requires the literary critic to take the fictional object literally: to treat 
the object not as a signifier within the structural framework of the novel‘s narrative, but 
as a functioning example of the tangible, quotidian artefact which it so manifestly 
represents. In Jane Eyre, for example, ‗understanding the widest possible range of 
meanings for […] mahogany furniture […] requires that one learn about the history of 
the depletion of mahogany in Madeira and in the Caribbean (the two major sources of 
wealth in the novel)‘. As with new historicism, it is an exercise that requires the 
reinsertion of historical detail into a text which is itself a part of that context – with the 
result that new light is shed not only on the text but on the historical moment that 
produced it. Taking mahogany literally prevents it from becoming simply ‗a weak 
metonym for wealth and taste‘ and ensures that ‗it figures, first of all, itself‘. Only once 
the nature of what haunts novelistic objects has been established can those objects be 
‗returned to their novelistic homes, so they can inhabit them with a radiance or 
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resonance of meaning they have not possessed or have not legitimately possessed in 
previous literary-critical reading‘.51 
 Freedgood‘s approach might be characterised as a species of new historicism 
that centres on the historical particularity of physical objects as well as of discursive 
practices. As Stephen Greenblatt‘s examination of Renaissance discourses of power 
within the texts of the period have helped to illuminate both the literary text and the 
historical document by demonstrating how the two cohere, a ‗strong, literalizing 
metonymy can ―start‖ fictional objects into historical life and historicize our fictions 
against the grain of the kinds of allegorical meaning we already know how to find, read, 
and create‘.52 It is, in short, ‗a historicist move that is now familiar but was once 
impossible to perform, given the cloistering canons of humanist or New Criticism‘.53 
Marx‘s theory of the commodity fetish informs Freedgood‘s argument, 
underlining the necessity of literalising the apparently figurative literary object. Marx 
sees the commodity as a social hieroglyphic requiring interpretation, but this 
interpretation is hampered by ‗commodity fetishism‘ – in Freedgood‘s definition, ‗the 
state of consciousness in which things are abstracted by a money value that is at once 
naturalized and obviously symbolic‘.54 The fetishised commodity, as theorised by 
Marx, is thus a potent reminder of the dual nature of objects (at once figurative and 
literal): a dualism that has become lost in a critical tradition that disregards the literal 
nature of represented objects in favour of an approach that regards the fictionalised 
artefact as a mere metonym. In fact, as Freedgood reminds us, ‗a commodity is both a 
material object and a trope‘:  
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The commodity stands for something that is and is not immediately clear to its 
beholders, but […] [critics] have imagined commodities such that they are 
somehow capable of letting us know that we have turned them into figures: we 
need to literalize them in order to re-figure them, that is we need to re-
materialize them in order to understand their value differently, less abstractly.
55
  
 
Thus, an analysis of the literary representations of material cultures cannot be effective 
if it attempts wholly to sublimate the materiality of the objects represented.  
In its emphasis on the significant materiality of objects in fiction, Freedgood‘s study 
usefully reconciles the literary critic‘s concern for the historically-situated discourses of 
fictional narrative with the historically-situated materialities that constitute the history 
of objects. Any study that seeks to examine the representation of books as significant 
objects in fiction, however, must recognise that, as a ‗readable‘ material artefact, the 
book is perhaps unique in its ‗peculiar status as a material object which [also] carries 
explicit, decodable symbolic information‘: 
 
Although it is true of all material objects recovered by archaeology that they carry a 
symbolic meaning, however mundane, a text is perhaps unique in conveying a 
meaning explicitly by means of language. […] [T]he text‘s unique value lies in its 
ability to ‗speak‘.56 
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Book historians would interject that if, as a relic of its historical moment, the text 
‗speaks‘, it does so not only by means of its written content, but also via the particular 
conditions of that content‘s physical medium which are themselves significant in 
generating meaning. Yet, the book is almost entirely unique in being a linguistic and a 
material text at the same time, which renders it problematic.  
 This has not always been sufficiently recognised when the significance of the 
physical book is under examination. Walter Benjamin, for example, in his celebrated 
essay, ‗Unpacking My Library‘ (1931), argues that the collector‘s relationship with his 
library is one which largely bypasses the books‘ ‗functional, utilitarian value – that is, 
their usefulness‘. Instead, for the collector, the book represents ‗the scene, the stage‘ on 
which the drama of its past history unfolds. For them, each individual book absorbs and 
speaks of the history surrounding it: ‗[t]he period, the region, the craftsmanship, the 
former ownership‘. It is, indeed, the ‗quintessence‘ of that history. So much so that, 
although collectors own their books, they are really only enlightened keepers, ‗the 
physiognomists of the world of objects[,] […] the interpreters of fate‘.57  
This emphasis upon the book collector as the interpreter of a physical form is 
understandable, of course, when one considers that one of the essay‘s aims is to explain 
how interpreting the individuality of each physical book can be a valid exercise in itself 
– that the narrative thus ‗read‘ is often as absorbing as that of the written texts they 
contain and transmit. Indeed, so ‗textual‘ is a book‘s physicality that the ‗non-reading 
of books‘ not only fails to detract from the validity of one‘s status as ‗collector‘, but can 
also be said to be ‗characteristic‘ of that type.58 In fact, Benjamin argues, the collector 
exists in a special relationship to the book as material commodity: the ‗purchasing done 
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by a book collector has very little in common with that done in a bookshop by a student 
getting a textbook, a man of the world buying a present for his lady, or a businessman 
intending to while away his next train journey‘.59  
Yet, Benjamin‘s example of the student and the businessman, each of whom 
wish, first and foremost, to purchase a particular kind of text, emphasises that, for the 
majority of readers the written text is just as important, as a factor in informing their 
purchase, as its physical form – if not more so. What this means is that any ‗idea‘ of the 
book must be seen as a response to a combination of factors concerning not only the 
particular physical status of a given text, but also, as I hope the example of Tess makes 
clear, from the cultural currency of a particular written text (or a particular kind of 
written text, or even ‗the book‘ as a concept) at a given historical moment. Because the 
‗novels‘ to which Tess refers are never enumerated, her reference to them clearly refers 
not to specific works and their specific contents, but only to an ‗idea‘ of those works. 
The fictional book is an ‗idea‘, anchored in books that are actually available to Hardy‘s 
readers (like Moore‘s novels or, indeed, Tess of the D’Urbervilles itself), but also 
recognisably metonymic of contemporary ‗ideas‘ about the ‗purity‘ of young ladies – 
an issue with which those objects are bound up, not only in Hardy‘s novel but also in 
the contemporary debates, which it underscores, about the novel as a textual and a 
material form.  
Gerard Curtis provides an illuminating example of how the book‘s double 
significance as both literary text and physical object – physically linked, but 
conceptually separable – can have consequences for the way in which the book 
functions as an idea in art. In his work on the book as the subject of artistic 
representation in the Victorian period, Curtis examines the ‗Literature‘ biscuit tin, 
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unveiled by Huntley and Palmer in 1901 and taking the shape of a row of books on a 
shelf. Curtis draws an analogy between the consumable, ephemeral quality of the 
biscuits contained in the tin and the words inscribed on the pages of a printed volume. 
He then contrasts the consumable text/biscuit with the tangible, permanent nature of the 
physical book: the solid tin that remains long after the biscuit has been consumed. The 
analogy leads him to conclude that ‗[b]ooks to the Victorians, said something in their 
physical presence that went beyond their content‘: ‗Text is biscuit, but book is tin and 
object: it is the iconoclast‘s hated reliquary, the fetishized device upon which greater 
meaning is conferred than the ―word‖ itself‘.60 The tin represents eight slim volumes 
labelled ‗History of England‘, ‗Pilgrim‘s Progress‘, ‗Burns‘, ‗Pickwick Papers‘, 
‗Robinson Crusoe‘, ‗Gulliver‘s Travels‘, ‗Self Help‘ and ‗Shakespeare‘. All the books 
are the same length – and the fact that the text of Samuel Smiles‘s Self Help (1859) is of 
the same thickness as the complete works of Shakespeare indicates, as Curtis suggests, 
that the two are not meant to represent the texts of Smiles‘s work nor of Shakespeare‘s. 
Rather, they are ‗empty tins‘: as commodified embodiments of ‗Smiles‘ and 
‗Shakespeare‘, they denote the cultural significance of a text but not the texts 
themselves.
61
 In symbolic terms, therefore, the book itself already represents the textual 
content it offers – or, at least, the textual content it is held to offer a particular audience 
within a particular literary-cultural context.  
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Curtis‘s implication is that every book is potentially an ‗empty tin‘, whose 
physical presence stands in for a certain abstracted idea of its contents, making the 
physical book available for artistic representation as an icon of what reading promises 
to facilitate. The collective representation of these works under the banner of 
‗Literature‘ renders the books whose spines appear on the tin simultaneously both a 
reflection of and an implicit comment upon the status of literature in 1901 – or, at least, 
they portray an idea of the literary book dominant enough for the manufacturer to have 
recourse to it. The ‗Shakespeare‘ volume, for example, stands in for an actual volume 
of Shakespeare and the playtexts contained therein, but it also acts as an icon of the 
contemporary cultural currency of those texts as examples of the highest form of 
literature – the text itself is physically absent, but it re-presents itself as that which its 
cultural currency has allowed its physical shell to symbolise. A similar statement could 
be made about the other books represented on the tin: the appearance of Self-Help, for 
instance, evokes an ethical principle, whilst simultaneously anchoring that principle in a 
specific text at a specific time. Smiles‘s work is present only as an abstracted idea of 
itself – an endorsement of self-help (the doctrine) communicable via the material 
presence of Self-Help (the text).  
 The representation of the book in fiction has in common with Curtis‘s biscuit tin 
the fact that it evokes and makes visible a familiar material object, but only by 
presenting that object as a representation of itself. For instance, Tess‘s absent novels 
can only signify within Hardy‘s narrative because of their recognisable situation within 
a wider tradition of books as representational objects, signifying only according to their 
position within a larger cultural discourse. Tess‘s evocation of un-named and un-read 
novels is possible only because of the significance retained by ‗the novel‘ within a 
wider debate concerning the availability of certain kinds of knowledge to certain kinds 
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of individuals. It helps shed light on that debate, even as the position of books within 
such debates helps to illuminate the significance of books in fiction. 
The importance of the book as both a physical and a textual object, as well as 
the way in which both combine to recast the book as an ‗idea‘, can be conveyed by a 
brief comparison of the way in which books feature in Joseph Conrad‘s first novel, 
Almayer’s Folly (1895), and his later Heart of Darkness (1899). In both these novels, 
books become tangible symbols of an ‗imperial‘ idea, which their textual contents fail 
to bear out. At the end of the former novel, the ruined trader, Almayer, returns to his 
office for the last time, intending to put the accoutrements of his failed career to the 
flame. Surveying a collection of old account books, he recalls how he had intended to 
maintain in them ‗day by day a record of his rising fortunes‘, but that ‗for many years 
there has been no record to keep on the blue and red ruled pages‘.62 The books, 
especially, speak of the nature of these broken objects as a decaying mask for the 
flourishing business enterprise they once promised. On the surface, they present a 
complete set of accounts but a glance inside reveals that these physical books have not 
fulfilled their promise. They contain nothing but blank ‗ruled pages‘. Indeed, the fact 
that the paper is ‗ruled‘ enables the absence of text to evoke not only Almayer‘s failure 
successfully to maintain an orderly rule over a trading outpost, but also over his native 
wife and daughter, both of whom have rebelled spectacularly against his attempts to 
exert power over them. The absence of text ensures the books‘ capacity to work as a 
mask not only for the failure of Almayer‘s business acumen, but also of the 
contingencies that render the imperial project one that must be carefully enforced, 
rather than one which arises unchallenged from the infallibility of Western supremacy: 
the ‗ruled‘ text is useless unless it is properly maintained. 
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A similar point might be made regarding the more famous example, in Heart of 
Darkness, of Kurtz‘s report for the International Society for the Suppression of Savage 
Customs, in which the persuasive power of ‗eloquence – of words – of burning noble 
words‘ is belied by the scrawl at the foot of the page:  
 
It was very simple, and at the end of that moving appeal to every altruistic 
sentiment it blazed at you, luminous and terrifying, like a flash of lightning in a 
serene sky: ‗Exterminate all the brutes!‘63 
 
Despite the eloquent mask of altruistic discourse, the startling shift from a moving plea 
for education to a bluntly stated desire to exterminate illustrates the unsuccessful 
suppression of the apparently civilized Kurtz‘s own ‗Savage Customs‘ in the face of 
humanity‘s perennial ‗proximity to a great human passion‘ forever waiting to be ‗let 
loose‘ (Heart of Darkness, 73). Ultimately, the badge of eloquence masks the proximity 
of Kurtz‘s own mission to the ‗savagery‘ it ostensibly resists, laying bare the 
uncomfortable notion that the suppression of savage customs can just as easily translate 
to a frenzied cry for the enforced physical erasure of those who practise them. An 
impulse to silence, to stamp out, which underlies both the eloquent appeal and the 
violent physical action of the imperial project, is used here to link the two.  
Almayer and Kurtz‘s books both serve, in their own ways, to reveal the 
uncomfortable ambiguities and vulnerabilities that lie masked behind the façade not just 
of behaviour, but of the myth of imperial dominance – not only its ability, but also its 
intrinsic right, to perpetuate itself. In Almayer‘s case, the physical books mask the 
absence of the imperial success which their installation (along with the office 
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containing them) was designed to govern. In Kurtz‘s case, on the other hand, it is the 
eloquence demanded of the form in which he writes that serves to mask the savagery 
behind the brutal project it implements. Both passages involve the use of written texts 
as a means of sweeping inconvenient truths beneath the carpet by buying into the ideas 
which the books prop up. In both cases, that ‗idea‘ relies on the ability of certain 
material and literary forms (the office ledger, the societal report) to signify within the 
imperial culture in which they circulate. In exposing the inadequacies of form and 
content, both in their literary and their material dimensions, Conrad‘s novels expose as 
contingent the success of the imperial ‗idea‘, which these texts have evolved to support: 
an idea of the book which depends on its textual contents but which, like Curtis‘s 
empty tin, continues to flourish even when that text has been undermined, or even eaten 
away completely.  
In this way, books are not only legible objects, but objects which, in their 
legibility, can be deployed in order to make a point about the legibility of objects – a 
legibility that links tangible physical things with historically contingent texts. For 
objects, or even people, to be compared to a book is to have their legibility 
simultaneously foregrounded and interrogated. In considering the ‗ideas‘ that accrue to 
the fictional book, it is necessary to recognise the book as an object that speaks 
constantly of its duality as a ‗thing‘ at once physical and textual – an object whose 
physical status is not just significant in itself, but also speaks of the symbolic weight 
which the ‗idea‘ of a particular kind of written text carries, or can be made to carry, 
under specific historical circumstances. This ‗idea‘ of the book – the way in which it is 
not only produced by, but also actively discussed within the period‘s fiction – is 
something I will discuss in relation to a wide range of late-nineteenth-century fictional 
narratives.  
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iii. Moral Furniture: books at the fin de siècle 
The examples of Conrad and Hardy demonstrate some of the ways in which, at the end 
of the nineteenth century, concerns about the changing condition of the book – its form, 
its function, its readers, its writers – intensified and become inextricably bound up with 
other characteristic fin de siècle concerns: the emergence of a new, literate, lower-
middle-class workforce; the rise of the New Woman; fears about human degeneration 
and the contingencies of progress, especially in an imperial context. Anxieties about the 
book join a plethora of isolated topical concerns which, together, were also taken as 
alarming symptoms of a wider fragmentation of the traditional social order – seismic 
cracks in social and national identity that led to fears about the kind of chaos that might 
arise from their destruction.
64
 As Holbrook Jackson argues in his account of the 1890s, 
the period is especially interesting not because it is ‗a ―period of transition‖‘, but 
because its denizens so self-consciously present themselves as the products of a 
transitory age,  ‗convinced that they were passing not only from one social system to 
another, but from one morality to another, and from one religion to a dozen more.‘65 In 
such a context, the circumstances of literary production can be read as one more 
indicator of a deeply felt shift in the nature of socio-political life.  
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Max Nordau‘s Degeneration (1892; English edition, 1895) exemplifies, in its 
most exaggerated form, the kind of all-encompassing fear of annihilation that could 
arise from a perception of the Western world as one in which society, in any 
recognisable manifestation, faced impending dissolution. Nordau announces an 
imminent ‗Dusk of the Nations […] in which all suns and all stars are gradually 
waning, and mankind with all its institutions and creations is perishing in the midst of a 
dying world.‘66 Against this apocalyptic backdrop, Nordau outlines several ‗case 
studies‘, which he identifies as typically fin de siècle – a diagnostic term for those 
individuals and groups characterised by ‗a contempt for traditional views of custom and 
morality… a practical emancipation from traditional discipline, which theoretically is 
still in force‘ (Nordau, 5).  
Nordau exemplifies the fin de siècle at its most pessimistic and hysterical, his 
insistent sense of an ending unwittingly (and ironically) placing his own work as one of 
the most exemplary amongst the pathological paranoia it seeks to denounce. Yet, as 
Peter Keating points out, this pervasive ‗questioning of fundamental beliefs‘, so 
characteristic of the period, could also take on ‗an air of denigration and mockery, a 
determination to reject mid-Victorian values and take a chance on what comes next.‘67 
So it was for Jackson, who felt that this ‗was a time when people went about frankly 
and cheerfully endeavouring to solve the question ―How to Live.‖‘ Nordau was only 
one side of the fin de siècle coin: ‗those who lived through the nineties as young men 
and women will remember that this search for a new mode of life was anything but 
melancholy or diseased‘ (Jackson, 26). 
                                                 
66
 Max Nordau, Degeneration (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), p. 2. Further 
references are to this edition and appear in the body of the text. 
67
 Keating, p. 98. 
 41 
Taken together, Nordau and Jackson‘s conflicting interpretations – the one a 
prophecy of doom, the other a retrospective account of optimistic questing – are linked 
by a shared perception of the era as one characterised by the fragmentation of a 
previously coherent system of values and beliefs, as well as by excited anticipation 
about what might replace them. In this sense, what is ‗fin de siècle‘ about fin de siècle 
debates is not their tendency to define and defend institutions perceived to be on the 
wane, nor simply a distrust of the new. Rather, it is a tendency to speculate about what 
lies beyond the status quo whose dissolution seems certain – an inevitable ringing out 
of the old mirrored by a corresponding uncertainty about what (if anything) will emerge 
to replace it. Nordau fears chaos, whilst Jackson recalls an excited search for ‗a new 
mode of life‘ – but both are equally insistent that ‗one set of institutions and creations‘ 
will soon be replaced by an entirely new one, whose nature is as yet unclear.  
Edmund Gosse‘s ‗The Influence of Democracy on Literature‘ (1894) illustrates 
the way in which discussions of the literary system in the period were, in this sense, 
typically ‗fin de siècle‘. Discussing the libraries‘ monopoly over the novel‘s form and 
content, Gosse describes ‗the disease which we might call Mudieitis, the inflammation 
produced by the fear that what you are inspired to say, and know you ought to say, will 
be unpalatable to the circulating libraries‘ – a condition that holds the author in check, 
forcing his fiction into a particular form. For Gosse, as for Moore, Mudieitis has its 
roots not only in the prudish whims of the librarians themselves, but also in their 
readiness to bow down to the demands of their subscribers – particularly ‗―the wife of a 
country incumbent,‖ that terror before which Messrs. Smith fall prone upon their 
faces‘.68  
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Laurel Brake uses the passage as proof of Gosse‘s ‗fin de siècle disillusion with 
the libraries – in that selectiveness amounts to censorship‘. What makes the problem 
particularly fin de siècle, however, is not the fact of censorship itself – hardly a new 
phenomenon – but the way in which Gosse sees censorship as an instance ‗of the direct 
influence of democracy upon literature, and that of a deleterious kind‘.69 Gosse‘s 
outburst is typically fin de siècle because of the way in which it places a conflict about 
the prevailing literary system at the heart of an increasingly democratic print culture, in 
order to establish the obsolescence of the system that currently governs that culture. In 
the year that the circulating library‘s monopoly on the novel ended, Gosse, in Nordau‘s 
terminology, presents the circulating library as propping up a literary system whose 
‗institutions and creations‘ now resemble the accoutrements of a dying world. He 
demonstrates precisely the ‗contempt for traditional views of custom and morality‘ that 
Nordau fears, and advocates a ‗practical emancipation from traditional discipline, 
which theoretically is still in force.‘  
That Gosse considered the circulating library obsolete by 1894 is hardly 
surprising given the various social and economic factors that would soon spell the end 
of its reign, as well as the dominance of the triple-decker form, which it had upheld. 
Technological improvements in printing techniques and the disbanding of the ‗taxes on 
knowledge‘ meant that the second half of the nineteenth century saw the production of 
cheap printed material becoming both increasingly practical and more economically 
viable. This led to a flood of new books and periodicals – itself arising to meet the 
increasing demand created by the advent of the first generation to benefit from the free, 
compulsory education provided by the Education Acts of 1870, 1880 and 1891.
70
 The 
                                                 
69
 Brake, p. 22. 
70
 A full summary of these Acts can be found at http://www.parliament.uk/about/living-
heritage/transformingsociety/livinglearning/school/overview/1870educationact/ [Accessed: 27
th
 March 
 43 
result was a massive expansion not only in the amount of printed material available, but 
also the kinds of markets that print culture could now reach.  
The rise in literacy rates was dramatic. The 1851 census recorded literacy 
figures of only 67 percent for men and 51 percent for women, but this had increased to 
97.2 percent for men and 96.8 percent for women by 1900.
71
 Admittedly, there is still 
some debate regarding the extent to which such figures can be taken as reliable 
indicators of literacy in the period – as well as the extent to which the Education Acts 
were implemented, and to what effect.
72
 Even so, the vast increase in printed material 
aimed at all levels of reading abilities would seem to suggest the presence of a similarly 
increasing mass of literary consumers. Simon Eliot, in his statistical study of literary 
production in the nineteenth century, provides an idea of the scale of the increase in 
book production: ‗by 1899 books had doubled their annual number of recorded titles in 
twenty-five years, whereas paper production had increased seven-fold in the same 
period‘.73 Richard Altick has also noted that although there remains no concrete reason 
to suppose that the Education Acts led directly to a sharp increase in reading ability, 
they performed important work in maintaining a steady rise in literacy that had been in 
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progress throughout the century, ensuring that basic literacy continued to increase, 
despite a constantly expanding population.
74
  
Not only did the amount of new publications increase, but the variety of 
readerships who consumed them led to a corresponding increase in the variety of forms 
and styles adopted by writers as new works were tailored to suit the increasingly 
diverse demands of an expanding market. As well as the moral question of who should 
be allowed to read which books under what circumstances, concerns were also raised 
regarding the extent to which an increase in the quantity of reading material meant an 
inevitable decrease in quality as writers struggled to produce enough material to meet 
demand. In George Gissing‘s New Grub Street (1891), the increasing dominance of 
market forces on literature traps the idealistic novelist Edwin Reardon in a series of 
artistic compromises, but furnishes his friend, the pragmatic hack Jasper Milvain, with 
a series of lucrative (if aesthetically dubious) opportunities. Through these parallel 
careers, Gissing illustrates fictively the tensions faced by writers in an expanded 
marketplace where the demand for printed material made authorship a viable profession 
only if authors were willing and able to compromise their art in order to produce what 
the market demanded: material of questionable merit written to suit the abilities and 
desires of the ‗quarter-educated‘ products of Forster‘s board schools.75  
Gissing‘s novel, with its pessimistic view of a super-democratised, hyper-
productive literary system, is indicative of the way in which, whatever the true extent of 
literacy in the period, a perceived extension in the numbers and kinds of reading 
experiences available (not to mention the numbers and kinds of people to whom they 
were available) was a source of anxiety at the time. Whatever the historical reality, the 
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growth in print culture had an imaginative currency in the late nineteenth century and 
was frequently the topic of intense debate and commentary. Thomas Wright, for 
example, was in no doubt not only of the very real effects of Forster‘s act, but also of its 
insidious nature: 
 
The extension of elementary education […] if left to its single self, will give us 
a larger number of the people able to read the police intelligence of the lower 
types of weekly newspapers, and willing to read little else.
76
  
 
Wright‘s fears echo Nordau‘s premonitions of inexorable decline: without an 
intermediary to enforce an objective control on literary quality, the marketplace will be 
saturated with trash, produced for the benefit of a new, barely literate public unable and 
unwilling to cope with anything more taxing. Joseph Ackland‘s ‗Elementary Education 
and the Decay of Literature‘ (1894), continued in the same vain. As Mary Hammond 
explains, both are symptomatic of a period in which the dominant view was that 
‗compulsory elementary education fitted the populace only to purchase and swallow 
whatever literature was thrown at them, rather than to discern the good from the bad‘.77 
Higher literacy rates meant that print in general was becoming an increasingly viable 
commodity, but it also meant that the production, distribution and consumption of 
printed material was becoming increasingly democratised. Clearly, such mass-
consumption could not ‗be left to its single self‘ if any notion of books as vehicles of 
objective moral and aesthetic value was to survive.  
The ‗problem‘ of the book in the period is comparable to a theory about the 
status of mass-produced objects offered by Jean Baudrillard in The System of Objects 
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(1968). Baudrillard suggests that when technological developments allow the 
production of many copies of the same object on a grand scale, the resultant object is 
‗liberated in its function‘. For example, he argues that ‗serially-produced‘ furniture, 
precisely in being more widely available, has lost the ‗expressive power of the old 
symbolic order‘.78 This rejection of distinctive designs in favour of a uniform 
functionality has the effect of ensuring that the object is more easily mobile and more 
adaptable to personal space. The individual is no longer defined through their 
possessions and is totally in control of how their use is to be conceived: 
 
The[ir] function is no longer obscured by the moral theatricality of the old 
furniture; it is emancipated now from ritual, from ceremonial, from the entire 
ideology which used to make our surroundings into an opaque mirror of a 
reified human structure.
79
  
 
To sweep away the old forms is to sweep away the stagnant ideologies linked to those 
forms and the practices associated with them. At the end of the nineteenth century, the 
book was one such object, which enabled the morals and values of its readers to be 
policed and upheld through a careful control of the practices associated with its 
production, distribution and consumption. As such safeguards began to break down, 
commentators like Wright demanded that new ones be instated – that reading should 
not be allowed to continue unchecked. The debate surrounding the triple-decker and the 
effect of its formal and moral constraints not only upon those who did read but also on 
those who, like Tess, conspicuously did not, was thus exacerbated at the end of the 
nineteenth century by developments in the ways in which fiction was produced, how it 
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was consumed and by whom. The effect of this on the novel has already been discussed 
at length, but an example of the book (a physical commodity of which the novel is only 
one manifestation) as the furniture of a dominant morality can be found in Vanity Fair 
(1847-48).  
In Thackeray‘s novel, George Osborne senior is accustomed to retire after 
dinner to ‗the usual apartment which went in his house by the name of the study; and 
was sacred to the master of the house‘. From this sacred den, Osborne runs the house. 
Here wages are paid, allowances distributed and discipline meted out when required. It 
is the seat of paternal command, the centre of power from whence the institution of 
Victorian patriarchy is maintained. Behind the seat of power (quite literally) lies a 
‗couple of glazed bookcases, containing standard works in stout gilt bindings‘: 
 
The Annual Register, the Gentleman’s Magazine, Blair‘s Sermons, and Hume 
and Smollett. From year‘s end to year‘s end he never took one of these volumes 
from the shelf; but there was no member of the family that would dare for his 
life to touch one of these books, except upon those rare Sunday evenings when 
there was no dinner party and when the great scarlet Bible and Prayer-book 
were taken out from the corner where they stood beside his copy of the Peerage, 
and the servants being rung up to the dining parlour, Osborne read the evening 
service to his family in a loud grating pompous voice.
80
 
 
The extract illustrates the way in which books, as objects, could operate as props in a 
‗moral theatricality‘, maintaining the moral order by being so crucial a part of the 
theatricality through which it operates. Osborne‘s books are furniture. Not to be used, 
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they are physical symbols of authority. On the only occasion when they are read, they 
are used as apparatus in the supplanting of one ritual (the evening meal) with another 
(the weekly sermon): props in a socialised rite combining the institutional power of 
both the patriarch and the church.  
 Nor is this the only occasion in the novel when books are equated with a social 
function. Of Lady Jane Briggs we are told that her mother ‗ordered her dresses, her 
books, her bonnets, and her ideas for her‘ (Thackeray, 412). This notion of print as 
vehicles of knowledge, access to which could be carefully controlled, is also reflected 
in Mrs Briggs‘s obsessive distribution of religious tracts as a species of medicine for 
the soul. Although savagely satirised by Thackeray, this evangelical zeal for the 
propagation of specific kinds of beneficial knowledge, and the use of books and reading 
as the props that govern family rituals reflects a world in which printed materials exist 
to control not only access to knowledge, but also to ensure the survival of the socio-
political institutions that carefully control its creation and distribution. 
 In his seminal study of the growth of the reading public in the nineteenth 
century, Altick bears out this conceptual link between books and knowledge, as well as 
its socio-political consequences. Tracing the link to the predominance, in the first half 
of the century, of evangelical and utilitarian ideas of education, Altick argues that both 
movements worked towards the expansion of literacy because each ‗had its special 
brand of Truth to disseminate through print‘.81 While evangelicals aimed ‗to point the 
way to the kingdom of God‘, utilitarians worked ‗to insure the greater glory of the 
workshop of the world‘.82 For both groups, however, reading was an essential form of 
education only insofar as it remained fundamentally an improving activity, facilitating 
the dissemination of specific knowledge for specific ends. Recalling the empirical 
                                                 
81
 Altick, p. 131. 
82
 Ibid. p. 132. 
 49 
preoccupations of Dickens‘s Gradgrind, Altick notes the utilitarian notion of reading as 
primarily the means by which could be disseminated ‗the good, solid, employable facts 
of mechanics and chemistry, metallurgy and hydraulics – facts that could be applied in 
the workshop and on the railway line, to produce goods more cheaply and efficiently, to 
communicate and transport more swiftly‘.83 
 So widespread was the association of books with the accumulation of 
knowledge that, in 1867, the educationalist W.B. Hodgson felt compelled to speak out 
against the ‗radical fallacy‘ of ‗supposing that no knowledge or improvement is 
obtainable except from books‘. For Hodgson, this had led to an overemphasis on 
literacy in education, due to ‗a confounding of means with ends‘. In fact, he argued, 
reading and writing ‗are no more knowledge or education […] than a knife, fork and 
plate constitute a dinner‘.84 On the other hand, David Vincent has described the way in 
which newly literate working class readers‘ first encounter with ‗book knowledge‘ 
often resembled ‗a secularised conversion experience‘.85 Vincent‘s examples, together 
with the steady rise of literacy throughout the nineteenth century, show that the idea of 
literacy as a key allowing access to the knowledge locked inside books was highly 
valued, not only by officials concerned with the expansion and regulation of elementary 
education, but also by those working-class readers to whom access to book knowledge 
represented a valuable opportunity to ‗better themselves‘.  
 What Vanity Fair demonstrates is that, while the evangelical trope that linked 
books with the ability to accumulate knowledge may have had a beneficial effect upon 
those newly-literate individuals who suddenly gained access to such a treasure-house, it 
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was precisely the idea that books already reflected the nature of the world, stentoriously 
and implacably bound in gilt covers on the gentleman‘s shelf or read aloud from the 
pulpit, that also allowed books to work as the social apparatus they become in the hands 
of Mr Osborne and Mrs Briggs. If reading allowed working-class people to ‗better‘ 
themselves via the accumulation of knowledge about the world, then careful 
surveillance could also ensure that the nature of the world to which it granted access 
could be rigorously controlled – precisely because books were held to reflect the world 
as straightforwardly as a mirror reflects a room. 
 The ease (one might almost say the complacency) with which John Ruskin is 
able to offer a definition of a ‗true book‘ is a case in point. Distinguishing between ‗the 
books of the hour, and the books of all time‘, Ruskin shares with later commentators 
the perception that the ephemeral ‗books of the hour‘ are the ‗peculiar possession‘ of an 
age in which ‗education becomes more general‘.86 Such a point is also made in 
Gissing‘s New Grub Street, where Milvain‘s devotion to churning out ephemera for 
consumption by the ‗quarter-educated‘ readers of the new journalism is in stark contrast 
to Reardon‘s devotion to the great novel of permanent worth, which he strives to write, 
only to be constantly foiled by the need to raise money by turning to lesser literary 
pursuits. In Gissing‘s novel, the books of the hour threaten the author‘s ability to 
produce books for all time. In Ruskin, however, there is little anxiety attached to the 
existence of such books – and the differentiation is not, primarily, one of intrinsic merit. 
Rather, the distinction is one of lasting value. Light reading has its place, but we make 
the worst possible use of it if we allow it ‗to usurp the place of the true book‘ (Ruskin, 
31). 
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 Ruskin‘s ability to find unproblematic the increasing number of new printed 
materials resulting from the spread of education rests, however, on an ability to 
delineate without much difficulty a ‗true book‘ to which these ephemera are the 
harmless counterpart. For books of the hour ‗are not books at all, merely letters or 
newspapers in good print‘. Conversely, ‗true‘ books offer a perspective on truths that 
transcend the historical moment of the writing in which it is expressed, a book being 
‗essentially not a talked thing, but a written thing; and written, not with a view of mere 
communication, but of permanence‘: ‗The author has something to say which he 
perceives to be true and useful, or helpfully beautiful. […] He would fain set it down 
for ever; engrave it on rock, if he could; saying, ―This is the best of me[‖]‘ (Ruskin, 31-
2). Books for all time are ‗true‘ books because not only will they always remain true, 
but that truth will always be legible to those educated enough to be able to get at the 
author‘s meaning, rather than simply imposing theirs in its place (Ruskin, 35). 
Subjectivity is banished from a reading act that is likened to the excavation of metal ore 
from a rock: ‗the metal you are in search of being the author‘s mind or meaning, the 
words are as the rock which you have to crush and smelt in order to get at it‘ (Ruskin, 
36). In Ruskin‘s formulation, right reading is not interpretation but recognition because 
textual meaning is intrinsic, permanent, durable and detectable – even at the level of 
language itself, since words retain ‗a deep vital meaning, which all good scholars feel in 
employing them‘ (Ruskin, 41).   
Ruskin‘s idea of the ‗true book‘ as one that preserves unfluctuating verities, 
accessible to anyone with the right training, is a concept echoed in Matthew Arnold‘s 
dictum that criticism embodies an attempt to ‗see the object as in itself it really is‘.87 
                                                 
87
 Matthew Arnold, ‗The Function of Criticism at the Present Time‘, Essays in Criticism: First and 
Second Series (London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1964), p. 9. Further references are to this edition and appear 
in the body of the text. 
 52 
This is the central tenet of Arnold‘s ‗The Function of Criticism at the Present Time‘ 
(1864). In the same essay, he argues that the poet ‗ought to know life and the world 
before dealing with them in poetry‘, but finds that the best way to go about such a task 
is to ‗read more books‘ (Arnold, 12-13). For Arnold, as for Ruskin, reading is the key 
to the most useful knowledge and to the best and most durable human values. The idea 
that the best books reflect truths that are directly apprehendable in life empowers that 
statement: they are able confidently to assert the best books‘ ability to enshrine the best 
values precisely because of a naïve belief that the ‗best‘ values are as directly 
apprehendable in life as they are in the best books. 
The evangelical zeal displayed by Vanity Fair‘s Mrs Briggs can be traced back 
to sixteenth-century Protestant reformers who placed such importance on a personal 
understanding of religion through an ability to read the Bible for oneself. As John 
Feather points out, however, ‗it was not until the creation of the industrial cities brought 
together a potentially dangerous mass of illiterates that the middle classes responded 
with their full force to the need to educate the poor‘.88 Cheap Repository Tracts started 
being published under Hannah More's stewardship of the Religious Tract Society 
during the Revolutionary period, and ‗were sold largely to the middle classes who gave 
them to the poor‘.89 There was also a secular dimension to these educational initiatives. 
1827 saw the founding, by Henry Brougham, of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful 
Knowledge, which produced the Library of Useful Knowledge in fortnightly parts at 6d 
each. Charles Knight was its editor and he also began producing, from 1829, a Library 
of Entertaining Knowledge. The names of these dual initiatives are telling, enacting as 
they do a taxonomisation of texts as either ‗entertaining‘ or ‗useful‘. 
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The sheer quantity of books and potential readers at the end of the century, 
however, and the variety of forms which reading took, ensured that the optimism that 
sometimes attached itself to the spread of literacy had become severely strained by the 
end of the Victorian period. In his preface to the 1882 edition of Sesame and Lilies, 
Ruskin wrote: ‗it much matters that the young reader of the following essays should be 
confirmed in the assurance […] that there is such a thing as essential good, and as 
essential evil, in books, in art, and in character; that this essential goodness and badness 
are independent of epochs, fashions, opinions, or revolutions‘ (Ruskin, 10). Such an 
emphatic reiteration of the assumptions underlying Sesame and Lilies was necessary, 
because the idea of ‗essential good‘ and ‗essential evil‘ – or, at least, the triumph of the 
former over the latter – seemed, by the later nineteenth century, to be everywhere 
challenged, not least upon the very site that Ruskin had put forward as the ultimate 
bastion for their continual rediscovery: the book.  
Of course, at the end of the century, we still find even the most radical writers 
upholding the conjunction between books and a totalising knowledge about the world, 
even when they offer challenges to other aspects of social life. Indeed, the conjunction 
between books and knowledge in the late nineteenth century is so widespread that to list 
the various appearances and variations of the paradigm as it is reflected in fiction 
would, in itself, fill several volumes. Tess is one obvious example of how the idea of 
the book as a knowledge-giving tool is reflected in fiction. The role played by books in 
imagined future societies is another. In William Morris‘s News From Nowhere (1890), 
for example, it is through an avid reading of its literature that the denizens of a future 
socialist utopia gain knowledge of the nineteenth century and its affairs. The narrator‘s 
companion, Dick, is able to conduct a discussion with the Victorian narrator on the 
long-since defunct institution of the prison as it existed in the 1800s because, he 
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explains, ‗there are good books on that period […] some of which I have read‘. The 
narrator complains that it is unfair of Dick to chastise the Victorians for tolerating the 
cruel conditions endured by prisoners because ‗perhaps […] they did not know what the 
prisons were like‘. His companion retorts that such ignorance is no excuse; after all, he 
argues, ‗you and I know it all these years afterwards‘.90  
H.G. Wells‘s Time Traveller makes the same point in a rather more pessimistic 
manner when he discovers a ruined museum at the heart of a similarly ruined future 
civilization. Previously, he has suspected the temporally distant land to which he has 
journeyed to contain only the savage Morlocks and the degenerate Eloi on whom they 
feast. Given the ‗intellectual degradation‘ of these creatures, he is surprised when an 
investigation of an enormous palace of green porcelain reveals the edifice to be ‗the 
ruins of some latter-day South Kensington‘.91 Realising that the fossil collection he has 
been examining is merely a small part of an even greater display of accumulated 
artefacts, he speculates excitedly: ‗this palace of Green Porcelain had a great deal more 
in it than a Gallery of Palaeontology; possibly historical galleries; it might be, even a 
library!‘ (Wells, Time Machine, 68) The Time Traveller‘s thrill at the possibility of a 
library echoes Morris‘s (not unreasonable) point about the ability of future societies to 
learn about past societies by reading the books they wrote about themselves. By finding 
a future library, the Time Traveller might learn something of the events that have led to 
the world becoming the arid wasteland it now is. At the same time, the dilapidated state 
of the building, a ruined repository of knowledge at the heart of world of ‗intellectual 
degradation‘ is a dramatic portrayal of what happens when humanity ceases to read. As 
with Tess, so with mankind: the absence of books is the absence of knowledge, and the 
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result of that absence is potential degradation. Moreover, the reverse is also implied: 
not only that books contain an essential core of ‗knowledge‘ to which reading gives 
access, but also that the accumulation of knowledge is, on its own, essentially 
progressive. 
As Feather points out, once acquired, ‗the use of literacy could not be 
controlled‘ and mass-education began to seem, in some quarters, less attractive in 
practice than, earlier in the century, it had done in theory.
92
 John Feather points out that 
the Religious Tract Society, for example, had  
 
demonstrated the existence of a vast potential market, and of the financial 
rewards to be reaped from it. The lesson was not lost on publishers whose 
interests were far from the high-flown moral principles of [Hannah] More.
93
 
 
The problem, however, is not the act of reading itself. Even those who, like Wright and 
Gissing, worried about the detrimental effect of an ill-educated mass-readership upon 
the quality of literature – and, conversely, the effect of low-quality literature upon the 
ill-educated mass-readership – only attack the quality of the education and the 
literature. Very rarely does one encounter a suggestion that education is in itself a bad 
thing – rather, the debate concerns itself with the nature and extent of that education. 
After all, an exponential increase in book production and the emergence of new 
readerships, as well as the accompanying concerns, were not new phenomena – they 
had already been a feature of the literary landscape since the mid-eighteenth century. 
As David Vincent explains, the ‗transformation in the availability of the printed word‘, 
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which began during the later decades of the eighteenth century, ‗owed more to a 
revolution in demand than supply‘: 
 
By the 1790s, the publication of new book titles was running at four times the 
level of the beginning of the century, and during the first half of the nineteenth 
century it was to increase by a further 600 per cent to reach 2,500 a year by 
1853[...]
94
  
 
Moreover, concerns about the nature of the novel form, such as those I have illustrated 
with reference to Tess, were as old as the novel itself. Indeed, almost exactly the same 
concerns about how candid fiction should be when addressing women and young 
people are to be found in Samuel Johnson‘s discussion of realism in the novel, which 
appeared in The Rambler more than a century before.
95
 More recently, at mid-century, 
Hardy‘s own point about the very real benefits that candid fiction might have for the 
purity of female readers finds a pre-echo in Anne Brontë‘s preface to The Tenant of 
Wildfell Hall (1848).
96
 Other debates about the moral and aesthetic merits of certain 
fictional forms and genres throughout the century have also been well documented.
97
  
                                                 
94
 Vincent, p. 11. 
95
 Samuel Johnson, The Rambler, No. 4, 31
st
 March 1750 [The New Realistic Novel] in Samuel Johnson: 
The Major Works, ed. Donald Greene (OUP, 2000), pp. 175-79. For a full discussion of concerns about 
books and reading in an eighteenth-century context, see Pearson, Women’s Reading in Britain. Space 
does not permit an extensive comparative study, but for an ‗idea of the book‘ in the late eighteenth 
century, as well as the first half of the nineteenth, see the essays in Bookish Histories: Book, Literature 
and Commercial Modernity, 1700-1900, ed. Ina Ferris and Paul Keen (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009). Despite the title, the books‘ essays cover issues governing print culture comprehensively only to 
the mid-Victorian period. 
96
 Defending the novel‘s candour in her preface to its second edition, Brontë, prefiguring Tess‘s outburst, 
writes: ‗O Reader! if there were less of this delicate concealment of facts […] there would be less of sin 
and misery to the young of both sexes who are left to wring their bitter knowledge from experience.‘ 
(Anne Brontë, The Tenant of Wildfell Hall [London: Penguin, 1996], p. 4).  
97
 The debate, in the 1860s, regarding the sensation novel, is a case in point. See Wynne, Sensation 
Fiction. 
 57 
Nevertheless, as Mary Hammond has noted, the last two decades of the century 
marked a new zenith in debates about the impact of the material form of the book, as 
well as the conditions in which it was read and by whom, as new printing techniques 
enabled ‗the rapid production of millions of copies in a variety of formats to suit almost 
every pocket‘. But printing was just one part of a network of new technologies that 
combined to create new conditions, not only of book-production, but also of 
consumption: 
 
New networks of communications (including newspapers and periodicals) 
ensured that potential customers knew about the work in advance and were able 
to discuss it afterwards. New social spaces enabled purchasers to read, and be 
seen to read, their new acquisitions. New markets opened up, encouraging the 
spread of new forms of literature.
98
 
 
The net result, it appeared to many, was unfettered, chaotic competition on an 
unprecedented scale.  
Thackeray‘s Mr Osborne uses his books, like a latter-day Prospero, to control 
his own environment ritually by making both the physical and textual book so much a 
part of his household‘s socio-political furniture. Eighty years later, an increasingly 
democratic print culture meant an exponentially larger number of printed books were 
available as objects through which a correspondingly broad array of readers could not 
only read about, but also announce their allegiance to, a correspondingly vast 
firmament of socio-political causes and ideas. The evangelical past, the mass-educated 
present and the imagined future of News From Nowhere are linked by a shared 
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assumption that in books lie the key to education and improvement. But if books were 
still linked with knowledge, the ‗truth‘ that Ruskin had no difficulty in attributing to 
them had become dangerously eroded in a world where, as Hammond puts it, ‗[w]hat a 
given book ―meant‖ in culture […] had new definitions, sometimes many of them, and 
sometimes simultaneously‘.99 
An increased readership meant an increasing proliferation of forms, styles and 
genres all of which combined to transform any idea of the book as the harbinger of 
social, religious or political ‗truth‘ into a bewildering array of conflicting truths, 
reflecting a similarly bewildering array of readers. But, as the example of Tess implies, 
it was not just the effect of this readership on the nature of the book that proved 
controversial in such an atmosphere, but the effect of the book‘s increasingly protean 
form upon a similarly protean mass-readership – a readership that stood as both the 
cause and the symptom of the book‘s increasingly diverse nature. Hammond finds, for 
example, ‗an intimate relationship between the ways and the formats in which a given 
work reached its reader, and the way that reader was constructed – or self-constructed – 
socially and psychologically‘: 
 
By the 1890s we frequently see a construction that figures the modern human as 
some sort of hybrid, a ‗child of the newspapers‘, the spawn of the unnatural 
mating of man and mass-produced literature.
100
 
 
This metaphor of hybridity becomes all the more troubling in the case of the debate 
surrounding the ‗corrupting‘ effect of fictional candour on young women, in which the 
imagined loss of purity projected onto young readers by concerned librarians, parents 
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and critics constructs the reading experience itself as tantamount to rape in its ability to 
bring about an unlooked for sexual experience – and, incidentally, implies a troubling 
capacity on the part of the debate‘s participants to equate rape with ‗sexual corruption‘. 
If debates such as the one surrounding reading and female ‗purity‘ indicates a 
perception that literature is construed as ‗carrying the sometimes exploitative, 
incalculable and runaway, but sometimes sweepingly beneficial effects of modernity 
into the reading subject‘, then such a transference is the result not only of the text itself 
but also of ‗the new places and the new ways in which it is being read‘.101 Literature 
was consumed ‗on trains and buses and in the city streets‘ as well as privately at home: 
 
Literature was in the public domain in myriad new ways and myriad new places. 
Each of these – precisely because of the social fluidity that it potentially enabled 
– was discussed, worried over, legislated and catered for in a unique manner and 
at a unique rate, and that meant the cultural meanings attached to each of these 
reading venues were very different.
102
 
 
Baudrillard‘s question regarding the difficulties of categorising everyday objects when 
mass-production exponentially increases the use, presence and availability of those 
objects for an ever-increasing number of different people is, therefore, one which late-
Victorian commentators on the book were also asking themselves: ‗How can we hope 
to classify a world of objects that changes before our eyes and arrive at an adequate 
system of description?‘103  
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 As Hammond has implied, the ‗moral theatricality‘ of the old institutions had 
been replaced with an array of new opportunities for self-expression in an increasingly 
fragmented modernity. This is as true for the book in the period as it is for gender roles, 
the health of the empire and, in aesthetics, the artistic integrity of new literary forms 
and genres in which these concerns were dramatised and explored. If, for Ruskin, the 
erosion of the ‗true‘ book at the fin de siècle meant that the end of the century heralded 
fin du livre, it is a measure of that era‘s concern for the book that Wells was able to 
provide an example of fin du livre in action as a symptom of a catastrophic fin du globe. 
In an era characterised by anxieties about fragmenting cultural institutions, it 
would be foolish to posit one over-arching ‗idea‘ of the book emerging coherently from 
the disparate works of such a diverse array of authors. What connects the authors 
discussed in this thesis (Oscar Wilde, Robert Louis Stevenson, M.R. James and E.M. 
Forster) is a preoccupation with the relationship between world and word – the ability 
of the written word to refract ideas and experiences it purports accurately to reflect. In 
fact, Wilde, Stevenson, James and Forster are linked by precisely the way in which 
their works reject one idea of ‗the book‘ in favour of a more subjective collection of 
intertexts and personal inflections, which becomes, in their work, precisely what 
characterises reading as an experience. Books become the site, in their fiction, not of a 
Ruskinian ‗excavation‘ of meaning, but a dialogic encounter in which the concerns of 
the individual reading subject always inflect the meanings they only allegedly 
‗excavate‘.  
The first chapter examines Oscar Wilde‘s anxious consideration of the 
damaging effects that obtain when texts are viewed as transparent expressions of truths 
by and about their authors. For Wilde, such a tendency is prevalent in the treatment of 
Keats‘s letters by biographers and those who purchase the dead writer‘s love letters. 
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Suggesting that contemporary reviews of his posthumous De Profundis (1905) proved 
such fears to be well founded, I argue that Wilde‘s play The Importance of Being 
Earnest (1895) foreshadows these responses in its presentation of a ridiculous and 
alarming world in which books serve as instruments with which individual subjects can 
be robbed of their autonomy. I provide a Foucauldian reading of the play, and argue 
that, within the narrative of the play, notebooks, novels and reference works have a 
panoptic effect, enshrining the parameters for an examination to which the play‘s older 
characters constantly and forcibly submit the younger protagonists. Having examined 
the consequences of such a reading for the situation of the book within Wilde‘s 
aesthetic and political writings, however, I argue that the play ultimately coheres with 
the radical ethos of Wilde‘s essays. Both suggest that the individual can bypass the 
book‘s panoptic surveillance by viewing identity itself as a self-authored text, rather 
than as an already-socialised essence. Earnest dramatises such an idea, establishing a 
dichotomy between the literal swapping of one character for a three-volume novel and 
another character‘s determination to believe in the validity of her own self-authored 
(and entirely fictional) diary. This dichotomy establishes identity as a fiction, 
differentiating not between the real and the imaginary, but between self-authored 
identities and those which society inscribes upon its subjects. I end by comparing 
Wilde‘s play with Henry James‘s novel The Ambassadors (1903), arguing that both 
share an affinity in championing the imbrication of art and the self as a method of 
retaining personal autonomy within an expanding commodity culture. 
The second chapter analyses the metafictional dimensions of Robert Louis 
Stevenson‘s adventure fiction. In his essays, Stevenson vehemently insists on popular 
appeal as, for the professional author, a valid measure of aesthetic success. However, 
the implicit endorsement of generic convention that underpins such an idea contradicts 
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Stevenson‘s ethical writings, which deplore, just as vehemently, the social and moral 
conventions to which young people are made to adhere. Through a reading of 
Stevenson‘s Treasure Island (1881-82) and The Black Arrow (1883) as serials in Young 
Folks magazine, I analyse the metafictional strategies taken by Stevenson to mitigate 
the anxiety of influence expressed in his ethical writings. I will argue that not only did 
Stevenson see adventure fiction as ethically valid only when its adherence to generic 
convention was sufficiently signalled within the text, but that the strategies involved 
were also materially necessary – designed to alert purchasers of the text in volume form 
to precisely the kind of commodity they could expect for their money.  
The thesis closes with a consideration of the writings of M.R. James and E.M. 
Forster, arguing that both authors use books to signal an epistemological crisis 
underpinning didactic and auto-didactic reading practices at the turn of the twentieth 
century. The academic protagonists of James‘s stories share with Forster‘s middle-class 
suburbanites a Ruskinian tendency to view books as the vehicle for written texts that 
enshrine (ready for readerly ‗excavation‘) unfluctuating socio-political and cultural 
knowledge. Both writers depict readers whose understanding of the texts they consume 
is catastrophically, even tragically hindered by their obtuse elision of their own role, as 
readers, in composing the textual ‗message‘ of that which they read. Yet what, for 
James, concerns predominantly a question of antiquarian methodology becomes, for 
Forster, a question of political engagement. Howards End (1910), ‗The Celestial 
Omnibus‘ (1908) and A Room with a View (1908) all feature readers whose inability to 
acknowledge the significant specificity of their individual identities as readers – their 
gender, class and sexual orientation – in the creation of textual meaning threatens to 
uphold those identities as damagingly ‗other‘ to the socio-political context in which 
their reading act takes place. These readers‘ refusal to read against the grain threatens to 
 63 
facilitate their continual subservience to the dominant ideologies that give rise not only 
to the texts they read, but also to the ways in which they read them. 
As politically charged discussions of reading at the turn of the twentieth 
century, Forster‘s fictions, like James‘s, present books as symbolic sites of contested 
textual meaning. Like all the authors discussed in the following chapters, their fiction 
formulates the book as an object the dominant ‗ideas‘ of which are inescapably aligned 
with the irreconcilable cultural, social and political conflicts that underlie both the 
reading and writing of texts. All of these authors use fictional depictions of books and 
reading to formulate a response to the perceived breakdown of epistemological 
certainties in a protean, exponentially-expanding print culture. Ultimately, their fictions 
present books not as texts that automatically succeed in enshrining dominant ideas, but 
as sites upon which ‗ideas‘ – the product of a dynamic interaction between text and 
reader – are continually shaped and reshaped as they circulate within the ideologically-
charged materiality of a particular historical moment. 
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Chapter 1 
No Purchase Necessary: Books and Ownership in the Writings of Oscar Wilde 
 
These are the letters which Endymion wrote 
To one he loved in secret, and apart. 
And now the brawlers of the auction mart 
Bargain and bid for each poor blotted note, 
Ay! for each separate pulse of passion quote 
The merchant's price. I think they love not art 
Who break the crystal of a poet's heart 
That small and sickly eyes may glare and gloat. 
 
Is it not said that many years ago, 
In a far Eastern town, some soldiers ran 
With torches through the midnight, and began 
To wrangle for mean raiment, and to throw 
Dice for the garments of a wretched man, 
Not knowing the God's wonder, or His woe?
104
 
 
i. The critic as artist, the biographer as tyrant 
In an intertext borrowed from Keats himself, the first line of Oscar Wilde‘s sonnet ‗On 
the Recent Sale by Auction of Keats‘s Love Letters‘ (1886) recasts the dead poet in the 
guise of the mythical ‗Endymion‘, whose curse is to be consigned to eternal slumber, 
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whilst at the same time remaining young and beautiful. The implications of using this 
name from mythology to refer to the dead Keats are manifold. It transforms the author 
into a symbol of eternal beauty that remains, as in the opening words of Keats‘s poem 
Endymion, ‗a joy forever‘. Unchanging, the figure of the dead writer becomes conflated 
with the literary legacy of the works he has left behind. To view him through the filter 
of mythological precedent at once elides biographical details and renders the historical 
Keats voiceless – as an eternal slumber is bound to do. Endymion becomes a façade for 
an inevitably silenced poet, whose life and personality are supplanted by a literary 
legacy the beauty of which speaks not only for itself but also for the poet it replaces.  
This elision of the author‘s proper name constitutes a refusal to recognise the 
poet as a historical entity and a decision to focus instead upon the writing that remains. 
It invites a reading of the sonnet alongside Michel Foucault‘s essay, ‗What is an 
Author?‘ (1970). In that essay, Foucault argues that texts present their authors not as 
real historical personages pre-dating the works ascribed to them, but rather as a function 
within discourse. This works in conjunction with a Foucauldian idea of writing as ‗a 
space into which the writing subject constantly disappears‘ – and from which he is 
perpetually reconstructed.
105
 The substitution in the sonnet‘s first line similarly 
emphasises that the historical Keats is, in every sense, no longer with us. To speak of 
Keats‘s letters as those which ‗Endymion wrote‘ is to underline the historical Keats‘s 
absence. 
Such a distinction (between the mythical façade of ‗Endymion‘ and the 
historical reality of ‗Keats‘) recalls Foucault‘s insistence that the links ‗between the 
proper name and the individual named and between the author‘s name and what it 
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names […] do not function in the same way‘. The author‘s name, he argues, ‗performs 
a certain role with regard to narrative discourse, […] [permitting] one to group together 
a certain number of texts, define them, differentiate them from and contrast them to 
others‘: 
 
[T]he author‘s name, unlike other proper names, does not pass from the interior of a 
discourse to the real and exterior individual who produced it; instead, the name 
seems always to be present, marking off the edges of the text, revealing, or at least 
characterizing, its mode of being. […] As a result, we could say that in a civilization 
like our own there are a certain number of discourses that are endowed with the 
‗author function‘, while others are deprived of it. A private letter may well have a 
signer – it does not have an author […]106  
 
In Wilde‘s sonnet, the situation is different, because a name other than the author‘s is 
nevertheless employed to refer to the authorship of certain letters which, we know from 
the poem‘s title, Keats wrote. In fact, while Wilde‘s speaker seems to adhere to 
Foucault‘s recognition of ‗the author‘ as a function in discourse that ‗marks off‘ a 
particular corpus of texts, his marking off is more inclusive than Foucault‘s, taking in 
not only the poetical works, but also the letters – all are ‗Endymion‘s‘ and all are 
marked by the exquisite beauty of the mythical youth whose name is adopted to refer to 
that corpus. If the author can be defined as the function by which a certain corpus of 
works is taxonomised, its edges ‗marked off‘, then the sonnet‘s refusal to name Keats 
as the writer of the letters also marks off a different, more inclusive idea of the ‗author 
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function‘ than the one theorised by Foucault – it speaks of a refusal to ‗mark off‘ the 
corpus in certain ways.  
The association of ‗Endymic‘ beauty with ‗poor blotted note[s]‘ demonstrates, 
therefore, the speaker‘s willingness to bring the letters into an arena in which they 
might (like Keats‘s poems) be considered incipient artworks of similarly enduring 
beauty. Yet, the sonnet also points to an act of ‗marking off‘ on the part of the auction 
attendees, which is in opposition to the speaker‘s own inclusive recognition of the 
letters as part of the body of Endymion‘s ‗work‘. Seeing the advent of Keats‘s letters in 
the public domain as an excuse to turn from ‗art‘ to ‗glare and gloat‘ at the figure of the 
author, the ‗brawlers of the auction mart‘ unconsciously and unthinkingly equate the 
letters with an historical Keats whom, they imagine, these writings will reveal. For the 
‗brawlers‘, it is Keats himself whom the letters define or ‗mark off‘ from an art they 
‗love not‘. The comparison with Christ is especially resonant here. Neither Christ nor 
Keats are, in this poem, mentioned by name; both are absent centres whose meanings 
are generated by the ‗wonders‘ and ‗woes‘ of which they are the authors, but which also 
retain an autonomy beyond their origin in one individual. The ‗brawlers‘, however, 
ignore the enduring beauty of that which these figures have done in favour of a focus on 
the physical relics of their existence as historical personages – turning not to Christ‘s 
genius, but to his ‗mean raiment‘, not to the beauty of Keats‘s poetry, but to what his 
‗poor blotted notes‘ might reveal about the human being that wrote them.  
Like Foucault, Wilde‘s speaker sees the ability to ascribe an author function as a 
sinister one, whose insistent tracing of textual meaning back to the figure of an author 
from whence it originally derives facilitates a means of surveillance – a means to ‗glare 
and gloat‘ not only at the writing itself but at the author whom it allegedly expresses 
definitively in discourse. By this means, the ‗ascription of discourse to an individual‘ 
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becomes a way of classifying not just texts, but also the individual named as their 
author, who becomes ‗a projection […] of the operations that we force texts to undergo, 
the connections that we make, the traits that we establish as pertinent, the continuities 
that we recognize, or the exclusions that we practice‘.107  
Conversely, by eschewing the use of Keats‘s name and citing instead the letters 
written by ‗Endymion‘, the speaker reveals the writings‘ distance from the historical or 
biographical Keats: the way they have become subject to a Foucauldian vision of 
writing in which ‗the mark of the writer is reduced to nothing more than the singularity 
of his absence‘.108 To emphasise the way in which Keats is now only present in and 
through the letters ‗which Endymion wrote‘ is to provide a reminder that these letters 
are the work of an author function (‗Endymion‘), rather than of an author (Keats). It 
announces that the historical ‗author‘ is now only present as a discursive product of the 
writings left behind – which is, paradoxically, no presence at all. Thus, the elision of 
‗Keats‘ for Endymion eschews biography and offers the letters as autonomous 
expression: it eschews the author ‗function‘, one might say, because it eschews the 
author. Ultimately, Endymion, standing in for Keats, stands also for a corpus of writing 
that speaks only of itself. Like the Foucauldian notion of the author function, the sonnet 
‗depriv[es] the subject […] of its role as originator, and analyz[es] the subject as a 
variable and complex function in discourse‘.109 It turns away from the idea of an author 
as a ‗free subject‘ who ‗penetrate[s] the substance of things and give[s] it meaning‘, 
pointing instead to the ways in which publication can lead to that subject becoming 
enmeshed in already extant discourses at the hands of those determined to ‗glare and 
gloat‘. 
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 Wilde would go on to explain these ideas about the way in which textual 
meaning is the product of material circumstances and reader-response at greater length 
in ‗The Critic as Artist‘ (1890). Taking issue with Matthew Arnold‘s definition of the 
function of criticism, Wilde‘s dialogue insists that the nature of an art object cannot be 
reduced to an essence, discoverable as it ‗really is‘, but is rather an absence to be 
occupied temporarily by personal impressions. No longer a means of ascertaining the 
truth that lies indelibly within the object of study, criticism is instead represented as 
‗the purest form of personal impression‘, which is ‗in its way more creative than 
creation, as it has least reference to any standard external to itself‘ (Works, 1125). In 
Wilde‘s formulation, ‗truth‘ is inevitably a matter of subjective interpretation rather 
than of objective discovery. The critic can never see the object as it ‗really is‘, because 
the ‗real‘ is, inevitably, an externally imposed product of the critical gaze. 
Consequently, it is imperative that the critic should recognise that his project must 
inevitably involve not the discovery of what the object really ‗is‘, but rather the creation 
of a new impression of the object – in effect, an account of what it ‗really is not‘ 
(Works, 1128).   
In the sonnet on Keats‘s letters, however, the brawlers‘ insistence upon their 
ability to discover an already-determined Keats through the perusal of his letters belies 
an ingrained belief in authorship as a process involving the direct expression of ‗truth‘, 
which attentive reading can reconstitute. Thus, by recasting autobiographical 
documents as art, Wilde‘s sonnet addresses a situation in which the indeterminate 
textual space of the art object‘s ‗true meaning‘ is mistaken for a direct account of what, 
in himself, its author ‗really‘ was. The tangible, yet fragile, ‗crystal‘ representing the 
affairs of Keats‘s ‗heart‘ reflects both the delicacy of the subject matter and the 
dangerously brittle nature of the ‗truth‘ contained in the missives. That this crystal was 
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once whole implies the validity of the experience (re)presented in the letters. The 
brawlers‘ inability to reclaim the truth of the experience in any definitive, coherent 
form is evoked in the shattering of the delicate surface, which is ‗broken‘ to reveal the 
absence of a kernel – Keats as a fixed historical entity – it does not, in fact, possess. 
Wilde made explicit his distress at the reading public‘s apparent determination 
to view autobiographical writing as an unproblematic mirror upon the subject‘s soul in 
a review of two biographies of Keats.
110
 Arguing against the idea that a diligent 
researcher could pin down a ‗real‘ Keats lurking beneath the surface even of an 
apparently autobiographical text, Wilde takes issue with a letter written by Keats‘s 
friend, Benjamin Bailey: 
 
We do not doubt that when Bailey wrote to Lord Houghton that common sense 
and gentleness were Keats‘s two special characteristics the worthy Archdeacon 
meant extremely well, but we prefer the real Keats, with his passionate 
wilfulness, his fantastic moods and his fine incompleteness. We do not want 
him reduced to a sand-paper smoothness or made perfect by the addition of 
popular virtues (Works, 967). 
 
As Wilde states, Keats is ‗made perfect‘ by the biographer, who nevertheless writes as 
if he had unproblematically found – was, indeed, unproblematically able to find – his 
subject intrinsically to be so. Bailey has, in Wilde‘s phrase, ‗sand-paper[ed]‘ the author 
into something he simply never was. The real Keats, we are told, was a more complex 
individual, whose ‗fine incompleteness‘ is at odds with Bailey‘s reductive account. 
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Questioning whether these ‗two special characteristics‘ might really amount to the 
determining truth about the subject in question, Wilde attacks the alarming ease with 
which the poet is brutally ‗reduced‘. This metaphor for the biographer‘s gaze invokes a 
painful process of literal dismemberment, as the poet is forced violently into a 
discursive mould which his character is too complex to fit. The extract does not – as 
Wilde‘s later writings would – go so far as to suggest the non-existence of a historical 
Keats transcending textual representation. Indeed, the review asserts a preference for a 
‗real‘ Keats whom Bailey ‗reduces‘. Nevertheless, the extract illustrates the concern, 
displayed in Wilde‘s sonnet, that biographical writing could be used as a way of 
reducing not only the text but also its author to a ‗sand-paper smoothness‘, ready for 
incorporation into the ‗popular virtues‘ of a dominant grand-narrative. 
At the heart of Wilde‘s review of the two biographies, therefore, is a Hegelian 
critique of conceptions of ‗the truth‘ as something always already imbued with 
‗Absolute‘ value.111 Hegel argues that, by comparing the object of investigation to 
notions whose value is seen as already intrinsic (‗Absolute‘), the object is either 
‗uncritically taken for granted as familiar‘ by the investigator, who merely reinforces as 
‗Absolute‘ pre-existing concepts such as ‗God, Nature, Understanding, sensibility, and 
so on‘, which are ‗made into fixed points‘ at which the investigation must always begin 
or end (Hegel, 59). The result is that simple reiteration of existing concepts is 
nevertheless taken as a ‗truth‘ that precedes both its iteration and its interrogation. In 
fact, argues Hegel, what is taken for a subject‘s ‗essence‘ is merely the illusory product 
of its expression by an observing consciousness which, like Bailey‘s, is involved in the 
unthinking application of ‗popular virtues‘ (in this case, ‗common sense‘ and 
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‗gentleness‘), rather than in questioning how and why those virtues signify as they do. 
To overcome this recourse to the ‗Absolute‘ as something that already exists before the 
dialogic process of investigation, Hegel emphasises the distinction between an object‘s 
‗being-in-itself‘ (its essential nature) and its ‗being-for-another‘ (its nature as mediated 
by the subjective observing consciousness).
112
  
Despite this emphasis on the distorting effect of the observing consciousness 
upon the apprehension of an object‘s essence, however, Hegel‘s conception of ‗truth‘ 
remains teleological. For him, a dialectical appreciation of the object‘s ‗being-in-itself‘, 
involving a continual re-examination and re-appropriation of the object‘s ‗being-for-
another‘, might eventually reach a point where knowledge of an object is reconciled 
with the object‘s essence – where being-for-another becomes synonymous with the 
object‘s being-in-itself. Yet, as Marx points out in his critique of Hegel‘s philosophy, 
any inquiry that seeks this teleological endpoint is inevitably inflected by the 
inescapable materiality of the thinker‘s social, cultural and economic context.113 In 
Marx‘s formulation, therefore, the telos is never reached but is instead endlessly 
deferred, leaving only a series of dialectically constructed ‗presents‘ in which ‗truth‘ 
depends on mutually dependent binaries, whose nature fluctuates continually. 
Consequently, any stance that expresses the object‘s essence (the ‗being-in-itself‘) as 
something already available for direct expression must be viewed with suspicion.  
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 Wilde‘s conception of ‗truth‘ is Hegelian in his consistent dismay at the way in 
which an object‘s ‗being-for-another‘ is nevertheless presented as its ‗being-in-itself‘ – 
an emphasis that finds its fullest expression in the ‗The Critic as Artist‘, with its 
insistence that the critic‘s gaze is inherently transformative, rather than reflective. It is 
modified, however, by a Paterian aestheticism that, in rejecting Hegel‘s teleological 
focus, foreshadows Marx‘s critique. For Pater, ‗the first step towards seeing one‘s 
object as it really is, is to know one‘s own impression as it really is, to discriminate it 
distinctly‘ – an approach that underlines The Renaissance (1873): 
 
What is this song or picture, this engaging personality presented in life or book, 
to me? What effect does it really produce on me? […] How is my nature 
modified by its presence, and under its influence? 
 
By prioritising his own subjective gaze, Pater emphaises, with Hegel, the importance of 
not confusing personal impression with universal truth. By making an understanding of 
one‘s own impressions the end of his enquiry however, Pater postulates that the critic 
‗has no need to trouble himself with the abstract question what beauty is in itself, or 
what its exact relation to truth or experience‘. Whether such questions are ‗answerable 
or not‘, they are simply ‗of no interest to him‘.114 While Pater concurs with Hegel in 
defining truth as a fragmentary ‗group of impressions […] in the mind of the observer‘, 
he differs in seeing ‗experience itself‘, rather than ‗the fruits of experience‘, as the ‗end‘ 
of human enquiry – a move that rejects implicitly Hegel‘s notion that experience and its 
lasting impressions, dialectically appraised, are primarily useful in so far as they must 
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eventually lead cumulatively to a triumphant apprehension of the Logos (Renaissance, 
248, 249).  
Pater dramatises this aesthetic inflection of Hegelian idealism in Marius the 
Epicurean (1885), through the episode of Marius‘s encounter with the work of the 
Greek philosopher, Heraclitus of Ionia. Heraclitus posits the ‗denial of habitual 
impressions, as the necessary first step in the way of truth‘ – a rejection of this ‗use-
and-wont‘ mode of seeing, that amounts to ‗a false impression of permanence or fixity 
in things‘.115 In fact, far from displaying a stable unchanging essence, ‗the objects of 
our ordinary experience, fixed as they seem, are really in perpetual change‘. For 
Heraclitus, as for Hegel, the ability to recognise that one‘s own fleeting impressions are 
not necessarily cohesive with the object‘s unchanging essence is ‗but the preliminary 
step towards a large positive system of almost religious philosophy‘: ‗[t]hat continual 
change, to be discovered by the attentive understanding where common opinion found 
fixed objects, was but the indicator of a subtler all-pervading motion – the sleepless, 
ever-sustained, inexhaustible energy of the divine reason itself‘ (Marius, 109). 
Yet, while Heraclitus (like Hegel) aims at a glimpse, however fragmentary, of 
‗the divine reason itself‘, Marius (like Pater in The Renaissance) refuses to see this 
recourse to personal impression merely as a means to regaining the divine Logos. For 
Marius, Heraclitus‘s philosophy has the effect of making ‗all fixed knowledge 
impossible‘ as ‗truth‘ becomes centred only in ‗the momentary, sensible apprehension 
of the individual‘, which becomes ‗the only standard of what is or is not‘. In fact, ‗the 
possibility, if an outward world does really exist, of some faultlines in our apprehension 
of it‘ leads to a broader question concerning ‗the criteria of truth‘ and the embrace of 
‗the subjectivity of knowledge‘ (Marius, 112; Pater‘s emphasis). What is important, 
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after such a realisation is not man‘s ability to apprehend innate truth as locatable 
externally, but his ability to ‗rely on the exclusive certainty to himself of his own 
impressions‘ (Marius, 110).  
‗The Critic as Artist‘, with its celebration of subjetivity for its own sake, is to 
some extent simply a reiteration of Pater‘s attempt to dethrone, as the central tenet of 
criticism, the detection of absolutely verifiable truths regarding the interpretation of 
creative works. Wilde‘s poem on Keats‘s letters and his review of the two biographies 
emphasise the socio-political necessity of the aesthetic project that ‗Critic as Artist‘ lays 
out. The tendency amongst those bidding for Keats‘s letters to view them as the 
autobiographical expression of a completely determined subject, and the biographer‘s 
presumed ability to chronicle his subject as if he were an already-determined entity 
(rather than, at least partly, the result of a series of impressions, derived from the artist‘s 
work and residual in the mind of the biographer) could, Wilde suggests, have profound 
implications for the autonomy of identity. 
 This was precisely the threat that underpinned the fears, expressed in Wilde‘s 
letters, concerning the fate of Wilde‘s own correspondence after his incarceration in 
1895 on charges of ‗gross indecency‘. When his lover, Lord Alfred Douglas, proposed 
to print, in the Mercure de France, some letters that Wilde had written him from 
Holloway prison, Wilde was understandably outraged. Such letters, he declared, 
‗should have been to you things sacred and secret beyond anything in the whole 
world‘.116 Bidding Douglas recall ‗the sonnet he wrote who saw with such sorrow and 
scorn the letters of John Keats sold by public auction in London‘, the letter argues that, 
far from clarifying to outsiders how matters between himself and Douglas ‗really‘ 
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stood, the appearance of these letters in print would simply constitute an open invitation 
to his enemies to confer their own meanings on what had been intended for Douglas‘s 
eyes alone. Wilde was concerned that the public, armed with attitudes such as those 
displayed by the ‗truth-seeking‘ brawlers at the auction of Keats‘s letters, would be 
similarly keen to discover in his own writings alleged ‗truths‘, which were in fact 
entirely of their own making – ‗truths‘ which, characterised as inimical to ‗popular 
virtues‘, could be used to vindicate that moral edifice. His concerns were not 
unfounded. As an ostensibly autobiographical work, De Profundis (1905) was itself to 
suffer the same fate at the hands of reviewers as Keats‘s letters had done at the hands of 
his biographers.
117
 Wilde‘s words would be wilfully misinterpreted in an attempt to 
reduce him to a ‗sand-paper smoothness‘, by the application, if not the ‗addition‘, of 
‗popular virtues‘.  
 In 1905, when Wilde‘s friend and literary executor, Robert Ross, first published 
the letter in an edited version, the tendency amongst some critics was to read the work 
as an indication that the man who wrote the volume under discussion was finally 
presenting himself in his ‗true‘ form. In an unsigned item in the Review of Reviews, for 
example, W.T. Stead noted that the work represented ‗the cry of the heart de profundis‘.
 
118
 He also wrote to Ross, praising him for ‗having permitted us to see the man he 
really was‘.
119
 Stead‘s misguided attempts to view the letter as a window on to Oscar 
Wilde‘s soul can be partly attributed to the title given the work not by Wilde, but by 
Ross himself – De Profundis: ‗From the Depths‘. Moreover, the blurb that occupies De 
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Profundis‘s cover, could hardly be said to have helped matters, proclaiming the volume 
to be ‗probably the most sincere and personal expression of his peculiarly artificial and 
sensitive nature‘. The description goes on to announce that ‗[a]s a human document this 
work possesses unique value and interest, and the beauty of its style entitles it to a high 
place in the literature of the time‘.120 Both the title and the description work to 
perpetuate the idea that the book provided an account that was somehow definitively 
‗true‘, a slipping of Wilde‘s stylistic mask to reveal the real Wilde underneath. It is not 
conceded that the very fact of its ‗beautiful style‘ might provide room for doubt 
regarding the text‘s status as an infallible ‗human document‘.  
 Other reviewers could not resist categorising the work as the definitive account 
of the entity ‗Oscar Wilde‘, which vindicated the status quo as far as he and his crimes 
were concerned. In The Month, for example, M.D. Petre paints the author as a tragic 
figure, whose actions delivered him ‗from a world which he could fashion to his 
likings, inspired by his artistic and creative instincts, to a world in which he had simply 
to take his place and endure the inevitable‘.121 As sympathetic as this might sound, it 
nevertheless constructs Wilde‘s narrative as a cathartic tragedy in which the ability to 
‗fashion‘ one‘s own self-image is ‗inevitably‘ overtaken by state-sanctioned control. 
 The reaction to De Profundis is significant, therefore, because it illustrates the 
power conferred upon reviewers by the appearance of the letter in book form, 
illustrating how publication can transform a life merely by presenting it for public 
perusal. Their idea of the book as a purveyor of truths about a biographical or 
autobiographical subject underlines these reviewers‘ belief in reading as an activity by 
which subversive elements could be reabsorbed into a dominant social narrative – in 
which reading discovers (rather than ascribes) meaning to the individual subject about 
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whom an account has been written. As with the biographical Keats, Stead‘s easy 
substitution of the textual entity ‗Wilde‘ for the man as he ‗really was‘ depends on the 
appearance and interpretation of certain documents – so much so that De Profundis‘s 
publication allowed Wilde to be replaced, in the eyes of many reviewers, by a book. 
The event thus betrays the reviewers‘ alarming amenability to the possibility of such a 
substitution – their willingness to accept not only the truth of the statements made 
within the text, but also the inherent validity of the assertions they facilitate about the 
kind of person Wilde ‗really‘ was. It betrays a naïve faith in a mimetic model of 
textuality in which texts represent the subject directly, along with an endorsement of the 
concomitant view – that texts allow the subject to be directly apprehended.  
 The episode illustrates the way in which an idea of a book as a purveyor of 
truths can facilitate a powerful method by which subversive elements could be stripped 
of individual autonomy and (re)appropriated into the dominant social narrative. Stead‘s 
presumed ability to conceive of a ‗real‘ Wilde is intrinsically linked to the appearance 
of the book in the literary marketplace. As with Keats, the creation of the textual entity 
‗Wilde‘ rested upon a belief in the ability of a text to make available a set of truths 
about an objective and objectifiable reality. Indeed, it is hard to decide which is the 
most shocking – the fact that, for most reviewers, Wilde had effectively been replaced 
by a book, or their belief that such a substitution was possible in the first place. Either 
way, the episode is of paramount importance in demonstrating the sociocultural 
significance of Wilde‘s insistence upon the dialogic nature of art and reality – that 
interpretation always involved the creation of a new ‗truth‘ as much as it had to do with 
the discovery of an innate one.  Even those who, like M.D. Petre, saw De Profundis as a 
moving account of a great man brought down by a tragic weakness, never questioned 
whether this was an interpretation they brought to the text in order to consolidate 
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existing constraints upon what was and was not considered a ‗weakness‘. Petre‘s 
comments betray a preference to view his interpretation of Wilde‘s story as not only 
inevitably invited, but also validated, by the text‘s position as an infallible, 
unambiguous expression of its author‘s soul.  
Discussing Wilde‘s own attitude to the practices that led to his incarceration, 
Patricia Flanagan Behrendt misses this point, therefore, when she complains that Wilde 
‗appears to have been politically ignorant of the issues at stake and of the humanitarian 
importance‘ of that which ‗writers like [John Addington] Symonds and [Havelock] 
Ellis were attempting to accomplish‘, preferring to rely instead on ‗self-centred 
posturing‘.122 It cannot be denied that these sexologists, who were attempting to find 
expression for the homosexual as a distinct, emergent, category of identity, were 
attempting work of ‗humanitarian importance‘. Drawing on Foucault‘s contention that 
the late nineteenth century saw the rise of an idea of ‗the homosexual‘ as a 
psychological category – something one could be defined as being, rather than as 
merely a series of sexual acts one performed – Ed Cohen and Alan Sinfield both point 
to the ways in which homosexuality is characterised, in the period, by a discursive 
silence. Cohen, for example, discussing newspaper reports of Wilde‘s trials, comments 
that, while their ‗narrative structures organised and gave meaningful shapes to the 
events they purported to accurately represent […] at no point did [they] describe or 
even explicitly refer to the sexual charges made against Wilde‘.123 The most explicit 
foregrounding of the absence of any discursive reality for Wilde‘s sodomotical 
practices occurs in the Evening Standard on the 3 April 1895, where the Marquess of 
Queensbury‘s libellous card was reproduced with the offending word excised: ‗―To 
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Oscar Wilde posing as _____‖‘.124 In defining and pathologising the ‗sexual invert‘, 
Ellis and Symonds were attempting to make visible that which popular texts seemed 
intent on making discursively invisible. 
 Yet, in filling this discursive silence by hypothesising the existence of the 
homosexual as a pathological type, sexologists also evolved a scientific understanding 
of sexuality and gender that reduced both to the components of an essential self. As 
Richard Dellamora notes: ‗their naturalising definitions insisted on the permanent 
character of real manliness and womanliness while in effect bringing homosexuals 
under control of medical legislation‘.125 Moreover, the idea that what one did was 
somehow the inward expression of what one was had the potential to backfire in the 
moral climate of late-Victorian Britain. The law claimed homosexual acts to be, by 
nature, ‗grossly indecent‘, and medical sexologists who apologised for the 
homosexual‘s indecency by claiming that he was an unfortunate soul who could not 
intrinsically help being indecent did little to alter the terms of the debate, maintaining 
the homosexual‘s position as the inversion of ‗normal‘ sexual orientation.126  
 Sexology is thus an intrinsic part of the apparatus involved in the production of 
knowledge as an instrument of power. What the homosexual ‗really was‘ continued to 
be defined not only in relation to what he did, but also to how those deeds were 
discursively constructed. This becomes increasingly obvious when one considers 
Sinfield‘s argument that the reticence regarding the naming of the acts committed by 
Wilde created a discursive silence which the author‘s person conveniently filled, 
making Wilde‘s name a shorthand definition not only of the vague ‗indecencies‘ he had 
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committed, but of the kind of person likely to transgress in this way. So, for example, in 
E.M. Forster‘s Maurice (1914), the central character is only able to give expression to 
the nature of his desires by describing himself as ‗an unspeakable of the Oscar Wilde 
sort‘.127 In Foucauldian terms, sexological definitions of the homosexual as an invert of 
the ‗normal‘ male ensured that Wilde was prosecuted, and his memory persecuted, not 
for what he had done, but for what he was. Ultimately, legal and medical discourses 
imbricate with each other in their quest for a ‗correct‘ definition of ‗homosexuality‘ as a 
species: ‗by solemnly inscribing offences in the field of objects susceptible of scientific 
knowledge, they provide the mechanisms of legal punishment with a justifiable hold 
not only on offences, but on individuals; not only on what they do, but also on what 
they are, will be, may be‘.128 This discursive ‗pinning down‘ of the homosexual can be 
traced in Stead‘s temptation to read De Profundis as a final, repentant confession of that 
which lay beneath the ‗peculiarity‘ of its style, which like those acts he had committed, 
could be seen as the unmistakable symptom of its author‘s inalienable otherness. 
Whether the act was one of stylistic or bodily transgression, the question remained: not 
only ‗―Who committed it?‖ But: ―How can we assign the causal process that produced 
it? Where did it originate in the author himself?‖‘129 
 The disciplinary mechanisms that led to Wilde‘s discursive absorption into the 
social narrative as the semantic embodiment of otherwise unspeakable vices was 
anticipated by Wilde himself in his writings. In implying that even real events (like 
Keats‘s affairs and his own transgressions) depend, for their significance, on the way in 
which they are discussed and written about, Wilde presents a situation in which 
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individuals are, in a sense, the ‗biographical‘ subjects of state and society – in which an 
identity discursively imposed upon the subject is passed off as the expression of that 
which apparently resides naturally within the subject. The regulation of sexuality 
through discursive surveillance demonstrates how concerns about authorial intention, 
editorial policy and the assumptions of readers have socio-political consequences for 
the creation of identity and meaning: consequences against which ‗self-centred 
posturing‘ provides an efficacious strategy of resistance, embodying as it does an anti-
essentialism that escapes surveillance by insisting that there might well be nothing to 
survey.  
Ross‘s attempt to rearrange the contents of Wilde‘s letter emphasises the extent 
to which the author‘s intention (the cry of the heart de profundis) is the product of the 
biographer-editor rather than simply a true reflection of the author‘s ‗real‘ self. 
Suffering is the keynote of the original 1905 version of the text, whose opening line, 
taken in conjunction with the ascribed title, immediately initiates the text as one 
concerned primarily with the author‘s tribulations: ‗…Suffering is one very long 
moment‘ (De Profundis, 1). Although the opening lines of Ross‘s edition were 
originally written by Wilde, they have been shifted several pages and are now placed at 
the beginning of the work. The book, whose cover proclaims its contents to have come 
‗from the depths‘ of its author‘s soul, thus begins with an apparent statement of 
helplessness by a suffering prisoner. The three dots might be Ross‘s attempt to indicate 
the excisions he has made to Wilde‘s letter, but readers unaware of the fact that the 
letter is excised might be forgiven for mistaking this as a further indication of the long 
‗moment‘ of suffering. Ultimately, the rearrangement facilitates a reading of the 
passage as the introduction to a repentant confession of sin.  
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The reader of Wilde‘s original letter, however, free of such paratextual 
preconceptions, finds Wilde subtly unrepentant though playing the penitent‘s role. In 
fact, he seeks absolution only by undertaking a transferral of blame from himself to 
Douglas. He writes, for instance, ‗I will begin by telling you that I blame myself 
terribly.‘ Yet, the next sentence completely undermines this apparent apologetic 
humility – ‗I blame myself for allowing an unintellectual friendship, a friendship whose 
primary aim was not the creation and contemplation of beautiful things‘ (Letters, 685). 
What Wilde blames himself for is not (as certain critics who styled the work a ‗tragedy‘ 
would have it) the crimes for which he was sent to prison, but for allowing himself to 
become influenced by Douglas to such an extent that he allowed himself to be sent to 
prison and brought to ‗utter and discreditable financial ruin‘ (Letters, 687). Wilde‘s is 
only a performative repentance – the blame is ultimately placed upon Douglas as much 
as, if not more so, upon himself. None of this appears in Ross‘s edition, however, 
which takes great care to obscure the text‘s origins as a letter to Douglas. As a result, 
the exact nature of the author‘s suffering (whether it is deserved, whether it is a mode 
of penance, whether it is Wilde‘s own fault) is left in the hands of the reader whereas, 
as Wilde wrote it, his own culpability is entertained only to be rejected. 
The construction and reception of De Profundis demonstrates the extent to 
which, in Jerome McGann‘s words, the ‗universe of literature is socially generated‘: the 
extent to which authorial intention is distorted, even inverted, through the ‗many 
relative centers which are brought to our attenton by our own acts of observation‘.130 
What the case of De Profundis also illustrates, however, is what Wilde himself was 
keen to point out in the case of Keats‘s letters; namely, that when the nature of the 
autobiographical subject is apprehended as being directly accessible to the reader in a 
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damagingly simplistic way, not only the text, but the autobiographical subject himself is 
in danger of being subjected to precisely this kind of ‗continuous socialization‘.131 
Ultimately, Wilde had posthumously fallen prey to the kind of insidious surveillance 
that attaches itself to books throughout his writings, where written texts are frequently 
portrayed as a means of creating and fixing allegedly innate ‗truths‘, which they are at 
least partly responsible for manufacturing. As a result, in Wilde‘s works, books often 
serve as tangible reminders of the way in which written texts can function not only as a 
mode of individual expression, but also as a means of exerting power: a world in which 
not only the book, but also the self, is usually the fruit of someone else‘s publishing 
venture. 
 
ii. The importance of being the author  
Wilde‘s horror at Bailey‘s presumed ability to fashion a ‗popular‘ Keats and pass him 
off as somehow definitively ‗real‘ is dramatised from the outset in The Importance of 
Being Earnest (1895). Upon hearing of Jack‘s intention to propose marriage to 
Gwendolen, for example, Algernon represents the institution sardonically as one 
designed specifically to codify the experience of being in love. As such, it destroys the 
uncertainty that is the ‗very essence of romance‘ (I. 77).132 The implication that 
romance is tamed by the ritual of marriage introduces the play‘s negative conception of 
acts which seek to bring the myriad ‗uncertainties‘ of experience under control by 
recasting experience as a set of codified performances – stripping it of spontaneity by 
scripting it in advance. Just as Bailey had sought reductively to mutilate Keats‘s 
character in order that it might cohere with ‗popular virtues‘, so marriage is presented 
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as a means by which the ‗many-sided mysteries‘ of love are mutilated in order to fit a 
reductive pre-determined mould. ‗Meaning‘ is thus reduced to a set of communal 
fictions to which the object – whether it be an individual‘s identity or the nature of a 
given concept, like ‗love‘ – is subjected, as it is forcibly (re)directed into the conduits 
of social ritual.  
 Lady Bracknell‘s easy dismissal of Jack‘s claim to be a Liberal Unionist is a 
further example: ‗they count as Tories. They dine with us‘ (I. 535). This verdict would 
seem to support Ruth Robbins‘s argument that Earnest prefigures poststructuralist 
conceptions of identity by evading ‗the notion that character is a deep structure that 
goes right through a person, where action is essence‘.133 Like Algernon, Lady Bracknell 
views life and identity as evolved from and through performance. Hence Liberal 
Unionists are defined by the social constructions that can be placed on their actions, 
regardless of what they profess to believe. Unlike Algernon, however, Lady Bracknell 
appears to remain quite unaware of the arbitrary basis of the conventions to which she 
insists upon enslaving other characters. The problem (and the joke) in Earnest is that 
performance is constantly mistaken for truth so that action is taken to define a 
corresponding essence. This in turn empowers the play‘s comedic project: to debunk 
the arbitrary process by which the conventional becomes the definitive by holding up to 
ridicule the way in which the definitive has become conventional.  
 The ridiculous equation of action with essence is thus both the main vehicle for 
humour in the play, and the constant object of its satire. In this sense the play coheres 
with Linda Dowling‘s definition of decadent literature as the expression of ‗a cult of 
artifice‘, which refers habitually not to an extant ‗natural‘ order of things, but to ‗a 
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world at one remove, a world already made into artifice‘.134 Dowling‘s contention is 
that this recourse to a view of the world as always already ‗artificial‘ constituted both a 
symptom of and a reaction to a linguistic crisis arising from a ‗new comparative 
philology‘, which led to a ‗theory of language as a wholly autonomous system‘.135 For 
Dowling, decadent literature dramatises this theory, deploying language as ‗a 
counterpoetics of disruption and parody and stylistic derangement‘, exposing the 
hollow centre of the meanings it creates as much as expresses.  
 In Wilde‘s play, rather than being viewed as the expression of an already innate 
essence, identity is reconfigured as a series of autonomous performances that society 
constantly undertakes to standardise according to authorised models. Earnest can thus 
be seen to exemplify Dowling‘s conception of decadent literature as an attempt to 
recognise a crisis in linguistic meaning. The autonomy of both language and identity 
make possible a ‗counterpoetics‘ – especially for the play‘s young female characters – 
and thus exemplify decadence‘s desire ‗to save something from the wreck‘.136 Yet the 
parallel autonomies of both language and identity are also shown to be a double-edged 
sword, at once empowering the individual self by emphasising its autonomy, whilst 
also threatening to confiscate it by means of a reabsorption into any autonomous 
narrative powerful enough to pass itself off as the definition of ‗reality‘ to which others 
must therefore be made to conform.  
 In defining the self as a series of performative roles – whether self-consciously 
adopted or otherwise – within a (re)writable narrative, books become a vital and central 
element of Earnest‘s iconography. Throughout the play, a mistaken belief in the ability 
of printed materials to enshrine objectively perceivable truths allows the book to 
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function as a means of exerting control over the individual subject, by proclaiming as 
true a particular configuration of ‗reality‘. Earnest is especially concerned with 
examining the socio-political consequences for identity in a world where life not only 
resembles but, on occasion, actually is an open book. By focusing upon episodes in 
which the definitive status of certain normative elements depends, quite literally, upon 
their being published, the play can be read as an analysis of the way in which the book 
itself can become a brutally effective means of social surveillance, creating the norms it 
purports objectively to record. The book is thus the hinge that links Wilde‘s play to the 
Foucauldian notion of the individual as not only the object, but also the result of the 
disciplinary apparatus responsible for the production of knowledge.  
 Lady Bracknell‘s notebook is an example of the many texts that allow the play‘s 
characters to find themselves measured against assumptions that are, quite literally, pre-
written. It contains a list of eligible young men, to which Lady Bracknell is ready to 
admit Jack‘s name, should his answers to her enquiries be ‗what a really affectionate 
mother requires‘ (I. 481). Her interrogation embodies the normalising effect of the 
examination: the means by which the ‗rule‘ is established by condemning ‗that which 
[…] departs from it‘, making the exposure of that which ‗does not measure up‘ the very 
method that makes measurement possible at all.
137
 The documentary project of Lady 
Bracknell‘s notebook, maintained by inscribing as definitive the results of 
interrogations designed in advance to enshrine her own social agenda, enables the 
maintenance of the ‗individual […] in his own aptitudes and abilities‘, under the gaze 
of a ‗permanent corpus of knowledge‘. The use of the book in this episode 
demonstrates how ‗the deployment of force and the establishment of truth‘ are not 
separate aims, but imbricate with each other in the ‗constitution of the individual as a 
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describable, analysable object‘.138 So long as an idea of the book as the embodiment of 
‗a permanent corpus of knowledge‘ is upheld, Lady Bracknell can preside over ‗a 
comparative system that [makes] possible the measurement of overall phenomena, the 
description of groups, the characterization of collective facts‘.139 By means of rigorous 
examination the suitors in the book are not recorded but produced as the embodiment of 
a body of quantifiable knowledge; their eligibility becomes ‗[the] effect and object of 
power‘, by also constituting them as the ‗effect and object of knowledge‘.140 The suitors 
do not embody ‗a set of circumstances defining an act and capable of modifying the 
application of a rule‘; rather, the individual suitor appears only in the guise under which 
‗he may be described, judged, measured compared with others, in his very 
individuality; […] [as] the individual who has to be trained, corrected, classified, 
normalized, excluded, etc.‘  
In making the book the means by which is brought about ‗the entry of the 
individual […] into the field of knowledge‘, the play also makes it the symbol of the 
power enabled by this enforced absorption.
141
 Lady Bracknell‘s book textualises society 
by prescribing the ‗truths‘ by which society‘s narratives are, in turn, to be recognised 
and categorised – it is thus indirectly responsible for creating, as the basis of an 
examination, the social rules it purports to maintain as already valid. Her insistence on 
the definitive status of the process that has given rise to the notion of ‗eligibility‘ it 
enshrines, enables her use of the book as the means of instigating and perpetuating an 
examination that modulates the society it claims merely to document – an unsettling 
move in which ‗society‘ is figured as the manifestation of a series of reference works 
maintained by a horde of Lady Bracknells. 
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 The book acts, in Earnest, as the apparatus of what Foucault identifies as a 
‗disciplinary power‘ that aims at ‗the progressive objectification and ever more subtle 
partitioning of human behaviour‘.142 For Foucault, power over the individual self ‗is not 
possessed as a thing, or transferred as a property‘, but ‗functions like a piece of 
machinery‘, in which ‗it is the apparatus as a whole that produces ―power‖ and 
distributes individuals in this permanent and continuous field‘.143 Basing his theory, 
initially, upon specific institutions (the school, the hospital, the army camp, the prison) 
he draws attention to the way in which such institutions subject their inmates to ‗a 
whole micro-penalty‘, establishing a system of ‗correct‘ behaviour in relation to time, 
activity, speech, the body and sexuality by punishing ‗non-observance, that which does 
not measure up to the rule, that departs from it‘.144 Like the Foucauldian ‗examination‘, 
Lady Bracknell‘s notebook ‗places individuals in a field of surveillance [because it] 
also situates them in a network of writing; it engages them in a whole mass of 
documents that capture and fix them‘.145 It is an example of how surveillance itself 
‗makes it possible to qualify, to classify and to punish‘,146 constituting ‗the individual 
as effect and object of power‘ by constituting him as the ‗effect and object of 
knowledge‘.147 In Earnest, the book is just such an apparatus, transforming Jack into 
‗the fictitious atom of an ―ideological‖ representation of society; […] a reality 
fabricated by this specific technology of power […] called ―disipline‖‘.148 
In some ways, of course, Lady Bracknell is simply putting into practice the 
arguments put forth by Wilde himself in ‗The Decay of Lying‘ (1889). Her selection of 
society‘s most eligible young men and the qualities that render them so, ensure that her 
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book is a consummate example of the way in which life is nothing if not the mirror of 
already-available aesthetic models – just as Wilde had proclaimed it to be in that earlier 
essay. Lady Bracknell resembles the essay‘s definition of a ‗great artist‘ – a figure who 
‗invents a type‘ so enticing that ‗[l]ife tries to copy it, to reproduce it in a popular form, 
like an enterprising publisher‘ (‗Decay‘, 1083). Such a definition of great art banishes 
teleological meaning by making truth ‗entirely and absolutely a matter of style‘ – the 
domain of art, behind which life can only follow meekly (‗Decay‘, 1081).149 Having 
appreciated a certain kind of young man, Lady Bracknell extrapolates a type which she 
then uses as the basis for creating (rather than reflecting) the truth of ‗what a really 
affectionate mother requires‘. In this, she resembles not only a ‗great artist‘, but also an 
‗enterprising publisher‘, who retains the stereotype necessary to reproduce a popular 
text.  
As Wilde makes clear in ‗The Decay of Lying‘, however, the tendency of life to 
imitate art (even more than art imitates life) becomes potentially problematic only 
owing to a widespread insistence that only the reverse was true: that art not only could, 
but should and did, unfailingly imitate life. Rejecting this idea, Wilde‘s essay argues 
that the process is, in fact, inescapably circular. In the end, art only enshrines ideas and 
attitudes which society either creates for itself, or has already copied from art‘s own 
originals. The episode of Lady Bracknell‘s notebook illustrates this circularity, and also 
illustrates the problems that arise when the rigid but false dichotomy of original ‗life‘ 
and imitative ‗art‘ is insisted upon. Lady Bracknell has no problem believing that her 
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attitudes to that which ‗really‘ affectionate mothers require are ‗really‘ valid, or that her 
list of men in whom these qualities have been detected might stand as a reliable 
metonym for those very qualities. By publishing their names, she makes them available 
as a standard by which others (such as Jack) can be judged – his place on the list would 
assure his ‗eligibility‘ by proving his ability to ‗measure up‘ in a certain process of 
examination. At the same time, however, Lady Bracknell seems not to realise that the 
list merely exemplifies her own socially-informed idea of ‗eligibility‘, rather than some 
transcendent value matching that term in nature. The products of her subjective 
examination are nevertheless recorded as the embodiment of a fact against other men‘s 
‗eligibility‘ is measured as a quantifiable value. She misses what Wilde‘s essay spells 
out – the circular relationship of ‗art‘ and ‗life‘ – because she elides her own ‗art‘. The 
book is thus a record of Lady Bracknell‘s faith in her ability to taxonomise society and 
its inhabitants according to certain categories that define what they ‗really‘ are (or, in 
Jack‘s case, are not). It is an example of the way in which Earnest points to the tyranny 
that obtains when the subject – indeed, the world itself – is viewed as ‗really‘ 
representable. 
The result is a situation in which truth is not discovered but enforced – in which 
power lies not in the ability to uncover and maintain an intrinsically legitimate status 
quo, but in the ability definitively to impose the boundaries of what is and is not 
legitimate. What is presented, in ‗The Decay of Lying‘, as the means to self-expression 
gives way, in Earnest, to insidious surveillance. Social identity is recast as an open 
book, there to be written by anyone who wishes to take up the pen. Indeed, in one of the 
most celebrated of the play‘s comic episodes, the infant Jack Worthing describes how 
he was discovered in a handbag, his place in the perambulator having been usurped by a 
three-volume novel. Having been replaced at birth by a novel – the most conventional 
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embodiment of Victorian fiction, in terms both of form and of production methods – 
Jack is subjected, as a marriageable adult, to comparison with Lady Bracknell‘s 
notebook. His whole life is lived, not just by the book, but also as a book – one which 
he has not written himself. By pointing to the way in which books enshrine ideas of the 
‗normal‘ and the ‗natural‘, which are then used as the means by which other characters 
are judged, the play undermines the book‘s symbolic currency as the means by which 
truths about society are recorded as already valid – the results of an examination 
already undertaken, there to be consulted as the measure of what can be legitimately 
expected of its subjects.  
The play echoes, therefore, Foucault‘s critique of taxonomy in The Order of 
Things. By presenting the book as the vehicle for a discourse that exerts power by 
expressing, ‗as though already there‘, a concept whose meaning has ‗no existence 
except in the grid created by a glance, an examination, a language‘, Wilde‘s play 
deploys the book as a symbol of the power residual in discourse and in the 
taxonomising gaze.
150
 In this symbolic capacity, books are available to Cecily as an 
object at which to direct her protest against the narrow remit of Miss Prism‘s 
educational programme. Throwing the books disgustedly aside, she systematically 
enumerates and rejects their subject matter: ‗Horrid Political Economy! Horrid 
Geography! Horrid, horrid German!‘ (II. 98) Crucially, it is not to any specific aspect of 
the subjects that Cecily objects, nor to any particular element of the textual content of 
the volumes – at least, not explicitly. Instead, the act of codification represented by the 
volumes carries a weight and authority of its own – an authority as visually imposing as 
the heavy volumes themselves. Like Lady Bracknell‘s notebook their presence as 
catalogues of facts grouped by educational discipline represents a means of encoding 
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knowledge into specific forms. Their very presence speaks of their ability to survey and 
taxonomise the multiplicity and complexity of the subject matter they represent.  
Cecily herself, on the other hand, spends much of the play demonstrating the 
impossibility of such direct ‗recording‘. She proclaims, for example, the impracticality 
of having to record certain speech acts directly, complaining that she does not know 
‗how to spell a cough‘ (II. 439). As with Vivian in ‗The Decay of Lying‘, Cecily is 
aware that ‗reality‘ is, in art, a matter of representation. Little wonder that she takes the 
fact of Canon Chasuble‘s never having ‗written a single book‘ to be a sign not of 
ignorance, but rather of ‗how much he knows‘ (II. 536-38): a book is not taken as proof 
of knowledge, but simply the physical result of the act of writing and publishing. If 
writing is the record of the writer‘s subjective gaze, therefore, books are the potential 
agents by which the results of that gaze are falsely passed off as the embodiment of 
definite knowledge. Far from the means to disseminate verifiable information, they are 
as much society‘s props as the play‘s. As in the example of the ‗Literature‘ biscuit tin 
discussed in my introductory chapter, books are, in this episode, not only physical 
embodiments of what is known to be true, but also of what, in a given society, goes 
under the banner of truth: just as the biscuit tin unconsciously exposes the limited way 
in which a particular corpus of texts can become commodified and objectified as the 
embodied symbol of all ‗literature‘. Cecily‘s brutality towards her schoolbooks can thus 
be seen as an attack on the symbolic currency of books as the embodiment of an 
arbitrary taxonomy that is nevertheless presented as ‗the truth‘.  
If the play presents books as the instruments through which social conventions 
are normalised, however, then it also critiques the play‘s older characters‘ complicity in 
obtusely upholding the symbolic currency of books as records of that which is already 
normal and natural – a complicity against which, through her physical rejection of the 
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schoolbooks, Cecily openly rebels. The most notable example of the kind of complicity 
that Cecily rejects comes in the form of Miss Prism‘s veneration of the rigid 
conventions of the three-volume novel. The artificial and limited nature of these 
conventions is neatly summarised in Miss Prism‘s assertion of what fiction definitely 
and unequivocally ‗means‘: ‗[t]he good ended happily, and the bad unhappily‘ (II. 54). 
Though presented in comic terms, her approach has disquieting implications, driven 
home by her reaction to the ‗death‘ of Jack‘s younger brother, Ernest – a fictional 
character who, in her eyes is conventionally ‗bad‘. Upon learning of his ‗demise‘, she 
comments, ‗What a lesson to him! I trust he will profit by it‘ (II. 223). Of course, had 
Ernest ever been real, he is unlikely to have gleaned any ‗profit‘ from such a ‗lesson‘ – 
despite having been assigned the unhappy ending which is the requisite fate of the ‗bad‘ 
fictional character. The episode illustrates the way in which reality and fiction, far from 
being separate, actually imbricate with each other; reality, in Miss Prism‘s formulation, 
is fundamentally allusive, drawing its inspiration from the books society writes about 
itself. It is a potent and concise demonstration of the way in which books can act as 
tools by which individual identities are given a ‗sandpaper smoothness‘ – forcibly 
written back into the social narrative contained within the prescriptive volumes that 
document established definitions of what is ‗good‘, ‗true‘ and ‗natural‘.151 
                                                 
151
 For a history of attitudes towards the ‗fictionality‘ of the novel form, see Catherine Gallagher, ‗The 
Rise of Fictionality‘ in The Novel, Volume 1: History, Geography and Culture, ed. Franco Moretti 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 336-63. Discussing the novel‘s increasing 
recourse, throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to ‗the confines of the credible‘ (337), 
Gallagher argues that mid-eighteenth-century writers like Henry Fielding developed a use for fictionality 
‗as a special way of shaping knowledge through the fabrication of particulars‘ (344). In the nineteenth 
century, such an attitude underlay the relationship of the novel‘s fictionality to the ‗real‘ world, in a 
manner traceable in Miss Prism‘s reading practices: ‗one is dissuaded from believing the literal truth of a 
representation so that one can instead admire its likelihood‘ (346). Wilde‘s play demonstrates the dangers 
of such an attitude taken to an extreme – Miss Prism is so persuaded by the ‗likelihood‘ of events in the 
novels she reads to the point where what is ‗likely‘ in fictionality becomes an infallible guide to ‗literal 
truth‘. 
 96 
For Miss Prism, fiction not only strives for, but also achieves, a direct mimesis 
of a social reality that already operates according to a set of obvious ‗meanings‘, which 
fiction has only to recover. Ultimately, what fiction ‗means‘ for Miss Prism is also, 
disturbingly, what society ‗means‘. Such a claim itself depends on the acceptance not 
only of fiction, but also of ‗the real‘ it represents, as always already normal and natural. 
In suggesting that ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘ are not copied from an originary definition, but are 
defined according to the way in which ‗the real‘ plays out as narrative, the episode 
underlines the dangers that characterise a world in which a determination to separate 
fiction and reality only leads to an even more determined belief in a new set of fictions.  
 Earnest thus presents the triple-decker as an agent of the phenomenon described 
by Foucault as ‗panopticism‘. Jeremy Bentham‘s ideal prison ‗arranges spatial unities 
that make it possible to see constantly and to recognize immediately‘, and the novel 
arranges social unities along identical lines.
152
 So long as fiction is upheld as a valid 
reflection of what really constitutes ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘, it has the panoptic function of 
performing, on the reader‘s behalf, the work of taxonomising the society it represents. 
Foucault‘s phrasing is significant. It is not that spatial unities are arranged in a way that 
enables an existing meaning to be apprehended and recognized – rather, the panopticon 
‗arranges spatial unities‘ which, having been arranged, ‗make it possible to see 
constantly‘ and thus ‗to recognize immediately‘ who is ‗good‘ and who is ‗bad‘, a 
recognition which, ultimately, seals their fate. Similarly, in Miss Prism‘s conception of 
fiction, knowledge of what makes a subject ‗good‘ or ‗bad‘ is not apprehended, but 
created via the mechanisms through which they are described – the archetypal plot, 
style and characters that, for her, define the triple-decker as a literary institution.  
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Thus, what D.A. Miller has noted of panoptic discipline is also true in novelistic 
discourse as it is characterised in Earnest: both are ‗interested in putting in place a 
perceptual grid in which a division between the normal and the deviant inherently 
imposes itself‘.153 Miller‘s study of the nineteenth-century novel draws attention to the 
way that even those novels which, like George Eliot‘s Middlemarch (1873), contain an 
‗explicitly thematized censure of discipline‘, are complicit in a project of ‗social 
regulation and standardization‘.154 To illustrate his point, Miller offers a reading of 
Balzac‘s Une ténébreuse affaire (1841). Among the characters of that novel are two 
agents of the secret police, Peyrade and Corentin. While Peyrade ‗could decapitate 
someone with his own hands‘, Corentin‘s methods are more insidious; he is ‗capable of 
entangling innocence, beauty, virtue in networks of calumny and intrigue, of coolly 
drowning or poisoning them‘.155 Like the omniscient narrator in a novel, Corentin‘s 
mode of policing functions on the basis of a total surveillance that allows him to take 
charge of individuals precisely by involving them in ‗a ―world‖ and a ―plot‖‘.156 
Corentin himself, whose task is ‗conceived as a penetration of social surfaces‘, 
possesses ‗―impenetrable‖ powers of vision‘ that ‗have already been penetrated by the 
narration that renders him‘. Thus, with the excuse of being ‗[o]n the side of 
perspicacity, Balzac‘s narration assumes a fully panoptic view of the world it places 
under surveillance […] and its complete knowledge includes the knowledge that it is 
always right‘.157 Ultimately, in fact, it is ‗hard to distinguish omniscience from the 
social control it parallels, since the latter too is often a matter of ‗―mere‖ knowledge‘.158  
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Yet, for all that it resembles those recording impulses that produce the 
individual subject as both the object and effect of knowledge – impulses exemplified in 
the power wielded by Lady Bracknell through her notebook – the omniscient narration 
of the triple-decker remains a stylistic device that offers only the illusion of 
omniscience. To empower the book as panopticon – as the location of ‗unities‘ that 
anatomise individuals in society, enabling the reader, like the figure in the watchtower, 
‗to recognize immediately‘ – takes more than an implied omniscience of representation; 
it also requires a reader who, like Miss Prism, harbours an assumption that the novel 
not only should, but apparently often does, offer ‗a permanent corpus of knowledge‘ 
about the world. It requires a readership that views what fictional characters do and the 
manner in which they do it as less important than what they can thus be ‗recognized 
immediately‘ as being. Betraying a naïve determination to seek out the moral import of 
that which she reads, even as she insists upon the fictionality of the events to which that 
import is attached, Miss Prism is just such a reader – determined to weave back into 
society the morality gleaned from its representation in fiction. It is a state of affairs 
slyly implied in the naming of this arch novel-reader – despite an unwavering belief in 
the novel‘s ability to reflect the world as it is, Miss Prism also suggests that the reader‘s 
gaze is ultimately, like her crystalline namesake, more refractive than reflective.  
 
iv. The Soul of Man Under Authorship 
One can read Earnest, therefore, as an attempt to destabilise the moral, social and 
political tyranny of books by exposing moral and social laws as always mediated, rather 
than always natural. The play exposes the way in which the assumption that about 
authors‘ abilities directly to chronicle meanings already ‗there‘ in the world about 
which they write transform books into tools by which such mediation can be effected. 
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In this sense, Earnest is congruent with Wilde‘s essay on socialism, in which the self is 
similarly presented as a text-in-progress and where identity is conceived of as a battle 
for authorship. ‗The Soul of Man Under Socialism‘ (1891) conceives of late-Victorian 
society as one whose denizens labour under a ‗sordid necessity of living for others‘ 
(Works, 1174). Earnest demonstrates the centrality of books to the argument, making 
explicit a link already implicit in Wilde‘s formulation of the self as authored rather than 
innate. ‗The Soul of Man‘ presents late-Victorian society as one in which people go 
around ‗thinking other people‘s thoughts, living by other people‘s standards […] and 
never being themselves for a single moment‘ (Works, 1182). Earnest identifies 
published and manuscript volumes as sources of both, locating ‗other people‘s 
thoughts‘ in Cecily‘s schoolbooks and ‗other people‘s standards‘ in Lady Bracknell‘s 
notebook. At the same time, however, the play demonstrates the way in which the idea 
of the book as an expression of power depends on the tyrannical ubiquity of the idea of 
the book (even the avowedly fictional book) as a mirror of identifiable types 
discoverable in the ‗real‘ world – a fallacy that secures for the book its dangerous status 
as a receptacle for ‗truths‘ about people. 
The representation of books in Earnest can be linked, therefore, with the wider 
rejection of an essential self that Jonathan Dollimore has identified as underlying 
Wilde‘s writings. Describing Wilde‘s encounter with André Gide in Algiers in 1895, 
Dollimore describes the older man‘s desire to ‗demoralize‘ Gide ‗in the sense of 
liberate from moral constraint‘ and, in doing so, to ‗undermine that lawful sense of self 
which kept Gide transfixed within the law‘.159 Implicitly, identity is seen here as an 
artificial set of ‗moralizations‘ imposed externally in order to maintain a ‗lawful sense 
of self‘. By upsetting this ‗lawful‘ self, Wilde aims to bestow upon the younger man a 
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degree of personal autonomy unfettered by the tyranny of ‗lawful‘ constraint. In ‗The 
Soul of Man‘, such tyranny is presented as the enemy of what Wilde takes to be the sole 
end of a socialist state. Hence, his definition of Socialism as any system through which 
each man‘s self (his soul) is allowed to develop untrammelled by societal or 
governmental influence, the removal of which will ensure a quickening of a latent, 
subjective self. The point is simple: ‗There is no one type for man. There are as many 
perfections as there are imperfect men‘ (Works, 1181). 
Wilde‘s influence on Gide is clearly detectable in the latter‘s L’Immoraliste 
(1902). In that novel, Gide offers a protagonist (the French scholar, Michel) who comes 
to the realisation that the books in which he has hitherto immersed himself serve only to 
inflect, rather than reveal, the world as it really is. After such a revelation, Michel 
reports, the ‗miscellaneous mass of acquired knowledge of every kind that has overlain 
the mind gets peeled off in places like a mask of paint, exposing […] the authentic 
creature that had lain hidden beneath it‘. Consequently, Michel sets out to reclaim ‗that 
authentic creature, whom everything about me – books, masters, parents, and I myself 
had begun by attempting to suppress‘ and to banish the ‗secondary creature, the 
creature who was due to teaching, whom education had painted on the surface‘. Like 
Wilde, Gide argues not only that society is largely responsible for creating a self that 
comes to be considered innate, but also that the book is a crucial instrument in the 
enforcement of such an idea. Both writers liken the self to a book, presenting identity as 
a (re)writable space: ‗I compared myself to a palimpsest; I tasted the scholar‘s joy when 
he discovers under more recent writing, and on the same paper, a very ancient and 
infinitely more precious text.‘160  
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Nevertheless, to read L’Immoraliste is also to note an important sense in which 
Gide (or, at least, Michel) deviates from the implications of Wilde‘s insistent 
‗demoralization‘. In offering this image of the palimpsest, the novel endorses a view of 
identity as already ingrained and innate – an original entity to be rediscovered beneath a 
false surface. Yet, in ‗The Soul of Man‘, Wilde had advocated the removal of any and 
all dominant ideas of what the self was, is and should be in order to facilitate the free 
expression of an individuality which, though latent, is the sum, rather than the origin, of 
its expression. He writes, ‗it will be a marvellous thing – the true personality of man – 
when we see it‘: crucially, the passage foregrounds the immanent nature of the ‗true 
self‘, emphasising that ‗we‘ have not ‗seen it‘ yet (Works, 1179). Similarly, in ‗The 
Decay of Lying‘, Vivyan is adamant that the ‗more one analyses people, the more all 
reasons for analysis disappear. Sooner or later one comes to that dreadful universal 
thing called human nature‘ (Works, 1076). Ultimately, ‗[w]here we differ from each 
other is purely in accidentals: in dress, manner, tone of voice, religious opinions, 
personal appearance, tricks of habit and the like‘. For Wilde, what matters are the 
‗accidentals‘, the outward appearance – the uppermost and not the bottom layer of the 
palimpsest. If the person can be said to be like a book, then it is only because both are 
textual spaces that never lose their potential for being rewritten. For Wilde, therefore, 
the revelation of a ‗true‘ self is not obtained (as Michel mistakenly assumes) through 
the removal of a superficial mask in order to expose the truth concealed beneath. 
Instead, it entails a reversal of the surface/depth model whereby the true self is 
deliberately composed by adopting a set of already available signifiers. The expression 
of the self becomes, in short, not a revelation, but a continuous process of creation and 
re-creation. Ultimately, ‗[t]ruth is entirely and absolutely a matter of style‘ (Works, 
1081). 
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Where Gide‘s protagonist urges the exposure of the original document beneath a 
social palimpsest, therefore, Wilde‘s view is closer to that espoused by Foucault who 
argues, in terms which apply to the arguments advanced by the hero of L’immoraliste, 
that the man ‗whom we are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a 
subjection more profound than himself‘.161 Always already the product of society and 
the texts it produces – always already a result of measurement against an established 
corpus of ‗permanent‘ knowledge – the self cannot be ‗reclaimed‘, having been a 
fabrication from the outset. Already textual, self-expression depends upon an 
individual‘s recognition of the self as not only never ‗natural‘, but also as never having 
been ‗natural‘.  
The idea of self-assertion that Wilde advances is borrowed from Baudelaire and 
underlies the decadent idea of the self. For Baudelaire, those who attack or avoid ‗the 
artificial‘ in their attitudes and appearance resemble ‗one of those half-wit peacocks 
whose elegance is the creation of his tailor and whose head of his barber‘. Such 
creatures ‗exist very much more for the pleasure of the observer than for their own‘.162 
Unless armed with the weapon of ‗self‘-consciousness, Baudelaire argues, the 
individual self is in danger of succumbing to ‗the pleasure of the observer‘. To assert 
oneself consciously is, conversely, to reclaim the self in one‘s ‗own‘ image by asserting 
the right to create that image. This is, in Earnest, what self-assertion means. In that 
play, writing, like the cosmetics that Baudelaire praises, becomes the instrument of a 
liberating counterpoetics. The book still resembles the stifling instrument of social 
conformity encountered in Gide‘s work; but, in and through the production of counter-
texts, it is also the means by which individuality can be asserted.  
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Throughout the play, Cecily and Gwendolen consciously reject the idea of an 
essential self by constantly pointing out that one‘s actions do not reveal, but rather 
create the self through performance. In response to Algernon‘s enquiry as to whether 
her hair ‗curls naturally‘, Cecily replies that it does – albeit ‗with a little help from 
others‘ (II. 505-6). Her awareness of nature‘s imitability demonstrates, paradoxically, 
that intervention necessarily precedes the display of what is apparently already 
‗natural‘: that the existence of the ‗natural‘ relies on the taxonomic act that defines it. 
For Miss Prism, reading and writing work together to ensure the book‘s proper function 
as a means for the distillation of a subject‘s innate ‗nature‘ in a written form. Thus, 
while Miss Prism‘s formulation constantly seeks the ‗truth‘ of character, Gwendolen 
and Cecily are adamant that ‗in matters of grave importance, style, not sincerity is the 
vital thing‘ (III. 28-29). While Miss Prism places her supreme trust in the legibility of a 
work‘s substance, therefore, Gwendolen and Cecily insist upon the self-authorship 
attainable through a conscious embrace of style over substance – a rejection of 
stiflingly definitive ‗nature‘ in favour of an elaborate self-nurture.  
Gwendolen, for example, expresses early on her hope that she will ‗develop‘ but 
is also determined that her development will not follow a natural course. Rather, it will 
follow the course which Gwendolen ‗intends‘ (I. 297-98). This is an expedient escape 
from a ‗natural‘ course which, as the play demonstrates continually, is merely the 
quintessence of that which is collectively deemed natural by society and propagated by 
its books. Indeed, Jack Worthing begins and ends the play by finding himself 
exchanged for books – his infant self having been swapped for a manuscript, his 
marriageable adult self spends the final scene frantically searching for his name in the 
Army Lists. As Christopher Craft has noted, he spends the play not only seeking, but 
also actually finding ‗his ―natural‖ or ―proper‖ identity in an antic succession of texts‘. 
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By having Jack end the play claiming to have discovered the vital importance of being 
Ernest – apparently abandoning triviality in the discovery of what he always ‗naturally‘ 
was – Wilde in fact ends the drama ‗with a punnning recognition of, on the one hand, 
the determinative power of prior inscriptions and, on the other, the transvaluing power 
of substitution‘.163  
If books are the way in which the natural is imposed upon the play‘s younger 
protagonists, however, the play also takes care to emphasise writing as a strategy for 
resistance – an opportunity to write one‘s own personal ‗natural‘. An example is 
Cecily‘s use of her diary, which is presented as a deliberate contrast with the 
prescriptive three-volume novels beloved by her tutor. Claiming that her aim in keeping 
a diary is ‗to enter the wonderful secrets of my life‘, she argues: ‗if I didn‘t write them 
down I should probably forget all about them.‘ (II. 40) Miss Prism is ready with a 
homiletic response: ‗Memory, my dear Cecily, is the diary we all carry about with us.‘ 
(II. 43) Cecily retorts that memory ‗usually chronicles the things that have never 
happened, and couldn‘t possibly have happened‘ – in fact, she believes memory to be 
‗responsible for nearly all the three-volume novels that Mudie sends us‘ (II. 46-48). The 
exchange connects memory, the novel and autobiography in a complex network of 
allusion that makes representable truth contingent upon the way in which texts are 
produced and consumed. Miss Prism‘s belief in memory‘s infallibility as a means of 
directly recording the real betrays a belief in the existence of an essential self that can 
be easily and conveniently summarised – and thus easily explained away as either good 
or bad. Yet, the allusion to Mudie‘s recalls the ways in which the novelistic ‗self‘ is 
largely the product of the harsh moral requirements demanded by the literary ‗nurse‘ 
that dominates the system under which these novels have been produced and 
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distributed. Emphasising memory‘s fallibility, Cecily underlines the inadequacy not 
only of the literary system to record, but of the individual consciousness to directly 
perceive, the ‗many-sided mysteries‘ which constitute an event or a person.  
 In writing her diary, therefore, Cecily is well aware that the record is just as 
impressionistic as the memories it purports to record. Instead of adhering to the 
mistaken belief that memory is inescapably aligned with truth, she inverts the idea by 
constructing a narrative in which memory is indelibly connected with writing and 
authorship. Her diary chronicles events which, as Algernon discovers, have yet to 
happen, containing the entire history of their courtship before any of it has had a chance 
‗really‘ to occur. Foucault argues that a ‗monument for future memory‘ is also ‗a means 
of control and a method of domination […] a document for possible use‘.164 Yet, while 
Cecily‘s diary reclaims writing as a means of control, it also eschews its potential as a 
‗method of domination‘. Literally replacing memory with a self-authored volume, it 
exposes the artifice not only of memory, but also of the narratives to which it gives rise.  
In this sense, Cecily self-consciously foregrounds what Lady Bracknell 
unconsciously elides, reclaiming the book as a means of empowerment by openly 
acknowledging the interchangability of the book and the self. Her interview with 
Algernon mirrors Lady Bracknell‘s with Jack, yet it also inverts it in a manner that 
offers an important commentary on the use of self-authored texts as a means of exerting 
power. Both scenes involve a proposed suitor‘s individuality becoming subsumed in the 
details established in a pre-written record – in both cases they are, literally, brought to 
book. Yet Cecily‘s interview demonstrates the way in which her diary is a construction, 
consciously designed to change reality into the shape desired by the writer. Believing 
Algernon to be Ernest, the lover with whom Cecily has already imagined an affair of 
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several months‘ duration, she scripts their conversations, altering them to make them 
more stylistically appealing: ‗I don‘t think you should tell me that you love me wildly, 
passionately, devotedly, hopelessly. Hopelessly doesn‘t seem to make much sense, does 
it?‘ (II. 444-46). Here, although style takes the place of substance, it is not, as in Lady 
Bracknell‘s case, ever mistaken for substance. Lady Bracknell assumes her notebook to 
be a truthful chronicle of already extant ideals, but Cecily‘s writing begins from the 
premise that her account is subjective, stylised and largely (if not entirely) fictional. 
The conventions it purports to maintain are not collectively-held precepts designed to 
make the individual conform to the demands of a wider social structure, but an ideal 
narrative constructed by one subject as a model for her own life.  
If, as ‗The Decay of Lying‘ suggests, ‗the basis of life […] is simply the desire 
for expression, and Art is always presenting various forms through which this 
expression can be attained‘, then Cecily‘s diary can be seen not as a means of gaining 
power over others, but of enshrining her own power to imagine and fulfil a narrative of 
her own choosing and, indeed, of her own authorship. Foregrounding the complete 
separation of textuality from an ability (or even a need) to represent the ‗real‘, Cecily‘s 
diary legitimates a concomitant disregard for a view of reading as a means of 
discovering truths about the world as it ‗really is‘. In this way, Earnest links the socio-
political thrust of ‗The Soul of Man‘ with the literary-critical ideas of ‗The Critic as 
Artist‘ by making the basis of self-realisation a conscious decision to see the text ‗as in 
itself it really is not‘.  
Arguing that ‗the dominant category for Wilde is not art, but style‘, Neil 
Sammells has drawn usefully upon the concept of bricolage, especially as deployed by 
Dick Hebdige to twentieth-century subcultures, in order to outline the political 
consequences of Wilde‘s insistence upon the superficial quality of the meanings which 
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reading apparently reveals.
165
 As Sammells explains, bricolage is a term borrowed from 
anthropology, which names ‗the subversive process by which subcultures seize upon 
and appropriate commodities in order to ascribe to them new meanings, shaking them 
free from their ―authentic‖ associations‘.166 Hebdige himself endorses Umberto Eco‘s 
definition of bricolage as a form of ‗semantic guerrilla warfare‘.167 For Sammells, this 
is an apposite description of the way in which Wilde handles genre. Rejecting the idea 
that the society comedy‘s trivialities can be peeled away to reveal a reality that they 
subvert and mock, Sammells contends instead that the comedy is, in fact, ‗all surface‘: 
‗For Wilde, playwright and bricoleur, generic and specific dramatic pretexts are 
appropriated and displayed: they are figures in the carpet, not the shell that hides the 
kernel in the nut. That process of display is a matter of style.‘168 
I would argue that what Sammells sees as a fundamental feature of Wilde‘s 
dramatic writing could be extended to the presentation of the self within that writing. 
Like the plays that contain them, the characters‘ true meanings are revealed as being 
not a revealed ‗kernel‘ but a series of appropriations (or impositions) directly linked to 
a process of reading or writing undertaken either by themselves or on their behalf. In 
emphasising the location of meaning in the surface details and not in an inner ‗kernel‘ 
of truth, the self becomes entirely a matter of what it expresses, rather than the other 
way around. The replacement of the infant Jack with a three-volume novel and the adult 
Jack with the codes enshrined in Lady Bracknell‘s notebook cannot, therefore, be seen 
as substitutions for an authentic Jack which they serve somehow to obscure. The play 
offers ‗Jack‘ as an entity under construction, formed by the enforced appropriation of 
texts forced upon him from without – but it also portrays Cecily as a character able 
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consciously to plan her self-development by writing it in advance and appropriating it 
retrospectively. Both characters are built from the books they read – the difference is 
that one consciously gathers books about herself, while the other has books thrust upon 
him. The self and the book are thus linked by a mutual reliance on an idea of writing 
not as the expression of an already-authentic essence, but as the appropriation of pre-
existing thoughts, ideas, images and tropes. As a fluctuating collage, deliberately 
unmoored from the ‗authentic‘, its coherence, like that of the taxonomies analysed by 
Foucault, is transient at best. In this sense, the individual is as ‗authored‘ as the books 
he or she reads – to read becomes, paradoxically, an act of appropriation, whilst to live 
becomes an act of authorship: a deliberate unmooring of the self from the ‗authentic‘, in 
order to escape the taxonomic frameworks that external forces impose tyrannically.  
In ‗Pen, Pencil and Poison‘ (1889), for example, the actions of the poisoner, 
T.G. Wainewright, are presented as more artistic than his writings. Rather than an 
unfortunate biographical fact, Wilde‘s essay argues, murder must be taken as 
Wainewright‘s supreme artistic medium. The quality of his writings, it is true, ‗hardly 
justifies his reputation‘, but Wainewright ‗recognised that Life itself is an art, and has 
its modes of style no less than the arts that seek to express it‘. The essay recalls the 
inversion of Art and Life which ‗The Decay of Lying‘ also makes, but adds a telling 
disdain for an obsession with ‗production‘ as the ‗vulgar test‘ of an artist‘s greatness, 
suggesting that genius lies as much in what an artist is or does as in the objects for 
whose production he is responsible (Works, 1095). It is also a validation of Wilde‘s 
pronouncement, in ‗The Critic as Artist‘ that criticism is ‗more creative than creation‘. 
After all, the aesthetic brilliance of Wainewright‘s criminal antics is not innate, 
depending upon the presence of a sympathetic interpreter to present them as ‗artistic‘. 
In this essay, therefore, it is hard to see where representation ends and the self begins. 
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But then, that is the entire point: by representing murder as a triumph of style, rather 
than the expression of an innately deplorable moral substance, the essay redefines 
substance as the invention of a particularly brilliant stylist – just as Earnest does when 
it presents Cecily‘s life as the inevitable fulfilment of her diary. 
Cecily‘s diary, therefore, enshrines a strategy of resistance that counteracts the 
damaging assumptions Wilde had already complained of in his review of two 
biographies of Keats – namely, that there had once existed a ‗real‘ subject that 
biographers could recover simply through reading, and that subsequent biographical 
accounts could present to the reader as Keats‘s real personality. Underlying these 
assumptions are two major principles, which Wilde‘s writing rejects: that a book can 
express a definitive truth and that a writer is able to make assertions of truth about a 
human subject that is, fundamentally, knowable. In effect, Wilde‘s sonnet suggests that 
what was up for auction was not just Keats‘s letters, but also the opportunity to 
proclaim definitively upon their ‗meaning‘. Mistaking writing for direct and infallible 
expressions of internal ‗truth‘ – mistaking style for substance – the ‗brawlers‘ operate 
under the misapprehension that to read Keats‘s letters is also to read ‗Keats‘. In 
ascribing such assumptions to the bidders, Wilde‘s sonnet postulates the ownership of 
texts not as something that begins and ends with a transaction in the marketplace, but as 
a concept whose significance extends beyond that realm to become an important factor 
in the politics of identity, where the right to interpret is confused with the right to 
proclaim the truth about the writing subject. The auction-goers‘ frantic bidding 
implicates them in a system in which meaning becomes the constructed product of 
vulgar consensus, and in which consensus is also passed off as ‗truth‘: a system in 
which, to paraphrase Roland Barthes, the literal death of the author entails the 
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monstrous birth of the consumer.
169
 It is to the implications of book ownership in such 
a culture that the chapter now turns. 
 
v. No Purchase Necessary: Wilde, Henry James and identity in the marketplace 
Examining the historical context of the novel in the first two decades of the twentieth 
century, David Trotter has noted the ‗cultural implications‘ of a ‗shift of emphasis, in 
economic theory and practice, from production to consumption, and from the 
satisfaction of stable needs to the creation of new desires‘, which he sees as 
characteristic of the period.
170
 Drawing on the work of Lawrence Birken, Trotter argues 
that the gradual demise of classical political economy meant that ‗desire began to 
replace property as the ―symbolic badge of individualism‖‘ as the turn of the century 
approached.
171
  
Trotter takes Stanley Jevons as an example of a new generation of economic 
writers who ‗converted economics from a theory of production to a theory of 
consumption, and thus broke decisively with the productivist ideology of Adam Smith, 
Ricardo, Mill and Marx‘. Jevons argues that production ought no longer to be seen as a 
means of increasing the wealth of nations, but as a means of ‗maximising pleasure‘. 
Production – and, by implication, property – was no longer the end, but the means: ‗a 
kind of detour, something the consumer had to undertake in order to ensure further 
consumption‘.172  
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For Jevons the fact ‗that there are many things, such as rare ancient books, 
coins, antiques, etc., which have high values, and which are absolutely incapable of 
production now‘ tends to undermine the productionist assumption ‗that value depends 
on labour‘.173 Nor could value be said to lie in utility, since some of the most useful 
commodities (such as water) are free. To account for these difficulties, Jevons 
formulates a theory of ‗marginal utility‘, which involves estimating a commodity‘s 
value according to the utility to the consumer of one additional unit. In most cases, for 
example, an additional diamond will be of greater value to the individual than an 
additional pint of water. For Jevons, this means that, in practice, value would depend 
upon the ‗will or inclination of the person concerned‘, its utility no longer inherent, but 
arising out of a commodity‘s ‗relation to man‘s requirements‘.174 
Jevons‘s ideas are symptomatic of the abandonment in the late nineteenth 
century of an economics that located value not in a commodity‘s utility, but in its 
scarcity – a system that, as Birken points out, marks the beginnings of ‗a systematic 
ideology of individualistic desire‘. The supreme individualism that characterised this 
new consumerist ethos is perhaps best summated in Patten‘s pronouncement that the 
laws of supply and demand were no longer based on an object‘s inherent utility, but 
were founded instead upon the more subjective ‗laws of enjoyment‘.175  
For Trotter, one of the most immediate and striking ways in which the ‗shift in 
emphasis from production to consumption‘ finds its way into the period‘s fiction is 
through the representation of the ‗new practice‘ of shopping.176 Identifying shopping as 
symptomatic of an emergent economic ethos centred not in the needs, but in the 
idiosyncratic desires of the consumer, he offers a cogent analysis of the consequences 
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of this ‗new practice‘ for the politics of identity. In a climate where ‗purchase satisfies 
desire rather than need‘, he argues that the act of purchase enacts a ‗mirroring of subject 
in object which will enlarge, in a modest way,‘ the identity of the purchaser.177 His 
contention is that shopping allows consumers not only to fulfil, but also to express their 
individual desires.  
The consequences of Trotter‘s proposition are strikingly at play in the 
penultimate book of Henry James‘s The Ambassadors (1903). The episode in question 
sees the protagonist, Lambert Strether, taking a train to the country, having failed in his 
task of retrieving the wayward Chad from the charms of Paris and returning him to 
New England. He aims to detach himself from the intricacies of familial diplomacy of 
which the city has become redolent and experience instead ‗that French ruralism, with 
its cool special green‘. Being ‗but a land of fancy for him‘, the excursion is 
romanticised. Though stirred by curiosity, Strether‘s aim is not to explore, for the first 
time, an unfamiliar landscape. Rather, he hopes to visit that France which is, for him, 
‗the background of fiction, the medium of art, the nursery of letters‘ – in short, he seeks 
physically to visit a land that he has already frequented in imagination. His journey into 
the rural vistas of France is intended only to stimulate another journey, by imagination, 
into the memory of a landscape glimpsed ‗through the little oblong window of the 
picture-frame‘. Strether has, indeed, one particular picture in mind, recalling ‗a certain 
small Lambinet that had charmed him, long years before, at a Boston dealer‘s and that 
he had quite absurdly never forgotten‘.178 His is not an idle visit, therefore, but an active 
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search for France as portrayed by Lambinet: ‗he could alight anywhere […] on catching 
a suggestion of the particular note required‘ (The Ambassadors, 453).  
Strether‘s impressions of France are thus doubly removed from the tangible 
landscape. On the one hand, he is determined impressionistically to view the scene as 
the mirror of Lambinet‘s painting. On the other hand, his impressions of the painting 
originate in an experience now temporally distant. His visit to the Boston art dealer 
took place ‗long years before‘ and he has never seen the work since, its price having 
rendered its purchase ‗beyond a dream of possibility‘. Since then, he has mythologised 
not only the work itself, but the purchase he never made. To remember the painting is 
to recall not just Lambinet‘s work, but also the scene of that aborted purchase: ‗the 
dusty day in Boston, the background of the Fitchburg Depot, of the maroon-coloured 
sanctum, the special-green vision, the ridiculous price, the poplars, the willows, the 
rushes, the river, the sunny silvery sky, the shady woody horizon‘ (The Ambassadors, 
453).  
 Strether‘s impression of the painting and of the scene it depicts is, in this 
passage, inseparable from the scene of his original encounter. The ‗particular note‘ that 
he seeks depends on a remembered conjunction of ‗weather, air, light, colour and his 
mood‘ (The Ambassadors, 453). But his memory of the painting is so intermingled with 
his memory of the dealer‘s shop that what appears, initially, to be the recollection of a 
painting, actually turns out to represent the memory of a ‗mood‘. Consequently, when 
Strether recalls a particular formation of ‗weather, air, light, colour‘, it is impossible 
definitively to pronounce whether this conjunction of impressions reflects his memories 
of the painting or of the conditions under which it was encountered. In fact, his memory 
is not of a painting, but of an encounter with a painting – and it is this memory of an 
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encounter, of a purchase he never made, rather than of the painting itself, which now 
informs his visit to the French countryside. 
What begins, therefore, as a meditation on art‘s capacity to prepare the mind for 
the beauty of nature proceeds immediately to draw back not only from nature, but also 
from its artistic representation. Lambinet‘s painting is neither directly perceived nor 
directly remembered by Strether. Instead, the impressions left by a work of art become 
inescapably mingled with the mediating gaze of the consuming subject and the 
refractive qualities of the context in which the artwork is encountered. As a result, 
Lambinet‘s painting passes into Strether‘s possession; not through a financial 
transaction, but through his own position as the source of a particular conjunction of 
impressions. He may never have purchased the painting, but its autobiographical 
significance – its inseparable commingling with the memory of encountering it at a 
particular time and in a particular place – ensures an imaginative hold (a different kind 
of  ‗purchase‘) upon his initial impression of the painting. This impression has 
remained his, even as possession of the physical canvas eludes him. Quite apart from 
any aesthetic attraction, it ‗abode with him as the picture he would have bought‘.  
Indeed, when Strether finally settles on a spot at which to alight, what greets 
him is a scene reflective not of Lambinet, but of the memory of Lambinet as he once 
experienced him: ‗it was all there, in short—it was what he wanted: it was Tremont 
Street, it was France, it was Lambinet‘ (The Ambassadors, 453). The tripartite 
formulation is tellingly general – Tremont Street has come to signify France, which has 
come to signify Lambinet. But then, Lambinet has also come to signify France, which 
in turn has come to signify Tremont Street. The artwork itself recursively gives way to 
a trail of meanings that leads back, not to the work of art but to the consuming subject, 
in whom they cohere.  
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The whole chapter is thus a chronicle of the pleasures that obtain from the 
memory of a purchase not made. For Strether, the prospect of purchase ignites a latent 
desire. Having been offered as a commodity, the painting is no longer simply 
Lambinet‘s depiction of the French countryside – rather, it is transformed, under the 
consumer‘s gaze, into the image of what the consumer desires the French countryside to 
be. The presence of the art object as a commodity acts as a catalyst for the expression of 
the consumer‘s own desires. Offered for sale, the art object becomes an avatar for the 
desires it exposes for the consumer.  
In this way, Strether‘s experience as a consumer tallies with Trotter‘s idea of 
shopping as an activity that enacts a ‗mirroring of subject in object‘. Yet, James‘s novel 
also serves to complicate Trotter‘s argument about the connection between shopping 
and the consumer‘s identity. When, in The Ambassadors, the art object is presented as a 
commodity, it is rewritten under the consumer‘s gaze, exposing its status as a textual 
space. But this revelation flows both ways. Certainly, the object could be said to 
‗mirror‘ the consumer, who makes it a subject of his gaze. In doing so, however, it also 
‗mirrors‘ the consumer as subject, exposing his own status as a text that has yet to 
express itself – that writes itself through as much as in the desired object. Thus, object 
and subject, commodity and consumer, are shown to be mutually responsible for the 
creation of a third text, the production of which is the inescapable consequence of the 
consumer‘s desiring gaze. The consumer thus intimately owns the object even when 
possession of the object as a physical commodity is deferred. On the one hand, 
therefore, Strether‘s shopping trip exemplifies an economic culture founded upon 
subjective ‗laws of enjoyment‘. But on the other, it demonstrates that, in an economy of 
production, the commodity‘s status as a vehicle for the idiosyncratic desires of the 
consumer also creates new opportunities for the interplay of subject and object in the 
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creation of identity. Where art is concerned, in a consumer society no purchase is 
necessary. 
  The heightened subjectivity with which art is approached in James‘s novel is 
echoed throughout Wilde‘s ‗The Critic as Artist‘, which makes explicit what Strether‘s 
experience demonstrates implicitly – that any ‗antithesis between‘ the critical and the 
creative faculties ‗is entirely arbitrary‘.  Gilbert (the dialogue‘s main antagonist) is 
adamant that the unavoidable deployment of discrimination, selection and omission in 
mimesis ensures that all ‗fine imaginative work‘, even that which ‗seems to us to be the 
most natural and simple product‘, is actually self-conscious and deliberate (Works, 
1118). In this, his view coheres with Arnold‘s in presenting the discriminating artist as 
a critic of life. Yet, where Arnold sees the work as the instrument by which the artist 
reveals an essential truth, which the critic later expounds, Gilbert is keen to emphasise 
the essential artifice of that which appears natural, unconscious and inherently ‗true‘. If 
‗artistic creation implies the working of the critical faculty, and, indeed, without it 
cannot be said to work at all‘, then it must surely follow that criticism is also ‗really 
creative in the highest sense of the word‘ (Works, 1124). 
Gilbert‘s argument – that creation is as critical as much as criticism is creative – 
undermines the idea of an objective truth in representation by destroying the possibility 
of objectivity in the onlooker. Interpretation is always autobiographically orientated and 
influenced by previous cultural encounters. Deriving from the reading subject and not, 
finally, from the work being read, it is not really a record of the work, but of a reaction 
to it – it is ‗really […] the record of one‘s own soul‘. Having no direct appeal to an 
external standard, it is ‗concerned simply with oneself‘. It is ‗[a] form of autobiography, 
as it deals not with the events, but with the thoughts of one‘s life.‘ Ultimately, the 
critic‘s ‗whole aim is to chronicle his own impressions. It is for him that pictures are 
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painted, books written, and marble hewn into form‘ (Works, 1125). In this sense, 
Strether as consumer resembles Gilbert far more than he resembles the ‗brawlers‘ in 
Wilde‘s sonnet on the auction of Keats‘s letters. Fully conscious of the transformative 
nature of the consumer‘s complicity not only in the financial, but also the imaginative 
appropriation of the artwork-commodity, Strether recognises implicitly the double-
edged nature of his purchase upon Lambinet. 
James‘s novel and Wilde‘s essays, therefore, both point towards a market in 
which a commodity‘s value does not reside intrinsically within the commodity itself, 
but is instead bestowed upon the object by its ability to meet the idiosyncratic desires of 
individual consumers. Yet while both writers argue in favour of the new ethos of 
consumption, Wilde‘s writings also seek actively to discredit the productionist notion 
of value that consumption displaces. In doing so, he posits the need to embrace the role 
of idiosyncratic consumer as an urgent political necessity if the tyrannies of 
productionist notions of utilitarian use-value are to be avoided.  
In ‗The Soul of Man‘, for example, Wilde asserts that ‗the recognition of private 
property has really harmed Individualism, and obscured it, by confusing a man with 
what he possesses‘:  
 
In a community like ours, where property confers immense distinction, social 
position, honour, respect, titles, and other pleasant things of the kind, man, 
being naturally ambitious, makes it his aim to accumulate this property, and 
goes on wearily and tediously accumulating it long after he has got far more 
than he wants, or can use, or enjoy, or perhaps even know of. (Works, 1178) 
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As the passage attests, private property is ultimately harmful to the cause of 
individualism because it is never, in the final estimation, actually ‗private‘. Rather, it is 
the tangible exhibit of the entirely public significance it has come to possess. The value 
of the property is seen to lie in its presumed ability to signify distinction, social 
position, honour, respect, titles and so forth. The value of property, in this estimation, is 
related directly to those ‗values‘ that it has come communally to signify – but this 
communal agreement has been lost in sight. Paraphrasing and inverting Arnold‘s 
attempt to ‗see the object as in itself it really is‘, one might say that, in ‗The Soul of 
Man‘, a value communally conferred upon property has come erroneously to represent 
a value that the commodity in itself really offers. Viewed in this way, private property 
reflects not the individuality of its owner, but the consensus of society – the assertion of 
membership and affiliation to a system of already-ascribed values. The extent to which 
property is ever ‗personal‘ is called into question; reconfigured as the communal 
embodiment of ‗other people‘s standards […] practically what one may call other 
people‘s second-hand clothes‘, it is merely authority‘s means of propagating and 
perpetuating itself by ‗bribing‘ the owner ‗to conform‘ (Works, 1182).  
In place of this system, Wilde draws upon Christ‘s teachings to formulate a new 
approach to property. According to Wilde, Christ‘s message (like Wilde‘s own) is that 
man should strive to ‗be‘ himself. In pursuing such a goal, the concept of ownership, 
insofar as it involves ‗accumulating or possessing external things‘, becomes redundant: 
‗Your personality does not need it. It is within you, and not outside of you, that you will 
find what you really are, and what you really want‘ (Works, 1180). Nevertheless, it 
would be a mistake to view Wilde‘s idea – ascribed to Jesus – as a wholesale rejection 
of personal property. What is advocated here is an emphasis on the way in which the 
‗personal‘ significance of ‗property‘ never lies, pre-written, within the object itself, but 
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is brought to the object by the owner. It is a reconfiguration of property that emphasises 
the congruity between ‗personal property‘ and ‗personal expression‘. Without this 
congruence, the ‗personal‘ is erased and the consumer is left only with ‗property‘. As in 
Baudrillard‘s conception of property as ‗moral furniture‘, Wilde presents property as a 
metonymic embodiment of the values of society, through which the dominant order 
asserts itself. Only in embracing and acknowledging the idiosyncrasies of desire can the 
individuality of the consuming subject be maintained.  
In this way, Wilde‘s essay not only endorses a consumerist idea of a 
commodity‘s value, but also conveys an urgent dissection of its political necessity. The 
injunction, in ‗The Critic as Artist‘, to see the object as in itself it really is not, is more 
than simply an absurd comic paradox. Its implication – that those who claim to carry 
out an Arnoldian right reading are actually speaking only of themselves and only for 
themselves – carries urgent political weight. Gilbert is quite explicit as to the 
implications of his argument: ‗[the] difference between objective and subjective work is 
one of external form merely. It is accidental, not essential.‘ Not only is all artistic 
creation pronounced to be absolutely subjective, but the field of ‗artistic creation‘ is 
also widened to include any and all talk about creative works (Works, 1143). In the end, 
meaning is in the eye of the beholder, ‗who lends to the beautiful thing its myriad 
meanings, and makes it marvellous for us, and sets it in some new relation to the age, so 
that it becomes a vital portion of our lives‘ (Works, 1127). 
 Such absolute subjectivity of meaning allows the critic to become a great artist. 
But it also allows the more obtuse (one might say Arnoldian) critic to mistake their 
‗own soul‘ for the spirit of the age. In fact, the assumption that an object contains a true 
meaning, which the critic can uncover, is more than simple philistinism. So long as the 
fallacy of a ‗true meaning‘ is maintained, criticism is synonymous with surveillance 
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and surveillance synonymous with criticism. It should not surprise us then, that in 
Earnest, Wilde makes the book a symbol of the relationship between property, self-
expression and social surveillance – nor that the three-volume novel should be singled 
out for particular attention as a site upon which all three conjoin. By 1895, the status of 
the novel as a commodity had undergone changes. The most major of these was the 
rapid decline of the triple-decker. Yet this development was also intimately related to 
the beginnings of a major shift in the ways in which novels were physically obtained – 
in their status as ‗personal property‘. As Guinevere L. Griest explains in her study of 
Mudie‘s, such institutions ‗maintained in the nineteenth century a reading public that 
borrowed, but did not buy original editions of novels‘.179 So entwined was the three-
volume form with its mode of distribution that Griest places the ‗end of the Victorian 
circulating library‘ not with ‗the closing of Mudie‘s, but rather with the extinction of 
the triple-decker, a method of publishing so closely entwined with its prosperity that the 
end of the one spelled the doom of the other. The company itself survived until the 
1930s, but its autocratic position was lost‘.180 
 Griest outlines a market situation in which the dominant form of the novel-as-
book depended upon an institution whose economic monopoly of the marketplace 
ensured near total control over which books the public would encounter and how. The 
three-volume form meant a higher price, which provided the libraries with ‗a kind of 
insurance that readers would be compelled to borrow‘.181 It also worked as ‗a handicap 
to the retail bookseller, already at a disadvantage because of the extra discounts often 
allowed to libraries‘.182 At the same time, however, the three-volume novel‘s position 
as the foundation stone upon which the circulating library‘s economic monopoly was 
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built meant that the abrupt extinction of the three-volume form also spelled the end of 
the library‘s absolute dominance. Consequently, the one-volume novel‘s appearance as 
the dominant form from the late-1880s onwards coincided with the beginning of a 
process that led to the novel becoming something one was more likely to buy than ever 
before. No longer were new books something one invariably possessed for only a 
limited period of time. They could now be something one first encountered as a 
commodity – as a form of personal property. 
As I discussed in my introductory chapter, other outlets for new fiction were 
available. Readers could purchase magazines in which new novels were serialised, buy 
novels from stalls at railway stations or obtain a copy of the latest instalment of a part-
work novel by the likes of Dickens, Trollope or Thackeray. Yet, the fact that libraries 
dominated the distribution of novels in volume form – and the fact that magazines often 
had to appeal to a whole family – meant that they too came under the influence of 
social and moral ‗safeguards‘. Moreover, railway novels tended to be reprints of work 
that had already passed through the library system – not to mention the fact that W.H. 
Smith‘s, the leading vendor of railway reading, were as selective as Mudie‘s about the 
novels they stocked. Although the rise in borrowing versus buying figures was not 
extraordinary, it was tangible. Furthermore, the need not only to increase library sales, 
but also to ‗attract those individual readers who could afford to buy rather than borrow‘ 
meant that the value of a new work of fiction would lie increasingly in its ability to 
satisfy ‗the idiosyncratic desires of the reader-consumer‘.183  
Cecily‘s stated decision to read only those books that she herself has written 
represents the idiosyncrasies of consumer desires stretched to the extreme. At the same 
time, it is presented as the reaction of a young person who, in having books thrust upon 
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her, has also had meaning thrust upon her in the form of a pre-written narrative. In this 
way, Earnest sets up the book as an embodiment of idiosyncratic consumer desire, in 
direct contrast to a productionist idea that saw the book as an object of utility, able to 
provide the purchaser with external, needful things – with moral, religious and political 
truths, which the reader could be expected to recognise as such. As books gradually 
took on the mantle of commodities formed by the consumer‘s idiosyncratic desires, 
they could no longer be expected to fulfil this ‗need‘ for ineluctable truths – the reader-
as-consumer would be less in thrall to the tyranny that books once exercised as 
representatives of communal fictions.  
To emphasise the reader‘s role as co-operative in bestowing a value or 
significance upon the text is to confiscate the book‘s status as the product of an author 
able faithfully to represent innate truths about the subjects depicted therein. In 
eschewing, like James, the need to possess the commodity physically, Wilde underlines 
the political importance of recognising one‘s self as consumer by insisting upon the 
consumer as, finally, the co-author and not the passive receiver of that which an object 
apparently ‗really‘ is in itself. Ultimately, the meaning of Keats‘s letters is brought to 
them by the consumer – what gives Wilde cause for concern in his sonnet is the 
inability of the ‗brawlers‘ to see themselves as consumers, or to see the dead author and 
his manuscripts as textual. Taking ‗The Critic as Artist‘ into account, any reading of 
Keats might be considered artificial – but any reading that fails to recognise its own 
artificiality, preferring to see itself as potentially definitive, is also tyrannical. The 
‗ownership‘ exerted by Keats‘s biographers is thus as illusory as those seekers after 
personal property, so vilified in ‗The Soul of Man‘, who fail to recognise their own 
stake in the production of the text‘s meaning.  
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Ultimately, the difference between Cecily and Lady Bracknell, like the difference 
between the productionist and consumerist economic outlooks, might be said to lie in 
the degree to which they are prepared (or able) to recognise the impossibility of 
objective representation in art – and, consequently the legitimacy of the book as the 
final word on society and the people who inhabit it. Like Wilde‘s essays, Earnest 
simultaneously celebrates and warily warns against the ‗birth of the consumer‘ at a time 
when books were slipping further and further from the remit of the libraries into the 
wider marketplace. In effect, Wilde‘s works can be seen not only as a manifesto for the 
role of art in a changing marketplace, but also as an eloquent and witty explication of 
the political urgency of recognising these changes. His writings present situation after 
situation in which a utilitarian attitude to art as the guardian of an unassailably 
legitimate status quo is symptomatic of a wider attitude to the self as not authored, but 
discovered – a misconception that could (and, in Wilde‘s case, poignantly did) 
transform writing into an imposition of power. Equally pervasive in Wilde‘s writings, 
however, is a counter-emphasis upon the ability of self-conscious artificiality – an 
acknowledgement that writing about the world is always, ultimately, to create or to 
uphold a co-authored fiction – to do away with the often unconscious tyranny that 
resulted. 
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Chapter 2 
Terms and Conditions Apply: Robert Louis Stevenson’s Metafictional Strategies 
 
Wilde‘s ambivalence regarding the ways in which reading will inevitably influence the 
formation of readerly subjectivity emanates from a model of self-development 
borrowed almost wholesale from the theories of Pater and Baudelaire. These writers‘ 
view of the self and its experiences as inherently artificial leads them to champion art 
that foregrounds the artificiality already present in the ‗real‘ from which art draws 
inspiration. Hence the central paradox of decadent aestheticism – that society is always 
already the product of its own representation, because it is always already the product 
of the art it consumes. This idea gives rise, in Wilde‘s writings, to a model of reading as 
always, to some extent, a personal appropriation of text – to read a book is thus, for 
Wide, to appropriate it for the self and thus, in one way, to ‗own‘ it. Thus, despite his 
preoccupation with the consequences of ownership for individual self-expression within 
a commodity-ridden consumer culture, Wilde‘s writing often subsumes concerns about 
the particularity of a text‘s physical form within a wider examination of the 
implications of textuality itself.  
In The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890), for example, fetishisation of the material 
book merely foregrounds the way in which the tangible volume is always itself textual. 
Obtaining multiple unbound copies of Joris-Karl Huysmans‘s decadent novel A 
Rebours (1884) from Paris, Dorian binds them ‗in different colours, so that they might 
suit his various moods‘ – imitating the bibliographic practice of Huysmans‘s 
protagonist, Des Esseintes. Here is an instance in which the physical conditions of 
textual reception exert just as strong an influence upon the reader as the text itself. 
Highlighting the physical as also textual, the incident emphasises the way in which the 
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volumes‘ material form retains a role in determining their meaning as texts. They can 
be made to reflect ‗the changing fancies of a nature over which‘ Dorian seems, ‗at 
times, to have almost entirely lost control‘. A change in the physical book is constituted 
here as a defence against the totalising influence of a text that seems ‗to contain the 
story of his own life, written before he had lived it‘.184 Controlling the relationship 
between the self and the book‘s physical form, Dorian is able to assert himself against 
the text, which threatens to subsume the nature over which he has ‗lost control‘. 
Literally ‗colouring‘ each reading experience, control over the material encounter 
allows Dorian to retain some control over the parameters of the textual encounter to 
which he apparently surrenders himself totally. For Des Essentes and Dorian, the 
discrete reification of the book as thing mitigates its universal influence over subjective 
autonomy. 
The incident is an example of the way in which Wilde‘s writings simultaneously 
expose and overcome the dangers of textual encounter for a self whose nature is already 
textual and thus under constant threat of being rewritten by the texts with which it 
comes into contact: Dorian ‗rewrites‘ the volume‘s material dimension in order to re-
establish control over a textual content that threatens to rewrite Dorian. The paradigm is 
echoed throughout Wilde‘s works. Lady Bracknell‘s notebook, for instance, in being so 
manifestly self-authored, foregrounds her determination to exert power over self and 
society merely by proclaiming one configuration of both as the definitive original. In 
fact, the specificity of the physical medium is often, in Wilde, just one facet of a wider 
point about the ambivalent effects of textuality. What is true of Lady Bracknell‘s 
notebook is, after all, also the case with the diaries, textbooks and novels that appear 
throughout Earnest. Like Dorian‘s multi-coloured volumes, they represent an attempt to 
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gain autonomy over the meaning of self and society. Their physicality is simply a 
convenient metonym for the tangibility of the abstract and arbitrary textual 
configurations to which they quite literally lend weight. Miss Prism‘s triple-deckers 
bring those texts into the purview of a particular literary system – that of Mudie‘s 
Select Library – and illustrate the stultifying effect of that system not only on literary 
texts, but also upon the society that consumes them. Ultimately, however, the play 
presents the specific physical form of the novels as less significant than the naïvely 
mimetic assumptions that have accrued to the kinds of fiction they represent. For the 
play‘s purposes, the reasons as to why, as physical commodities, triple-deckers promote 
happy endings for the ‗good‘ and unhappy ones for the ‗bad‘ – the social, economic and 
literary factors that locate the triple-decker historically – are ultimately less important 
than the unfortunate fact that, as texts, this is what they do. 
In this chapter, I will argue that Robert Louis Stevenson shares many of Wilde‘s 
concerns regarding the relationship between reality and its textual representation, but 
that, unlike Wilde, he grounds his discussion of that relationship in the historically-
specific material conditions that govern the production, circulation and consumption of 
such representations. Stevenson‘s approach to fiction – both in theory and in practice – 
raises similar questions regarding textual representation as those that plague Wilde. I 
will argue, however, that, as a writer who preaches the necessity of writing for a 
specific audience in a specific market, Stevenson contributes to the debate a more 
nuanced concern for the ways in which writers and readers have inescapably to deal 
with material conditions that cannot be avoided. In varying ways, his adventure 
narratives show signs of having been carefully tailored to suit specific markets. They 
are also metafictional, drawing attention to themselves as the product of a writing 
subject catering for the desires of a particular kind of reader-consumer within a specific 
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literary marketplace. Wilde‘s writing deals fully with the question of what it means to 
write, own and read a ‗text‘: Stevenson asks the more specific question of what, within 
the rapidly expanding literary marketplace of the late nineteenth century, it means to 
write, own and read a ‗book‘.  
 
i. Reading, romance and experience 
In July 1888, as part of a series of articles for Scribner’s Magazine, Stevenson 
composed an essay dealing with the enormous popularity of those authors who, 
although unsung in conventional literary circles, had gained a widespread notoriety 
among the mass-readership of cheap periodicals. ‗Popular Authors‘ is representative of 
a coherent ideology of authorship detectable throughout Stevenson‘s writing. A reader-
centric outlook that situates literature as a trade among other trades, it is an ideology in 
which literary merit depends on a writer‘s ability to meet the demands of his readers, 
just as every producer must meet the demands of the consumer on whose patronage 
they depend.  
Stevenson imagines the habitual contributors to the penny press longing for a 
more respectable outlet for their literary aspirations in a realm more conventionally 
associated with literary success: 
 
[N]ot content with such glory as comes to them, they long for the glory of being 
bound – long to invade, between six boards, the homes of that aristocracy whose 
manners they so often find occasion to expose; and sometimes (once in a long 
lifetime) the gods give them this also, and they appear in the orthodox three 
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volumes and are fleered at in the critical press, and lie quite unread in 
circulating libraries.
185
 
 
The passage appears patronisingly to consign these writers to the realms of sub-library 
inferiority. To brand the three-volume novel as ‗orthodox‘ reinforces the situation of 
the penny serial on the fringe of conventionally respectable modes of literary 
production. It maintains a separation between the work of popular authors and those 
novelists who achieve a more conventional fame through the adulation of circulating 
library subscribers – the readerly ‗aristocracy‘. The popularity of these penny authors 
is, conversely, founded on the adoration of servants and tradesmen: ‗[y]our butcher, the 
landlady at your seaside lodgings […] the barmaid whom you doubtless court, even the 
Rates and Taxes that besiege your door‘ – these are the people who ‗have actually read 
your tales and actually know your names‘ (Essays Literary and Critical, 24-25). 
‗Popular Authors‘, therefore, performs several taxonomic operations: between popular 
serial literature and the novel; between the reading of the working classes and the 
reading of the middle classes; between ‗orthodox‘ and unorthodox literary forms; 
between the relative glories of popular appreciation and critical success.  
Yet, in acknowledging these disjunctions, Stevenson‘s aim is not to judge one 
set of literary productions as inferior and another as superior, nor is the essay an attempt 
to bridge the gap between the two. To do so would be to reinforce ideas of high and low 
culture when, in fact, by separating the penny serial from the novel, Stevenson is 
actually emphasising the wholly different standards by which each must be judged. 
Emphasising the relative nature of ‗orthodoxies‘ of literary success, Stevenson 
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confesses that, for all the praise he has received from peers and reviewers, he has ‗tried 
and on the whole […] failed‘ to please a mass readership:  
 
A servant-maid used to come and boast when she had read another chapter of 
Treasure Island: that any pleasure should attend the exercise never crossed her 
thoughts. The same tale, in a penny paper of a high class, was mighty coldly 
looked upon. (Essays Literary and Critical, 25)  
 
As this self-assessment indicates, Stevenson was intensely committed to the notion that 
reading should be, first and foremost, a pleasurable exercise and that the adoration of 
readers, the very quantum of popular success, was not an achievement lightly to be 
dismissed.  
‗Popular Authors‘ encapsulates a continual insistence, in Stevenson‘s literary 
criticism, that any discussion of literary merit must take into account the tastes and 
reactions of readers who actually consume and enjoy fiction, rather than focusing 
narrowly on the aims and aspirations of the authors who produce it. His ‗Letter to a 
Young Gentleman Who Proposes to Embrace the Career of Art‘ (1888) reminds its 
correspondent (Stevenson‘s stepson Lloyd Osbourne) that an artist‘s career is defined 
by its relation to other ‗honest trades‘, not least professional authorship (Essays 
Literary and Critical, 4). As with other tradesmen, professional writers have a duty to 
produce not what they themselves wish to write, but what the consumer desires and 
demands. It is, after all, the consumer ‗who is to pay us […] for services that he shall 
desire to have performed. […] To give the public what they do not want, and yet expect 
to be supported: we have there a strange pretension, and yet not uncommon‘ (Essays 
Literary and Critical, 7). The writer-as-tradesman formulation foregrounds the author‘s 
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task not as one of composition, but of production – a practice dependent upon the rules 
of supply and demand, rather than an ability to tap into some essential literary genius. 
Indeed, in this formulation, the ability to meet consumer demand successfully becomes 
itself a species of literary genius – an index of literary merit in which the author‘s own 
artistic ideals must always be reconciled to that which a particular readership desires.  
‗Popular Authors‘ can be read, therefore, as an analysis of popular fiction by a 
writer who wished not to dismiss, but rather to understand its enormous mass-appeal. 
To write such tales is, for Stevenson, not only a skill worth learning, but also one not 
lightly acquired. All professional writers, Stevenson argues, ‗profess to be able to 
delight‘. Yet, he adds, ‗how few of us are!‘ To identify the writer as a tradesman 
peddling readerly ‗delight‘, however, invokes the important question of how such a 
subjective construction is to be understood. After all, if the author is fundamentally a 
producer of commodities, it is necessary to know what exactly s/he is being asked to 
produce. It involves the difficult task not of proscribing, but of anticipating the reader‘s 
desires. How is this ‗impudent design‘ to be fulfilled? (Essays Literary and Critical, 8-
9). For Stevenson, the answer lies in the constant references, throughout his work, to 
childhood as a period in which narrative invention is allowed to shape and govern 
actual experience. As well as a defence of writing for the market, ‗Popular Authors‘ 
presents an autobiographical reminiscence of the penny fiction Stevenson himself 
consumed avidly in childhood, as well as an attempt to provide the reader with a 
flavour of the ‗delight‘ that attended this boyhood reading.  
His summary of The Diamond Necklace, or the Twenty Captains by William 
Stephens Hayward, is a typical example. The story begins, Stevenson recalls, with the 
placement, by the protagonist, of an advertisement inviting nineteen like-minded 
gentlemen to join him in an exciting enterprise. Within the course of the story, these 
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captains must rescue the tale‘s imperilled heroine. Describing this episode, Stevenson 
emphasises not only the way in which the story‘s events are governed by the narrative 
conventions of genre writing, but also how popular genres evolve from the stereotypes 
and conventions of particular modes of publication. For instance, his summary eschews 
characters‘ names, replacing them instead with labels denoting their roles in the story: 
‗Is injured innocence, with her diamond necklace, to lie at the mercy of an aristocrat? 
Forbid it, Heaven and the Cheap Press!‘ (Essays Literary and Critical, 22). In a story 
governed by the conventions of the ‗Cheap Press‘, the laws of narrative can be 
entrusted to prevent the heroine‘s molestation. Yet, the moral absolute of ‗Heaven‘ also 
appears to require the generic conventions of the press to ensure their successful 
implementation. The readers‘ ‗delight‘ is figured as the product of generic convention, 
whilst simultaneously arising from an easy recognition of those conventions as the 
generic accoutrements of a particular publishing tradition. 
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the twenty captains‘ rescue is 
unhampered by such banal concerns as might hinder the success (not to mention the 
excitement) of such a journey in reality: ‗As well as I can gather, there were no stations 
and no pointsmen on the route to Dover, which must in consequence be quick and safe‘ 
(Essays Literary and Critical, 22). The only thing it has in common with ‗other and less 
simple railways‘ is a line of telegraph poles. These the captains are able to destroy 
using a coil of rope, which one of them happens to have about his person; but not 
before another of their company, a blundering Irishman, hilariously botches things by 
destroying part of the engine in the process. In his synopsis, Stevenson emphasises the 
generic inevitability of these events, emphasising the lack of readerly surprise in the 
face of the patently improbable: ‗One of them, you will not be surprised to learn, had a 
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coil of rope – in his pocket, I suppose; another – again I shall not surprise you – was an 
Irishman and given to blundering‘ (Essays Literary and Critical, 22).   
The evident strain of mockery in this summary should not detract from the 
simple fact that it is, first and foremost, a description of a fondly remembered reading 
experience. To characterise ‗Popular Authors‘ as a work of description as much as (if 
not more than) a critique allows the essay to be read as the embodiment (rather than 
simply a satire) of a particular kind of readerly engagement. Far from denouncing the 
‗Cheap Press‘ as unoriginal or derivative, the essay argues that this is a form of print 
culture where the derivative is to be celebrated as the very foundations of the genre 
because of the readerly pleasure it provides. Indeed, elsewhere in the essay, Stevenson 
explicitly states that the kinds of pleasures to be found in a mode of reading that 
appreciates and responds appropriately to the deployment of conventional narrative 
devices and tropes is the most appropriate one in this instance. Such a response 
recognises, with the child-reader, that these tales, though ‗acutely untrue to life as it is‘, 
are nevertheless ‗pleasantly coincident with childish hopes of what life ought to be‘ 
(Essays Literary and Critical, 23). For Stevenson, the link between the imagined 
recasting of adult experience for the purpose of child‘s play and the highly conventional 
nature of the popular literary romance derives from the dependence of both upon what 
the imagination can furnish as opposed to what experience confirms. They are, quite 
literally, such stuff as dreams are made on: ‗Such tales as a man, such rather as a boy, 
tells himself at night, not without smiling, as he drops asleep; such, with the same 
exhilarating range of incident and the same trifling ingenuities, with no more truth to 
experience and scarcely more cohesion, HAYWARD told‘ (Essays Literary and Critical, 
21; Stevenson‘s capitalisation).  
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Stevenson‘s description of Hayward‘s story is not a criticism, therefore, but a 
definition of the kind of fiction Hayward set out to write – a definition offered as part of 
a larger quest to determine the pleasures that his readers craved and which Hayward so 
successfully provided. Fascinated by the nature of the ‗art‘ involved in constructing a 
text so completely governed by the need to entertain, Stevenson asks: ‗What kind of 
talent is required to please this mighty public? that was my first question, and was soon 
amended with the words, ―if any‖.‘ While this appears to differentiate between 
popularity and ‗talent‘, it is merely a prelude to a more subversive proposition. In fact, 
he suggests, a conventional attitude to mass-popularity, in which derivative works 
founded on a series of loosely connected incidents are to be denounced by dint of their 
preposterousness, is actually an aberration. A proper appreciation of these tales 
involves an acceptance of their unconventional mimetic assumptions, which are ‗not 
true to what men see‘, but rather ‗to what the readers dreamed‘ (Essays Literary and 
Critical, 28).  
In his essays, Stevenson constantly returns to the figure of the imaginative child 
to explain the enduring appeal of escapist literature for the adult reader. Like the roles 
conjured by childhood imaginations for the purpose of play, the situations presented in 
popular fiction provide the adult reader with a means of imaginative escape. In ‗Child‘s 
Play‘ (1878), Stevenson comments that such a capacity for imagination ensures that the 
child‘s world is always imagined and never ‗real‘: ‗In the child‘s world of dim 
sensation, play is all in all. ―Making believe‖ is the gist of his whole life, and he cannot 
so much as take a walk except in character.‘186 Adults are more keenly aware of the 
difference between life and play – but this does not mean that the impulse for play has 
disappeared. Indeed, the imaginative life they lead as children is preserved in the 
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suspension of disbelief inherent in the act of reading: ‗We grown people can tell 
ourselves a story, give and take strokes until the bucklers ring, ride far and fast, marry, 
fall, and die; all the while sitting quietly by the fire or lying prone in bed‘ (Virginibus 
Puerisque, 131). The essay on ‗Popular Authors‘ revisits this correlation between adults 
poring over the book and the child engaged in play, suggesting that if, as adults, we 
have put away childish things, in reading they are temporarily taken out again.  
As ‗Child‘s Play‘ demonstrates with its classless (and genderless) reference to 
‗grown people‘, Stevenson‘s outline of the lingering return of the childhood impulse to 
imaginative play is not confined to the quarter-educated. It is not simply the likes of 
‗the shop-girl‘ who are provided with ‗the pattern of their naked fancies‘ or furnished 
‗with welcome scenery and properties for autobiographical romancing‘. Indeed, 
Stevenson is keen to point out that ‗[e]ven in readers of an upper class‘ the need to 
experience a readerly identification is essential in order to facilitate the imaginative 
business of fictional escape. Though apparently more sophisticated than the penny 
fiction that entertains the masses, the reading materials of both are governed by literary 
conventions evolved from readerly desire: ‗The villain, even the heroine, may be a 
Feejee islander, but only on condition the hero is one of ourselves‘ (Essays Literary and 
Critical, 31). The sentence neatly encapsulates the expectations of a particular kind of 
reader, but it also underlines the fact that, for Stevenson, a particular kind of reader 
must come before a particular kind of text – the islander is not the hero, because the 
market has not evolved with the islander in mind.
187
 The use of childhood as a trope in 
Stevenson‘s criticism is thus key to an understanding of his attitudes towards the pre-
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emption of reader-response – the writer knows how to delight who remembers being 
delighted in childhood.  
 
ii. Anti-mimesis: Stevenson and the romance text 
‗Popular Authors‘ suggests that genre is the natural effect of readers‘ desires as they 
have become apparent over time, rather than the determined effect of artistic ideals at 
work in a cultural vacuum. The essay thus makes explicit the origins of a genre whose 
aesthetic profile Stevenson had been attempting to raise, since the beginning of the 
decade. In his critical writings on the romance, Stevenson argued that the genre could 
be defined not only by its subject matter, but also by the view of reading that underlay 
the production of romance texts as commodities in a marketplace.  
In ‗A Gossip on Romance‘ (1882), for example, Stevenson reiterates the idea 
that the pleasure involved in the reading of a romantic narrative is comparable to the 
pleasures of a children‘s game: ‗Fiction is to the grown man what play is to the child; it 
is there that he changes the atmosphere and tenor of his life‘.188 The ‗Gossip‘ 
emphasises the romance‘s capacity to offer a ‗change‘ from the ‗atmosphere and tenor‘ 
of ordinary life. Yet, in constructing the romance-reader as a figure who craves a 
literature conspicuously different from the realities of everyday existence, the essay 
also sets up the idea of romance as a genre that thrives on an anti-mimesis which, in 
‗Popular Authors‘, Stevenson equates with the child‘s daydream. If the romance offers 
the reader an escape, then its particular flavour is defined by the kind of ‗reality‘ from 
which that escape is offered. 
This is Stevenson‘s point in ‗A Humble Remonstrance‘ (1884), which suggests 
that all fiction is inescapably anti-mimetic. The essay was written in response to Henry 
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James‘s ‗The Art of Fiction‘ (1884), in which James argues that fiction should strive for 
a convincing illusion of reality. Stevenson begs to differ. Initially, he defends the 
romance as an example of a species of fiction that thrives upon its difference from 
reality and reiterates his point in the ‗Gossip‘ about romance‘s capacity to offer an 
escape from the complexities of lived experience. While James ‗misses what he calls 
the ―immense luxury‖ of being able to quarrel with his author‘, Stevenson suggests that 
the luxury, for readers of romance, ‗is to lay by our judgment, to be submerged by the 
tale as by a billow, and only to awake, and begin to distinguish and find fault, when the 
piece is over and the volume laid aside‘ (Memories and Portraits, 199). Stevenson 
moves on, however, to suggest that romance is not only just as aesthetically legitimate 
as realism, but also casts doubt upon the very ability of narrative prose finally to be 
realistic at all: ‗No art – to use the daring phrase of Mr James – can successfully 
―compete with life‖‘. On the contrary: ‗To ―compete with life,‖ whose sun we cannot 
look upon, whose passions and diseases waste and slay us – to compete with the flavour 
of wine, the beauty of the dawn, the scorching of fire, the bitterness of death and 
separation‘ is an impossible requirement of any kind of fiction:  
 
Man‘s one method, whether he reasons or creates, is to half-shut his eyes 
against the dazzle and confusion of reality. The arts, like arithmetic and 
geometry, turn away their eyes from the gross, coloured and mobile nature at 
our feet, and regard instead a certain figmentary abstraction. (Memories and 
Portraits, 195)  
 
Stevenson objected to realistic depiction of life, therefore, not because such an 
endeavour was always undesirable, but because its proponents ignored the fact that it 
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was always illusory – something which, for him, rendered the heightened unreality of 
romance just as viable as the illusion of contemporary ‗reality‘ striven for by realist 
authors. Narrative, especially fictional narrative, was one thing – life was quite another. 
Indeed, even historians are not immune, since their selection and rehearsal of events 
inevitably transforms history into story. For Stevenson, therefore, because literature is 
always necessarily governed by generic and stylistic conventions, the heightened 
conventionality that makes the romance so popular serves only to emphasise and carry 
to extremes the falsity inherent in all fiction.
189
 
Stevenson‘s anti-mimetic position can be linked to the aestheticism that informs 
Wilde‘s writings, which similarly argue that, in terms of literary representation, ‗truth‘ 
is ‗a word of very debateable propriety‘ (Memories and Portraits, 195). As Stephen 
Arata points out: ‗Aestheticist and romance fiction in the fin de siècle are alike in being 
reactionary movements […] marked by a turning away from the lived experience of the 
late-Victorian world‘.190 Stevenson advocated romance as a chance to escape to a 
counterworld of amoral action in which the complexity of ethical judgement could be 
suspended to satisfy the reader‘s ‗demand for fit and striking incident‘. For Stevenson, 
romance worked to elide psychological ‗realities‘ to focus on action for action‘s sake: a 
genre ‗which either does not regard the human will at all, or deals with it in obvious and 
healthy elations; where the interest turns, not upon what a man shall choose to do, but 
on how he manages to do it‘ (Memories and Portraits, 174-75). Wilde‘s writings 
similarly advocate the suspension of moral judgment and reject the realist‘s tiresome 
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recourse to literature as truth. Indeed, Wilde expressed a clear preference for 
Stevenson‘s anti-mimetic, escapist romances to the engagement with political realities 
that he saw as characterising Stevenson‘s South Seas writings: ‗In Gower Street 
Stevenson could have written a new Trois Mousquetaires. In Samoa he wrote letters to 
The Times about Germans‘ (Letters, 789).  
Yet Stevenson‘s insistence that reading offered an escape from reality 
immediately differentiates him from Wilde. While both agree that art is always an 
abstraction or simplification, Wilde collapses life and art – the very binary that 
Stevenson‘s writing upholds – by insisting on the ‗real‘ as a series of performances with 
no underlying meaning or significance. Like Wilde, Stevenson championed an 
individual‘s right to personal autonomy in matters of taste, morality and life choices.191 
Yet his insistence on the fundamental difference between life and art, which 
characterise Stevenson‘s aesthetic writing, also characterises the fundamental 
difference between himself and Wilde.  
It could also be argued, however, that Stevenson‘s writings on the romance 
genre differentiate him from Wilde‘s aestheticism to the precise degree that 
Stevenson‘s romances differentiate themselves from the genre as he theorises it. 
Stevenson‘s fiction replicates romance‘s conventions and re-deploys them, 
metafictionally, as a signposted performance. As narrative texts, they draw attention to 
the very nature of literary genre as fundamentally a ‗game‘ that readers and writers 
‗play‘, but they also draw attention to reading and writing as performances dictated by 
the literary market that governs the way in which texts are written, read and circulated. 
They announce themselves at every turn to be commodities within particular literary 
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systems. Replete with reminders of their own status as artful constructions, Stevenson‘s 
romances insist, as Wilde‘s writings do not, that reading is always an escape. Dedicated 
to providing the reader with a chance to dream again as they had in childhood, they also 
remind the reader that the book, once shut, necessitates the end of dreaming in the face 
of ‗the dazzle and confusion of reality‘.  
When Treasure Island first appeared in book form in 1883, for example, it was 
prefaced by a poem addressed ‗To the Hesitating Purchaser‘. In it, the novel is offered 
not as an original production, but as an ‗old romance retold /exactly in the ancient way‘. 
The author promises ‗Storm and adventure, heat and cold […] schooners, islands, and 
maroons, / And buccaneers, and buried gold‘, elements which, he hopes, may ‗please, 
as me they pleased of old‘. Not only is the text announced from the outset as entirely 
conventional, but the narrative‘s conventional nature is also held up to be the very thing 
that will most appeal to the potential buyer – the buyer who recognizes the pleasures 
encoded in the elements of the plot here enumerated and who has already read the 
works of Ballantyne, Kingston and Cooper, who are mentioned by name as a point of 
comparison. The poem thus alerts the hesitating purchaser to the book‘s generic 
heritage, setting up the terms (the rules) of the game about to be played. At the same 
time, however, it exposes that game for what it is – a textual exercise fulfilling, for the 
reader, ‗services he shall desire to have performed‘. The poem, in short, alerts the 
potential buyer to the conditions upon which the novel-as-commodity is offered for 
sale, ensuring that the text never transcends the material concerns governing its 
production. It emphasises the role of supply and demand in the relationship between the 
author and the reader: that narrative has an economic as well as an aesthetic purpose. 
‗To the Hesitating Purchaser‘ betrays Stevenson‘s commitment to making 
romance – with its inbred appeal to the delights of action – contingent upon the reader‘s 
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recognition of a certain kind of authorial and generic performance by foregrounding the 
artificiality of the whole proceeding. Highlighting the game of romance as primarily a 
literary phenomenon, it celebrates, with his aesthetic essays, the excitement that 
romance narratives can engender, whilst simultaneously foregrounding the excitement 
of such narratives as part of an escapist reading experience that Stevenson, the literary 
tradesman, obligingly offers.  
While Stevenson‘s essays certainly allow us to place his writings within the 
context of late-nineteenth-century debates about the relative merits of romance and 
realism, paratextual strategies like the preface to Treasure Island complicate his 
relationship to that debate even as they announce fairly conclusively his commitment to 
literary romance. His response to James does not posit (as did other late-Victorian 
defences of the romance) a binary opposition between the exotic, incident-heavy and 
fantastic plots of romance and the domestic occurrences, intricately-drawn characters 
and contemporary urban setting of realist fictions. In this respect, he differs from 
Andrew Lang, a major proponent of the romantic school of fiction, who defended the 
early novels of Stevenson and Rider Haggard in these terms: 
 
It has become undeniable that the love of adventure, and of mystery, and of a 
good fight lingers in the minds of men and women […] The moral is not that 
even the best boys‘ books are the highest class of fiction, but that there is still 
room for romance and a love of romance in civilised human nature.
192
 
                                                 
192
 Andrew Lang, ‗Realism and Romance‘, Contemporary Review, Vol. 52 (Nov 1887), 683-93 (692). 
Other references to this article appear in the body of the text. For an account of the late-Victorian 
romance/realism debate see Kenneth Graham, English Criticism of the Novel 1865-1900 (OUP, 1965), 
pp. 61-70 and Arata, ‗Realism‘. Edwin M. Eigner‘s discussion of Stevenson‘s relationship to the romance 
as theorised in the eighteenth century is historically useful, but the lack of any detailed discussion of the 
‗Gossip‘ and the ‗Remonstrance‘ (which are briefly mentioned once) leads to some unconvincing 
conclusions. His almost exclusive focus on Stevenson‘s fiction, for example, leads him to identify the 
author with a romantic tradition in which ‗the statement about life is primary; then comes the picture‘ 
 141 
 
Lang‘s argument certainly coheres with Stevenson‘s in its presentation of ‗boys‘ books‘ 
as works that exist in complete and conscious contrast to the realist novels of James and 
Dostoevsky (Lang‘s examples), but that in itself hardly renders them unworthy as 
literary productions. Nevertheless, it maintains the distinction that the one class of 
novelist offers fiction that is ‗real‘ while the other does not. The main problem, for 
Lang, is that ‗realism has a tendency to blink many things in life which are as real as 
jealous third-rate shrews and boozy press-men‘ – that the ‗tendency of Realism in 
fiction is often to find the Unpleasant Real in character much more abundant than the 
Pleasant Real.‘193 In short, Lang objects to the kind of content realistically presented 
rather than questioning, as Stevenson does, the degree to which anything presented in 
narrative can ever be said to be represented truly at all (Lang, 687).  
For Stevenson, therefore, the romance emphasises and carries to extremes the 
falsity inherent in all fiction, which is always necessarily governed by literary 
convention. While Lang echoes Stevenson‘s insistence that romance fulfils the 
legitimate escapist desires of many readers, he sees those desires as innately atavistic 
and equates their elision with unfaithfulness to the ‗real‘ of human nature. Stevenson, 
however, sees romance as a genre that reconnects readers not with innate, atavistic 
urges, but with memories of games learnt in childhood and enshrined in related reading 
experiences. Ultimately, Stevenson objected to realistic depiction of life not because 
such an endeavour was undesirable, but because he thought it impossible. Narrative, 
especially fictional narrative, was one thing – life was quite another. 
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Stevenson‘s conception of romance is implicitly and self-consciously 
metafictional and intertextual. Moreover, the self-conscious display of metafictions and 
intertexts, which, I will argue, characterises Stevenson‘s romances, are made necessary 
by an equally present danger that readers might become so ‗immersed‘ in a 
romanticised version of the world that they lose sight of the very real dilemmas that 
govern events as they are actually experienced in reality. They thus contain an implicit, 
built-in reminder of the ‗Humble Remonstrance‘s message: ‗phantom reproductions of 
experience, even at their most acute, convey decided pleasure; while experience itself, 
in the cockpit of life, can torture and slay‘ (Memories and Portraits, 196). By 
foregrounding the conditions of the escapist reading experience that the text offers as, 
specifically, a commodity – the manufactured product of an author-tradesman – 
Stevenson constantly reminds readers of the falsifications that legitimate romance and 
romanticisation within the special conditions of a literary genre founded upon a child‘s 
game and commodified in a literary marketplace. In doing so, the romance (and the 
impulse to romanticise) is safely differentiated from the ‗real‘ from which it facilitates 
only a temporary escape. 
 
iii. Romanticisation and metafictionality: An Inland Voyage (1878) 
Stevenson‘s first book, An Inland Voyage dramatises the troubling incompatibility 
between the romanticisation underpinning readerly delight and the more complex 
dilemmas attendant on lived experience. The book is ostensibly a record of a series of 
actions or incidents that actually occurred.
194
 Its self-conscious presentation of the 
journey as a retrospective narrative, however, succeeds initially in eliding the voyage as 
a physical experience, turning instead upon the impressionistic reactions of its author to 
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events, people and places which are, arguably, unremarkable in themselves. Here we 
have a record of an actual physical endurance test which, when narrated, becomes less 
about the physical test itself and more about the way such physicality is reconfigured 
for the reader‘s pleasure.  
In the early stages of the book, Stevenson offers a model for what follows when 
he covets the nomadic existence of the bargee. ‗[S]uch a life,‘ he writes enviously, ‗is 
both to travel and to stay at home‘: 
 
[I]t is merely as if he were listening to another man‘s story or turning the leaves 
of a picture-book in which he had no concern. He may take his afternoon walk 
in some foreign country on the banks of the canal, and then come home to 
dinner at his own fireside.
195
 
 
This use of reading as a metaphor for travel recalls the book‘s preface, in which 
Stevenson notes: ‗this voyage of ours is going into a cheap edition‘. Travel literature 
always involves some amount of reconstruction, selection and narration in order to 
evoke the journey that is its subject, but there is a literal ring to Stevenson‘s assertion. 
The preface foregrounds reading as a ‗voyage‘ that never goes further than the perusal 
of ‗a cheap edition‘ – a voyage which might offer an imaginary escape from the 
material confines of the moment of reading, but which always begins and ends with the 
physical book. From the outset, Stevenson‘s invitation ‗to follow in my steps‘ is 
undermined by a reminder that the reader‘s transport never escapes the material 
conditions of the reading moment (An Inland Voyage, 3).   
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If it is impossible for readers physically ensconced by their firesides 
simultaneously to be travelling down a canal in France, then they might at least enjoy 
the imaginative experience of such a journey by reading the author‘s account. In the 
preface, however, Stevenson reminds readers that this is not a slavishly faithful record 
of the physical voyage, but the deliberate creation of that entity, ‗the writer‘, who ‗must 
show himself for a moment in the portico‘ of the text – a metaphor that emphasises the 
construction of text as of a building. If the book is a commodity – the voyage narrated 
in a ‗cheap edition‘ – then the preface emphasises that it is not the travels themselves 
that are being offered, but the narrator‘s particular attitude to the objective facts of 
travel. Certainly, Stevenson‘s unashamedly impressionistic account exhibits a pleasure, 
which the reader is invited to share, in the romantic embellishment of experience. At 
the same time, however, the book‘s inevitable swapping of the physical act of travel for 
the imaginative act of reading is always in the foreground.  
Stevenson‘s account largely eschews physical detail to explore the ways in 
which travellers (himself included) reconcile themselves to, and imaginatively contain, 
the peculiarities of the individuals they encounter and the places in which they find 
themselves. It also emphasises the immense pleasure that can be derived from 
imagining lived experience to be conditioned by the kind of generic conventions that 
abound in fiction. Fishermen and anglers are revered, for instance, not because of any 
charm inherent in their occupation (Stevenson does not ‗affect fishes unless when 
cooked in sauce‘) but because ‗an angler is an important piece of river scenery, and 
hence deserves some recognition among canoeists‘. Such figures are an essential part of 
Stevenson‘s imagined conception of the scene; the picture ought to include anglers, 
whose ‗quiet presence serves to accentuate the solitude and stillness, and remind you of 
the glittering citizens below your boat‘ (An Inland Voyage, 27). It helps Stevenson 
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successfully to play the part of the traveller, deserving ‗some recognition‘ simply 
because it is the sort of thing which a ‗canoeist‘ would recognise.  
A delight in the apparent incursion of fiction into reality permeates the early 
part of the book. It is to be found, for example, in Stevenson and his companion‘s 
treatment at the hands of a group of children to whom, he imagines, they ‗were plainly 
a pair of Bluebeards‘ (An Inland Voyage, 29). In a later encounter with some girls, to 
whom Stevenson recounts his experience of near-drowning to rapt attention, he 
exaggerates the episode to Shakespearean proportions: ‗It was Othello over again, with 
no less than three Desdemonas and a sprinkling of sympathetic senators in the 
background‘ (An Inland Voyage, 57; italics in original). The artifice that transforms the 
story of a fairly ordinary journey into a romance with Stevenson as the central character 
is foregrounded, emphasising the narrative‘s focus on the author‘s subjective 
impressions over and above the situations in which he finds himself. Such a strategy 
refrains from providing a faithful evocation of the journey‘s physical conditions, 
presenting the reader instead with the impressions of the traveller-as-author. It 
emphasises the opportunities for imaginative play afforded by travel and alerts the 
reader to the pleasure inherent in these romantic embellishments of actual experience. 
By emphasising Stevenson‘s role as a protagonist in his own narrative, not only does 
the text become as much about the imaginative interpretation of experience as the 
physical experience itself, it also employs this self-awareness as a deliberate means of 
overcoming the discrepancy between travel as a physical act and the position of the 
reader imaginatively experiencing the journey at second-hand. In this way, Stevenson‘s 
self-awareness tends self-consciously towards readerly ‗delight‘, ensuring that the 
physical book becomes the medium by which the reader is able, imaginatively, ‗both to 
travel and to stay at home‘.  
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Yet, having established the narrative as an invitation to the imaginative 
embellishment of lived experience and an acknowledgment of the pleasure afforded 
thereby, An Inland Voyage also illustrates how this approach can become morally 
dubious when it strays beyond the confines of the imaginative exercise and encroaches 
on lived experience. Arriving in the town of Pont-sur-Sambe, Stevenson and Simpson 
are mistaken for peddlars. In its presentation of this episode, the text initially points 
once more to the pleasures afforded by the imaginary alienation from the self facilitated 
by the defamiliarising effect of travel in a foreign country. Not only can Stevenson 
begin romantically to occupy the role of a pedlar in a French village, but the locals 
‗began to think we might be pedlars after all‘. There is a degree of humour to the 
statement, to be sure, but the completeness of the illusion on the villagers‘ part is 
striking: ‗These Hainaulters could see no difference between us and the average pedlar‘ 
(An Inland Voyage, 31). Whilst the illusion is maintained, ‗Stevenson the pedlar‘ ceases 
to be a self-consciously imagined embellishment – to all intents and purposes it is also a 
material fact.  
Initially pleasurable as an imaginative exercise, this confusion of imagination 
with lived experience soon becomes unsettling. Despite the unpleasant conditions of the 
inn and the culinary adversity of the ‗tough beefsteak‘ they are served, Stevenson takes 
refuge in the role he has been offered: ‗I tried to make believe that I was amused with 
the adventure, tough beefsteak and all.‘ Ultimately, however, he admits the 
reprehensibility of make-believe in this particular situation: 
 
[It was] against the etiquette of the universe – to sit at the same table and pick 
your own superior diet from among their crusts […] I had not seen such a thing 
done since the greedy boy at school with his birthday cake. It was odious 
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enough to witness, I could remember; and I had never thought to play the part 
myself. But there again you see what it is to be a pedlar. (An Inland Voyage, 32)  
 
In this episode, the sustained adoption of a role, which affords Stevenson great pleasure 
elsewhere, merely serves to disguise the moral repercussions of falsely depriving a 
poorer family of their precious victuals – an action which remains, however one recasts 
it imaginatively, ‗against the etiquette of the universe‘. A false identity is the only 
means of making such an action in any way justifiable. But for Stevenson, who, unlike 
like Doctor Jekyll, is unable physically to retain two different identities at once, the 
unethical nature of this falsity is inescapable.  
Despite the undeniable pleasure this constant make-believe affords, it is an 
effort that the narrative is unable to sustain beyond this episode. As the pair approach 
Landrecies, imagination fails to overcome the insistent reality of physical discomfort, 
which breeds a taste for ‗the real‘, a resurgence of ‗authentic‘ identity and a retreat from 
the exercise of imagination: ‗the rain still fell and the wind still blew; but we found a 
double-bedded room with plenty of furniture, real water-jugs with real water in them, 
and dinner: a real dinner, not innocent of real wine‘ (An Inland Voyage, 41). There is, 
therefore, an ethical dimension to Stevenson‘s initial emphasis on the materiality of his 
first book, which draws the reader into the imaginative pleasures afforded by travel 
only to demonstrate the inherent offence against the etiquette of the universe involved 
in just such a readerly engagement. The life of the bargee, like the life of the armchair 
traveller, may be pleasurable, but to encounter such things in a book is to be always 
‗listening to another man‘s story or turning the leaves of a picture-book in which he had 
no concern‘. Episodes such as that of the pedlar remind him, as they remind Stevenson 
the narrator/traveller, ‗that he is not a traveller everywhere, and that his journey is no 
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more than a siesta by the way on the real march of life‘ (An Inland Voyage, 93). In thus 
drawing attention to the discrepancy between the real and the narrated, Stevenson also 
demonstrates the fundamental difference between experience and reading – between the 
world and the book. He suggests, moreover, that the difference is important not only in 
terms of the aesthetics, but also the ethics of narrative.  
In a recent study, Glenda Norquay considers Stevenson‘s assertion that his 
works were those of ‗a literary vagrant‘.196 Such an image, she suggests, is analogous to 
Michel de Certeau‘s idea of the ‗reader as traveller‘, which identifies reading as a 
process in which the reader appropriates an author‘s texts according to his or her own, 
deeply individual, situation: ‗he poaches on it, is transported into it, pluralises himself 
into it like the internal rumblings of one‘s body […] Words become the outlet or 
product of silent histories. […] A different world (the reader‘s) slips into the author‘s 
place‘.197 De Certeau‘s model, Norquay argues, allows for a fluid interpretative method 
that ‗avoids fixity of the text or of the reading process, allowing the reader agency 
without mastery‘.198 Stevenson, she suggests, bases his understanding of the reader‘s 
habits on a similar theory of individual appropriation. Rather than set himself apart as 
an authority on matters of literary interpretation, his critical writings draw upon his own 
reading experiences in a manner that emphasises their fundamentally subjective and 
individual nature. They are ‗characterised by the absolute specificity‘ of the reading 
experience: ‗the moment one summer evening when he first discovered he loves 
reading, perusing fairy-tales while walking into the village on an errand; or reading 
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Dumas on a winter‘s night in the Pentland hills‘.199 Drawing on his own experience of 
reading, his writings aim to ‗[t]ranslate authorial recollection and past enthusiasm into 
present readerly enjoyment‘.200  
An Inland Voyage provides an insight into how Stevenson not only imagines 
such specific conditions as always central to reading, but also theorises the impact of 
such inevitable specification upon the reader‘s experience of textuality. It employs the 
metaphor of reading as travel to explain how the work really can offer a literary escape, 
whilst simultaneously emphasising the limitations of the reader‘s imaginary journey by 
pointing constantly to the specific material conditions that always enshrine it. 
Emphasising the specific conditions that govern the reader‘s individualised encounter 
with the book, therefore, An Inland Voyage also points to the fact that the appropriation 
of text begins and ends with the material conditions that govern reading and which 
reading never succeeds in demolishing. It does not posit, as Wilde does in his aesthetic 
essays, an unbroken distinction between textuality and reality: in Stevenson‘s 
formulation, the latter always precedes and directs the former. 
Norquay‘s study is a useful example of the way in which Stevenson criticism 
has benefited from the work of book historians and their focus upon the way in which 
the conditions inherent upon each moment of reading impact in the ways in which texts 
are interpreted. In arguing not only that a similar acknowledgment lay at the heart of 
Stevenson‘s theory of fiction, but also that his reader-centric understanding of 
professional authorship impacted upon the way in which his own fiction was written, 
her work places the author‘s commitment to ‗the theorisation of the reading process‘ at 
the centre of her understanding of Stevenson‘s works. She invites us to view the author 
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as ‗less interested in romance‘s envisioning of a brave new world or its timeless appeal 
than in the power it had upon the individual reader who succumbs to it‘.201 
Norquay‘s examination of Stevenson‘s essay ‗My First Book‘ (1894), however, 
raises an important paradox that must be dealt with in any examination of Stevenson‘s 
outlook on popular fiction and mass-reading practices. In that essay, Stevenson 
discusses the composition of Treasure Island, acknowledging its debt to other literary 
sources. For Norquay, however, the essay is less than frank, demonstrating an 
unwillingness to acknowledge the tale‘s true origins in the recollection of joyful 
childhood encounters with penny serials by Hayward, Bracebridge Hemyng and the 
like. The essay acknowledges ‗possible sources of plagiarism, and repetition of 
published material‘, locating the text ‗in a pattern of familiarity and repetition, the very 
source of ―popular‖ pleasures‘, demonstrating ‗how well known the elements of his 
own yarn were‘.202 At the same time, however, Treasure Island is presented as 
‗different from these sources‘, because it ‗arose from individual inspiration‘. Thus, 
argues Norquay, Stevenson can be seen clearly to be ‗working within two very different 
aesthetic modes, two different regimes of value‘: 
 
[T]he ‗cultural value‘ of the novel was indeed being calculated in terms of 
opposition to other texts, set apart by its breaking of expectations, by the way it 
complicated rather than simplified. In other words it was being defined by the 
familiar strategies deployed to separate high culture from the popular.
203
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Implicit in this argument is the suggestion that Stevenson‘s romances, as well as his 
critical writings, construct his own fictional output as a conscious re-writing of the kind 
of fiction celebrated in ‗Popular Authors‘, which serves to differentiate his own work 
from the commercially popular literature celebrated in that earlier essay. Drawing 
attention to his exploitation of the ‗pattern[s] of familiarity and repetition‘ on display in 
the works of which Treasure Island is an avowed imitation, Stevenson also 
demonstrates the comparative sophistication of his own works in a manner that 
undermines the aesthetic arguments which he himself uses, in ‗Popular Authors‘, to 
defend the productions of penny paper contributors on their own terms. For Norquay 
this constitutes a ‗duality of focus‘ in Stevenson‘s defence of romance: however 
defensive Stevenson appears to be of commercial and escapist forms of literature and 
however much his criticism strives to demonstrate the aesthetic integrity both of writing 
for a mass-market and of accepting the literature of the masses on its own aesthetic 
terms, his artistic theories still reflect contemporary concerns surrounding the 
implications of writing for a literary marketplace in which financial remuneration did 
not necessarily correlate with aesthetic success. This leads to a dilemma, whereby his 
expression of ‗anxieties common to writers of his time about the doubtful nature of 
popularity and the tension between consumers‘ acclaim and aesthetic success‘ conflicts 
with his vision of ‗pleasure and the fulfilment of a reader‘s wants as key to 
understanding the nature of literary activity‘.204 
I would argue, however, that Norquay is in danger of over-emphasising the 
ambivalence of Stevenson‘s attitude to popular success. While it is important to read 
Stevenson‘s commitment to ‗the fulfilment of a reader‘s wants‘ in the context of ‗the 
tension between consumer‘s acclaim and aesthetic success‘, it is misleading to suggest 
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that such an outlook represents a ‗duality of focus‘.205 Such a suggestion implies that 
anxieties about popular success and the desire to fulfil consumer expectations exist in 
mutual opposition to each other as forces governing the production of Stevenson‘s 
texts. In fact, as the essay on ‗Popular Authors‘ demonstrates, far from constituting 
separate impulses pulling the author in contradictory directions, Stevenson‘s definitions 
of aesthetic and popular success not only complement each other, but are reconciled 
within a kind of popular text that recognises its own status as a literary commodity 
offering the reader a clearly delineated reading experience. For Stevenson, the ‗delight‘ 
of the romance text represents an ‗ironic‘ enjoyment founded on a conscious 
performance of authorship, which invites an equally self-conscious attitude on the part 
of the reader, who is asked to adopt a particular kind of pose in relation to the work – a 
sort of ‗guilty pleasure‘ in which the guilt is mitigated by a frank admission of the 
relationship between the author-as-tradesman and the reader-as-consumer.  
In Kidnapped (1886), for example, Stevenson‘s dedication to Charles Baxter 
makes clear that the author is very much aware of the kind of text he is engaged in 
writing: ‗This is no furniture for the scholar‘s library, but a book for the winter evening 
school-room when the tasks are over and the hour for bed draws near‘. Alan Breck, in 
this context, ‗has no more desperate purpose than to steal some young gentleman‘s 
attention from his Ovid‘ and ‗carry him awhile into the Highlands and the last century‘. 
Like the prefatory poem to Treasure Island, it signals to the reader the kind of reading 
experience that he or she is to expect and, indicating the mode in which the text is to be 
appreciated, points to the role the reader is expected to adopt. Both texts emphasise 
their status as the agents of a particular kind of reading experience so that aesthetic 
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success and readerly acclaim become the same thing – both are collapsed into the 
ability to appeal successfully to the imagination of a young boy. 
Yet it cannot be denied that Stevenson‘s anxieties about his debt to such mass-
market authors as Hemyng and Hayward were very real, nor that they palpably 
underscore his writings. Norquay is right to point out that Stevenson‘s fiction, though 
indebted to the works of his favourite ‗popular authors‘, also constitutes a more 
sophisticated re-writing of those tales in a manner that implies at once a celebration of 
their work and a conscious need to differentiate his own output from theirs. 
Nevertheless, Norquay exaggerates the extent to which Stevenson‘s anxieties stem from 
a need to prove that his own writing contains an extra germ of originality, preventing it 
from being merely a rehash of something that wasn‘t very good to begin with. In fact, 
Stevenson‘s anxieties about the nature of popular success did not necessarily emanate 
from an ingrained sense of the inferiority of popular forms of fiction, nor of fiction 
geared towards entertaining the reader. It is my contention, however, that while 
Stevenson‘s writing does differentiate itself from the sources he openly emulates the 
nature of the imitated sources is, finally, less important or problematic than the 
consequences of imitation itself.  
 
iv. Anxieties of influence 
As the ‗Humble Remonstrance‘ demonstrates, Stevenson sees literature as 
fundamentally an imitation, distinctly and inescapably separate from any emulated 
‗real‘. To enjoy literature is to abandon a complex and infinitely faceted reality, in 
favour of a simplified abstraction. The heightened fantasies of romance narratives 
provide a reading experience whose pleasure is grounded in an engagement with a self-
evidently ‗assembled‘ set of generic devices, expected by readers and assigned by the 
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marketplace within which the author works. Yet, the admission that romance depends 
upon an adherence to convention (for the author) and an immersion in improbable 
incident (for the reader) poses an ethical dilemma for Stevenson. For, if his literary 
criticism establishes and celebrates the fact that all literature depends on convention, 
elsewhere he is equally eloquent in his expressions of loathing for conformity.  
The essay, ‗On the Choice of a Profession‘ (c. 1879), positively nihilistic in its 
attack on the validity of convention in the form of ‗received wisdom‘, is a potent 
example of this loathing.
206
 In response to a young man‘s request for advice on the 
eponymous topic, Stevenson‘s reply is less than encouraging: ‗I fear I can only tell you 
that the wise, in these circumstances, act upon no principles whatever.‘ More than 
simply a condemnation of ‗the wise‘, the argument attacks conventional concepts of 
‗wisdom‘ itself, exposing them as sham constructions dependent upon a network of 
received fallacies. Taking, as an example, a hypothetical young man who works in a 
bank, Stevenson enquires into the forces that contrived to place him there: 
 
The fellow was hardly in trousers before they whipped him into school; hardly 
done with school before they smuggled him into an office; it is ten to one they 
have had him married into the bargain; and all this before he has had time so 
much as to imagine that there may be any other practicable course. (Essays 
Literary and Critical, 14)  
 
Received wisdom is the process by which ‗any other practicable course‘ is rejected in 
favour of a course chosen by others and forcibly thrust upon one. It is likened to a 
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taming process, a flattening of possibility by which ‗the wild ass‘s colt is broken in; and 
now sits diligently scribbling‘ (Essays Literary and Critical, 14-15).  
What begins as an analysis of the ways in which lifestyle choices are made ends 
with an explicit declaration of cultural relativity and the influence of native tradition in 
a particular individual‘s mode of life. All manners, customs, occupations, as well as the 
conventions that govern their selection are exposed as actually ambivalent insofar as 
their intrinsic value is concerned: ‗geography is a considerable part of orthodoxy; […] a 
man who, when born in London, makes a conscientious Protestant, would have made an 
equally conscientious Hindu if he had first seen daylight in Benares‘ (Essays Literary 
and Critical, 16). It is therefore difficult, when choosing a profession, to defer to duty, 
or the desire to do good: such ‗principles‘ are so contingent as to melt into air as soon 
as they are examined closely. The subversive truth is that ‗[t]o ―do good in the world‖‘ 
is merely ‗to be received into a society‘ (Essays Literary and Critical, 17) and has little, 
if anything, to do with the intrinsic worth of one specific action or decision. In the end, 
therefore, ‗[i]t will probably not much matter what you decide upon doing; for most 
men seem to sink at length to the degree of stupor necessary for contentment in their 
different estates‘ (Essays Literary and Critical, 19). Development, the essay suggests, 
is always imitative and thus always an exercise in conformity. Imitation, celebrated 
elsewhere by Stevenson as the cornerstone of his theory of art, is to be abhorred in this 
context because it inevitably leads to stagnation.  
 Yet, if Stevenson‘s work consequently exhibits both an adoration and a 
denunciation of convention, the dilemma cannot simply be dismissed as the self-
deprecation of an author demeaningly forced into writing (or even ‗diligently 
scribbling‘) for a mass-audience. After all, Stevenson‘s writing also endorses the idea 
that literary worth should be judged according to its ability to please those who read it – 
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something he himself admits that Treasure Island failed to do. In fact, the ‗duality of 
focus‘ detected by Norquay in Stevenson‘s literary outlook, is ascribable not simply to 
his ideas about what literature is, but rather to his anxieties about what it has the 
potential to do. For his aesthetic writings, which entail a celebration of the reader‘s 
capacity to ‗immerse‘ themselves in an action-packed narrative engagingly related 
according to familiar conventions, also involve a problematic deference to the influence 
of ‗received ideas‘ – a trait for which, elsewhere, Stevenson professes abhorrence. The 
result is a profound anxiety about the influence of literature, which permeates and 
informs his work.  
In ‗The Morality of the Profession of Letters‘ (1881), for example, Stevenson 
emphasised the professional writer‘s ethical responsibilities: ‗even in the humblest sort 
of literary work, we have it in our power either to do great harm or great good‘. This 
was because ‗[t]he total of a nation‘s reading‘ was at least partly constitutive of ‗the 
efficient educational medium of youth‘ (Essays Literary and Critical, 54):  
 
Those who write have to see that each man‘s knowledge is, as near as they can 
make it, answerable to the facts of life; that he shall not suppose himself an 
angel or a monster; nor take this world for a hell; nor be suffered to imagine that 
all rights are concentrated in his own caste or country, or all veracities in his 
own parochial creed. (Essays Literary and Critical, 55) 
 
This evocation of the ‗facts of life‘ is, in fact, a subversion of the idea that life can ever 
be reduced to ‗facts‘ at all. The only plain ‗fact‘ in evidence in this passage is that 
things are rarely one way or another; one caste does not hold ‗all the rights‘ and one 
man is seldom merely an ‗angel or a monster‘. The duty of the author is to show how 
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things are rarely that simple. Accordingly, the cohesion of self-evident ‗facts‘ is 
rejected in favour of a negotiation between them. By pointing out that a ‗fact‘ is always 
susceptible to complication, the passage demonstrates the one fact that can be trusted: 
namely, that knowledge is not the same as resolution, but fluctuates continually 
depending on one‘s point of view. It is imperative, therefore, that a young person read 
as widely as possible in order to obtain as rounded a view of the ‗facts‘ as possible: 
‗even if a fact shall discourage or corrupt him, it is still best that he should know it‘. 
The young person must learn, in its totality, the complications of ‗this world as it is‘, 
rather than let himself be mesmerised by the deceptive ideal of ‗a world made easy by 
educational suppressions‘. After all, it is in a world free of such suppressions ‗that he 
must win his way to shame or glory‘ (Essays Literary and Critical, 56). 
It is difficult to reconcile such a sentiment with ‗A Humble Remonstrance‘. 
That essay not only insists that literature is always ‗a simplification of some side or 
point of life‘ (Memories and Portraits, 205-206), but also celebrates this deceptive 
simplification for its pleasure-giving qualities. One finds the same tension in ‗Popular 
Authors‘. On the one hand, the essay celebrates the pleasure to be found in the self-
evidently preposterous tales of Stephens Hayward, true to the familiar conventions of 
the penny adventure serial and ‗the cheap press‘, but hardly reliable as an account of 
adventures ever likely to be encountered by most readers. On the other hand, such tales 
as these, though fit for emulation by the author who wishes to entertain, also exert, by 
dint of that very power, a potent and very real influence over the reader – an influence 
whose consideration is of ‗grave importance‘. After all, the young sailor, whose 
meeting with Stevenson forms the occasion for the essay, has allowed himself to 
become so immersed in Stephens Hayward‘s Tom Holt’s Log (1868) that a mistaken 
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belief in the veracity of its plot has changed his life forever by influencing his decision 
to take to the seas: 
  
He cannot make a tale of his own life […] It is not this that he considers in his 
rare hours of rumination, but that other life, which was all lit up for him, by the 
humble talent of a Hayward – that other life which, God knows, perhaps he still 
believes that he is leading – the life of Tom Holt. (Essays Literary and Critical, 
32) 
 
‗A Humble Remonstrance‘ demonstrates Stevenson‘s commitment to the idea of the 
book as a commodity that offered its possessor an escape into ‗that other life‘ – a world 
governed by the ‗significant simplicity‘ of narrative conventions. Yet, the case of Tom 
Holt’s Log demonstrates the difficulties posed for one such as Stevenson, who 
enthusiastically both consumed and produced escapist stories of adventure. Literary 
texts, even those that purport to represent real occurrences, present the reader with 
worlds and lives governed by recognisable conventions and are thus reducible to ‗facts‘ 
in a manner that fundamentally differentiates them from lived experience. As with the 
oracles that govern the young man‘s ‗Choice of a Profession‘, they replace the vagaries 
of life as it is lived with pre-conceived ideas of life as it might ideally be, creating a 
reductive image. The result is a conflict between the idea of convention as an 
underlying feature of literary texts and convention as the tyrannical ruler of lived 
experience. While the simplification facilitated by the romance‘s heightened 
conventionality – the familiarity of its rules – forms the basis of a particular kind of 
literary enjoyment, this very quality is nevertheless in danger of deceiving the 
impressionable reader with a simplification that is as false as it is aesthetically 
 159 
‗significant‘. In order to demonstrate the ways in which Stevenson overcame this 
dilemma, the remainder of this chapter will analyse Stevenson‘s Treasure Island and 
The Black Arrow (1883) in their original material contexts both as books and as serials 
in the children‘s magazine, Young Folks.  
As Norquay has indicated, there is a comparison to be made between 
Stevenson‘s idea of a reader‘s total immersion in a fictional text and de Certeau‘s 
theory of readers as ‗poachers‘, appropriating texts according not only to their 
individual situation, but also according to the particular nature of each individual 
moment of reading. This endless capacity for the commingling of text with individual 
experience, however, is rendered problematic in light of the intense anxiety surrounding 
the question of influence so bitterly set forth in ‗On the Choice of a Profession‘. For if 
readers appropriate texts for themselves and transform them in their own image, then 
the reverse must also hold true – that readers are themselves inevitably transformed by 
their textual encounters, just as the young man in search of a profession is inevitably 
moulded by a knowledge and appropriation of other people‘s experiences. Thus, even 
though Stevenson differs from Wilde in his refusal to collapse the boundaries between 
fictional genres and lived experience, he shares Wilde‘s anxiety about the way in which 
books can come to enshrine, for readers, the ‗reality‘ it actually refracts through 
specific mimetic traditions.  
Romance‘s potential damagingly to equip readers with a reductive (even a false) 
view of lived experience is especially troubling in light of the proposed amorality of the 
romance text. Piracy, kidnap, duels and war: these turbulent experiences, ‗robbed of 
their vivacity and sting‘ are tolerable and almost always agreeable when presented in 
fiction. As mere ‗phantom reproductions of experience‘ they are able, ‗even at their 
most acute, [to] convey decided pleasure; while experience itself, in the cockpit of life, 
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can torture and slay.‘ The ability of the reader ‗to lay by‘ his judgment for the duration 
of the textual encounter is fundamental, therefore, to the enjoyment of the events for 
their own sake: a gesture devoid of any other consideration than the exhilarating 
pleasure their textual representation is able to convey. Ethically, however, it is 
important that the reader is made aware that delight in the text‘s events, along with the 
pleasures attendant upon ‗immersion‘ within them, only remains legitimate within a 
fictional framework: that the ‗obvious and healthy elations‘ of the human will require, 
for their capacity to delight, equally ‗obvious‘ artistic embellishments (Memories and 
Portraits, 174).  
Thus, if Stevenson‘s works pre-empt the reader‘s individual appropriation of the 
text, as de Certeau argues, it is only with the ultimate aim of defusing dangerous acts of 
textual appropriation, of policing the barrier between fiction and reality, between life 
and text. Narratives like Hayward‘s might well be in danger of sending a young reader 
to sea in emulation, as he appropriates the text into the narrative of his own life to the 
extent that fiction and reality are dangerously and misguidedly combined. Stevenson‘s 
texts, however, are determined to foreground the reading experience as precisely that – 
an immersion in exciting narrative incidents that only remains ethically and mimetically 
legitimate while the game of textual consumption is still in play.  
Throughout Stevenson‘s romances, therefore, the reader is confronted with the 
fictionality of the narrative, underlining the intrinsically artificial conditions required to 
render the brutal realities of romantic action aesthetically pleasing. While the text 
courts the reader‘s pleasurable submersion by the book ‗as by a billow‘, readers are 
never allowed to lose sight of the conditions of their engagement with the text and, 
consequently, of the conditions of literary mimesis in general. Such an approach 
eschews the potentially dangerous simplification that nevertheless characterises 
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romantic composition by drawing attention to the necessity of that simplification in the 
construction of narrative events: by emphasising the work as a commodity grounded in 
the provision of certain pleasurable falsifications of experience. Ultimately, 
Stevenson‘s romances anticipate and dramatise reader response in order to defuse the 
dangerous possibility of a too-ready identification with fictional action. 
In the early stages of Kidnapped, for instance, David Balfour attributes his 
uncle‘s strange behaviour, realistically enough, to the notion that the older man is 
suffering from insanity. At the same time, he cannot help but entertain a more fantastic 
notion, akin to ‗a story like some ballad I had heard folk singing, of a poor lad that was 
a rightful air and a wicked kinsman that tried to keep him from his own‘ (Kidnapped, 
26). That the latter explanation turns out to be the true one only serves to remind the 
reader of the status of ‗truth‘ in the romance narrative. If such a fantastic explanation is 
not remotely out of place in a romantic story, then it should also be noted that thus 
drawing attention to its preposterousness serves implicitly to question the quality of 
truth in narrative. The validity of the romance narrative as a site in which such ideas 
can be pleasurably entertained is never compromised, yet the reader is made aware of 
the terms on which the tale is offered. Later on, Alan‘s impromptu ballad on the battle 
being fought in the round-house ensures that the events are enacted as already-
legendary, in the same way that David‘s experiences at the hands of his uncle are 
already ‗like a ballad‘. David‘s insistence that, despite the ballad‘s focus on Breck, he 
himself played a part in the battle, demonstrates a similar concern with the way in 
which the actual historical fact will eventually be presented as narrative history. In 
short, the battle is enacted and narrated in such a way that its possibility for 
retrospective transformation into a romantic narrative becomes almost the very reason 
for its occurring in the first place, enabling Breck retrospectively to look upon it as ‗a 
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bonny story… Fifteen tarry sailors on the one side, and a man and a halfling boy upon 
the other!‘ (Kidnapped, 75)  
Stevenson took to heart the idea that adventure stories operated on a level of 
mimesis governed by literary conventions that were themselves responsive to the 
demands of the readers‘ imaginations. Moreover, he viewed the author as complicit in 
satisfying readerly desire for certain kinds of narrative development. What becomes 
clear from an example like the roundhouse episode in Kidnapped, however, is the way 
in which his romances are keen to emphasise and draw attention to that complicity, 
enabling the text itself to enact an implicit commentary upon the naivety of literary 
‗realism‘, in a manner that both demonstrates and celebrates the intrinsic falsity of 
literary representation. To this extent, they exemplify a view expressed by Stevenson‘s 
‗Morality of the Profession of Letters‘: 
 
The subject makes but a trifling part of any piece of literature, [but] this spirit in 
which a subject is regarded, important in all kinds of literary work, becomes all-
important in works of fiction, meditation, or rhapsody; for there it not only 
colours but itself chooses the facts; not only modifies but shapes the work. 
(Essays Literary and Critical, 57) 
 
In drawing attention to the way in which such acts of authorial selection and 
embellishment are demanded by the genre in play, Stevenson‘s romances (like his 
travel writings) signal themselves as the authored constructions they really are. Such an 
emphasis upon the emphatic falsity of literary romance also serves an ethical purpose, 
however, highlighting the terms on which the fiction is offered as a reading experience 
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that involves taking pleasure in actions morally untenable beyond the moment of 
reading itself. 
A similar strategy is at work in Treasure Island, in which the prefaratory poem 
posits the ensuing tale as a kind of Ghost of Reading Experience Past – a medium by 
which the reader could re-engage with fondly-remembered scenes of pleasurable 
literary engagement. It establishes the novel as the continuation of a romantic tradition 
founded upon a delightful immersion in uncomplicated formality: an ‗old romance‘ 
would be ‗retold / Exactly in the ancient way‘. The poem reconfigures the novel‘s 
narrative as a greatest hits package designed to reconnect the reader not only with the 
kinds of stories the tale openly references, but also with the (specifically personal) 
experience of reading those tales. To this end, the novel constantly makes conditional 
the fulfilment of a specific kind of tale by emphasising both the conventions of past 
works and of childish imagination. On the one hand, such features allow the reader to 
recognise the narrative‘s generic features as those belonging to a specific kind of story 
whose familiarity ensures an appropriate (and desired) response. On the other hand, the 
prefatory poem foreshadows a tendency, in the ensuing narrative, to draw attention to 
these generic (and desired) features. The way in which the events of the novel unfold 
draws attention to the terms according to which the novel has been written, emphasising 
the process of its narrative construction, not just as a work of imaginative fiction, but as 
the fulfilment of a particular readerly desire. It is a metafictional strategy that 
undermines the escape it appears to offer, constantly underlining the intrinsic falsity of 
the generic certainties that make possible that escape: emphasising, at every turn, the 
narrative‘s status as a commodity quite as manufactured as the physical book that 
contains it.  
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From its earliest stages, the narrative of Treasure Island is caught up in the idea 
of stories and their influence on impressionable minds. Jim notes how his imagination 
is kindled by Billy Bones‘s map, leading him to dream about the adventures that the 
depicted island might hold:  
 
I approached that island in my fancy, from every possible direction; I explored 
every acre of its surface […] but in all my fancies, nothing occurred to me so 
strange and tragic as our actual adventures.
207
 
 
The passage is a meditation on the power of the imaginative faculty brought into play in 
the act of immersing oneself in a romantic narrative. The map, like the book, evokes 
exciting images of ‗the most wonderful and changing prospects‘ that will soon become 
a reality for Jim. If the ensuing adventure is a child‘s dream made manifest, however, 
the text dramatises the problematic relationship between the impulses of the 
imagination at play over an intriguing text and the physical and psychological horrors 
that characterise the ‗strange and tragic‘ nature of such adventures in reality.  
Like the young sailor in ‗Popular Authors‘, Jim longs for the sea as a 
consequence of the pleasure he finds in an imaginative engagement with a romantic 
text. For the reader of Treasure Island, of course, Jim‘s ‗strange and tragic‘ adventures 
themselves form the substance of the main body of a romantic text. Their presentation 
at the outset as, in actuality, ‗strange and tragic‘, therefore, defuses their potentially 
dangerous effect on the reader by emphatically warning of the disparity between the 
‗delight‘ of literary romance and ‗actual‘ reality. After all, the monstrous Long John 
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Silver shares Jim‘s romantic ideals of island exploration, wishing that he could 
participate in the young man‘s experiences:  
 
‗You‘ll bathe, and you‘ll climb trees, and you‘ll hunt goats, you will; and you‘ll 
get aloft on them hills like a goat yourself. Why it makes me young again. I was 
going to forget my timber leg, I was. It‘s a pleasant thing to be young, and have 
ten toes, and you may lay to that.‘ 
 
The symmetry between his own ideals and Silver‘s causes Jim some discomfort. As his 
own daydreams are recalled in Silver‘s recollection of his own childhood imaginings he 
can ‗scarce conceal a shudder when he laid his hand upon my arm‘ (Treasure Island, 
63). Little wonder since, this time, the imagined vision of boyish adventure is not 
occasioned by a textual representation, safely perused in domestic comfort. Rather, it is 
occasioned by Jim‘s arrival upon a real island, in a ship vessel that is itself embroiled in 
a bloody mutiny. The difference between romance as imaginatively constituted and 
romance as experienced ‗in actuality‘ is troublingly apparent – and Jim can ‗scarce 
conceal a shudder‘ at the disparity. The ‗cruelty, duplicity and power‘ attributed to 
Silver, therefore, is also the ‗cruelty, duplicity and power‘ of romance itself. The 
‗hesitating purchaser‘ should beware, as his desire for a certain kind of romantic 
engagement (the very grounds on which the book has been offered) is subverted by 
association not just with the heroic protagonist, but also with the brutal pirates, whose 
actions provide the entertaining matter of the romantic text.  
As Emma Letley suggests, Stevenson‘s text overcomes the potential horrors of 
the story‘s multiple killings by drawing attention to itself as a generic exercise. At 
‗moments of great tension and terror […] the reader is taken away from the physical 
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details […] An in-built distance is thus present in the more terrifying episodes‘. Such a 
strategy ‗ensures that the sense of the story as boys‘ day-dream is maintained‘.208 It is 
true that Stevenson‘s tale necessarily shies away from the potentially visceral quality of 
the story‘s many violent scenes, enacting precisely the kind of ‗simplification‘ that not 
only links the romance to a boys‘ day-dream, but is also key to the successful 
functioning of the romance narrative as escapism. I would argue, however, that the 
anxiety betrayed by the text about the falsifying nature of imaginative renderings of 
experience is not simply a desire to mediate potentially unpleasant experiences in order 
to make them suitable for young readers. It is also an attempt to dramatise the moment 
of reading in a manner that makes explicit the conscious divorcing of the visceral 
realities of such experiences from their literary representation – a separation that 
operates in that moment and makes its enjoyment possible. 
 
v. Dick’s Dilemma: Stevenson in Young Folks 
Through such examples Stevenson‘s romances establish the dramatisation of the 
reading experience as a fundamental element of the genre. Pre-empting readerly 
experience of romantic incident, however, also involves a manipulation of the way in 
which the narrative content will be circulated and consumed. Stevenson is very much 
aware, for example, of the different audiences to be catered for in writing for periodical 
and volume publication. If the inclusion of a poem like ‗To the Hesitating Purchaser‘ is, 
at the beginning of the book edition of Treasure Island, a necessary way of signalling 
the kind of reading experience the consumer can expect from the volume, such a 
preface would be absurd in a magazine story. As he wrote in the dedication to the 
volume publication of The Black Arrow in 1888, ‗[t]hose who read volumes and those 
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who read story papers belong to different worlds.‘209 This is not a pronouncement of 
authorial snobbery, any more than is the similar acknowledgement in ‗Popular 
Authors‘, written at around the same time. Rather, it is a recognition that the readers of 
Young Folks already expect a certain kind of tale, whose conventions were not set by 
the author, but were already in place for him to adopt or to reject at his peril. They did 
not need to be told what kind of story they could expect – the readers of the novel, 
however, had to be informed (or reminded) of the reading experience such a work 
might provide. 
Stevenson recognised and admired the producers of penny serials for young 
readers‘ periodicals not least because of their ability to adopt so successfully the 
narrative and aesthetic conventions that readerly expectation dictated as the purview of 
their chosen publication. This much is evident from ‗Popular Authors‘. But his 
correspondence emphasises just how committed he was to upholding these conventions 
in writing for the young readers of a penny publication. In a letter to W.E. Henley in 
1881, he enthuses about the tale on which he has recently begun work: ‗The Sea Cook, 
or Treasure Island: A Story for Boys‘. This early reference to the story in Stevenson‘s 
correspondence, as well as the pseudonym under which the tale was offered (Captain 
George North) demonstrates that Stevenson saw himself as engaged in writing a certain 
kind of narrative, designed to live up to the expectations of a particular readership. 
From the outset, it is characterised as ‗a Story for Boys‘ and the pseudonym implicitly 
constructs an author with an adventurous career of his own – ‗Captain‘ implies a naval 
or army background, while ‗North‘ conjures geographical bearings and, hence, 
exploration. Moreover, his initial summary of the tale makes it clear that he intends to 
honour the Stephens Hayward tradition of giving the reader exactly what they expect 
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with as little attempt as possible to stray from the path of convention: ‗Will you be 
surprised to learn that it is about Buccaneers, that it begins in the Admiral Benbow 
public house on [the] Devon Coast, that it‘s all about a map and a treasure and a mutiny 
and a derelict ship and a current and a fine old Squire Trelawney‘.210  
It is not difficult to infer from this letter that Stevenson intended the tale as a 
fulfilment of readerly desires which, he imagined, its material and paratextual apparatus 
would inescapably encourage – indeed, it is, significantly, the title page that the letter 
evokes, rather than simply the title.
211
 At this stage the story was designed, not with 
serial publication, but with immediate volume publication in mind. Stevenson‘s 
reference to a publishing house with a particular reputation for this kind of text betrays 
a commitment to market conventions – ‗would you be surprised to hear, in this 
connection, the name of Routledge?‘ The laws of the marketplace are allowed to govern 
the production of the text to such an extent that originality or ‗surprise‘, is banished, in 
favour of a submission to narrative facts, universally acknowledged, which bind certain 
kinds of conventional content to the means by which that content reaches the reader in 
the form of a printed text. The story was, we learn, even ‗tried out‘ on Stevenson‘s 
stepson, Lloyd Osbourne, to ensure the desired effect (Letters, Volume Three, 225).  
So self-conscious was Stevenson‘s attitude to the conventions of the popular 
romance that his writings for Young Folks must be seen not simply as the production of 
tales for a popular publication, but as a performance of a particular kind of authorship – 
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a deliberate adoption of a specific role. He even signs the letter, ‗R.L.S. Author of 
Boys‘ Stories‘. At the same time, however, the anxiety with which the text of Treasure 
Island treats the imaginative depiction of the island by its child protagonist 
demonstrates the aim of this performative approach – to dramatise not only the process 
of construction involved in the writing of romance, but also the troubling amorality of 
romantic texts which renders problematic anything other than a self-consciously 
performative attitude toward such material. In short, if the author is expected to 
perform, then the reader is also expected to adopt a specific kind of role.  
If Stevenson‘s contributions to Young Folks can be seen as a performance of 
authorship, however, it was one which its intended audience did not look upon as a 
success. Despite the best efforts of James Henderson (Young Folks‘s editor) to persuade 
his subscribers that Captain North‘s piratical tale was ‗an admirable one‘ of which he 
‗cannot speak too highly‘,212 Stevenson was forced to admit to Charles Baxter that ‗the 
readers thereof spew me, as an author, out of their mouth‘ (Letters, Volume Three, 250). 
When Henderson asked him for another contribution, therefore, it is hardly surprising 
that Stevenson opted to produce a tale with an even greater dependence on formulaic 
devices, episodic set-pieces and exciting incident (over and above considerations of 
characterisation and plot development) in order more closely to emulate the kind of 
serial usually to be found in the magazine‘s pages. Having modelled Treasure Island on 
his own childhood reading of penny serials of the kind detailed in ‗Popular Authors‘, 
Stevenson was now to hone this imitative process by bringing it to bear not simply on 
the kind of tale that might appear in children‘s periodicals more generally, but in Young 
Folks specifically.  
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Dedicating the first volume edition to his wife, Stevenson notes that The Black 
Arrow was written not only ‗for a particular audience‘, but also ‗in rivalry with a 
particular author‘. The author in question was Alfred R. Phillips. A habitual contributor 
to Young Folks, Phillips‘s serial, Don Zalva the Brave; or the Fortune-Favoured Knight 
of Andalusia, ran simultaneously with Treasure Island, beating Stevenson‘s tale to the 
coveted front-page position. The appearance of the first instalment of The Black Arrow 
in the magazine‘s Midsummer Double Issue of 1883 coincided with both the final 
chapter of Phillips‘s Glaucus; or, The Fight for the Faith: A Romance of Ancient Rome 
and the first chapter of his new serial, Sevajee, The Mahratta Chief: An East Indian 
Romance. But if Phillips retains pride of place during the appearance of Treasure 
Island, this is not the case during the serialisation of Stevenson‘s next tale. Booth and 
Mehew‘s claim that the ‗success of The Black Arrow in Young Folks relegated 
Phillips‘s current serial, Sevajee […], to the back pages‘ is an exaggeration, but the way 
in which possession of the prominent front pages alternates, during its run, between 
Stevenson‘s tale and Sevajee is certainly evidence that The Black Arrow had proved a 
greater success than Stevenson‘s previous contribution (Letters, Volume Three, p. 189 
n.). The signs of readerly appreciation that appeared regularly in the correspondence 
pages of the paper also indicate that, in his self-styled ‗rivalry‘ with the more 
experienced Phillips, Stevenson certainly held his own in the game of writing a Young 
Folks serial.  
That Stevenson was so consciously aware of the ‗rivalry‘ between himself and 
another of the paper‘s prolific contributors indicates his increased commitment to 
ingratiate himself into the milieu of Young Folks writers. Indeed, there is little within 
the tale itself to indicate that Stevenson had singled Phillips out for specific imitation 
when composing The Black Arrow. In fact, the elements that bring The Black Arrow in 
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line with the more popular tales in Young Folks at around this time are elements that 
signal its imitation of the fiction included in the periodical more generally. Begging its 
readers to pay special attention to Stevenson‘s new serial, for instance, the editor 
assures his readers that this new story ‗is rich in incident of an exciting character‘.213 
This alone would have differentiated it from Treasure Island. Certainly, exciting (and 
improbable) set-pieces like Jim‘s single-handed recapture of the Hispaniola, his battle 
with Israel Hands, the episode of the besieged fort and the climactic treasure-hunt itself 
might lead one to argue that Treasure Island had been similarly enriched by thrilling 
incident. Yet, despite the picturesque presence of Billy Bones, whose fantastical stories 
in the first number hint at events to come, very little actually happens in Treasure 
Island until the pirate‘s death and the arrival of Blind Pew in the third instalment. The 
opening instalements focus upon Jim‘s yearning for adventure and incident, rather than 
on the incidents themselves.  
Reading the text in volume form, it is difficult to conceive how uninspiring a 
beginning this must have been for readers who, from the first paragraph of the first 
instalment, expected a constant stream of episodes ‗rich in incident of an exciting 
character‘. In Walter Villiers‘s Sir Claude the Conqueror: A Story of English Chivalry, 
for example, which begins in the same issue as the first number of Treasure Island, no 
sooner are the heroic protagonist and his beloved introduced than the hero is plunged 
into a fight to the death between himself and no less than twelve ‗villainous-looking 
desperadoes‘ – a break-neck pace that continues throughout the serial‘s run.214 The first 
part of Oliver Optic‘s Lyon Heart; or Adrift in the World: An Adventure Story, which 
coincided with the beginning of The Black Arrow‘s serialization, begins with the 
                                                 
213
 ‗Our Midsummer Chat‘, Young Folks, Vol. XXII, no. 656 (Midsummer Double Issue), p. 213. 
214
 Walter Villiers, Sir Claude the Conqueror: A Tale of English Chivalry, Young Folks, Vol. XIX, no. 
565, 1 Oct 1881, p. 106. 
 172 
eponymous young protagonist in the act of attempting to rescue his parents during a 
dramatic shipwreck and ends with the boy being press-ganged onto a vessel bound for 
the African coast. From the very first line, the tale delivers the ‗adventure‘ promised by 
the title, with the young protagonist immediately ‗adrift‘ not just in the world, but in an 
exciting and action-packed version of it. To compare it with the opening of Treasure 
Island highlights the striking contrast between the two. Lyon Heart is first encountered 
already in the midst of the most exciting of sea-faring incidents. Jim Hawkins, on the 
other hand, spends a good deal of time dreaming and speculating about sea-faring 
adventure, but does not encounter anything resembling a physical challenge until the 
third instalment – and does not actually set foot on a schooner himself until the fourth 
number. As thrilling as the events of Treasure Island may have been, therefore, its 
serialized opening, with its vague hints of adventure to come, could not hope to match 
the sheer intensity of incident provided elsewhere in the paper and betrays its roots as a 
narrative initially conceived for immediate publication as a one-volume novel – the 
work of an author not of ‗boys‘ stories‘ but of boys‘ books.  
Another difference between ‗George North‘s‘ piratical romance and the other 
serials on offer in the paper is the nature of Treasure Island‘s main character. As Robert 
Kiely points out, Jim is given plenty of opportunities to prove his fitness for the leading 
part in a tale of adventure, as ‗things keep happening to him which he cannot foresee or 
prevent‘.215 Yet, while Jim faces these unforeseen challenges in a manner that 
demonstrates his ability to cope with the most daunting obstacles, thus demonstrating 
his fitness for purpose in the role of romantic protagonist, he begins from the position 
of a normal, unexceptional young man. He resembles Walter Scott's heroes of the early 
part of the century – passive figures who are drawn into circumstances rather than 
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shaping their own destinies. His heroic qualities are not intrinsic or innate features of 
his being, but are proved through the heroic deeds he finds himself able to enact under 
pressure as the need arises. 
This lack of an innate easily-detectable heroism differentiates him from the 
majority of the protagonists in Young Folks‘ adventure serials. Characteristically, these 
are presented from the outset as models of virtue whose more than usually high degree 
of mental and physical ability single them out from the villains whom they encounter, 
marking them as an ideal or heroic type from the outset. Sir Claude, for instance, 
despite his youth, is already a formidable adventurer when we first meet him. Not only 
is he a ‗truly noble and gallant-looking youth‘, but he is also experienced in the ways of 
combat and the life of militaristic action: ‗Has not my courage been tried? Has not my 
proficiency in arms been proven? Am I not attached to the person of Edward the Black 
Prince?‘ Despite his vow to his beloved Alicia that he is ‗determined to win my spurs 
and climb to fame‘, 216 he is already well on the way to achieving his goal. A similar 
situation exists with Lyon Heart, who is designated from the outset as a natural 
adventurer – not least by dint of his improbable nomenclature. He has ‗a powerful 
frame for a boy of his years, and he had the heart of a lion in his breast‘; he is ‗stout and 
hearty‘, the result of four years‘ work on a farm. He is ‗a great reader‘ – but he is also 
‗a bold, brave boy‘.217 In these instances, the protagonist‘s encounter with the physical 
challenges of the romantic narrative is not a development, but a confirmation of an 
already intrinsic facet of his personality. 
These differences point towards an important fact that must be borne in mind 
when examining the texts of Treasure Island and The Black Arrow – that Treasure 
                                                 
216
 Villiers, Young Folks, Vol. XIX, no. 565, 1 Oct 1881, p. 105. 
217
 Oliver Optic, Lyon Heart; or Adrift in the World: An Adventure Story, Young Folks, Vol. XXII, no. 
656 (Midsummer Double Issue), p. 213. 
 174 
Island was written, initially, for volume publication, while The Black Arrow was, as 
Stevenson himself notes, written with the ‗particular audience‘ of Young Folks in mind. 
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that The Black Arrow has less in common with 
Stevenson‘s earlier serial than it does with the much more conventional story of Sir 
Claude, which debuted at the same time. Like Sir Claude, Richard ‗Dick‘ Shelton, has 
already experienced at first hand the tumultuous tribulations of the Wars of the Roses – 
his father has been murdered in the course of the conflict and he is the ward of Sir 
Daniel, a prominent knight of the Lancastrian party. Much of the story, as with the tale 
of Sir Claude, has to do with the adventures that befall Dick in his quest to rescue his 
beloved (Dick‘s Joanna, like Claude‘s Alicia, is kidnapped by the villains of the piece 
mid-way through the action) and win his spurs. Yet, like Sir Claude, he is already well 
placed to fulfil this ambition. Confronted, on the serial‘s first page, with the ringing of 
the bell of Tunstall Hamlet‘s Moat House at ‗an unaccustomed hour‘ (The Black Arrow, 
3), everyone in the village, including Sir Daniel‘s messenger, is ignorant ‗of what was 
forward‘. Dick Shelton, however, is at no such disadvantage:  
 
He, at the least, would know, and they hailed him and begged him to explain. 
He drew bridle willingly enough – a young fellow not yet eighteen, sun-
browned and grey-eyed, in a jacket of deer‘s leather, with a black velvet collar, 
a green hood upon his head, and a steel crossbow on his back. (The Black 
Arrow, 4) 
 
The peasants‘ expectations and Dick‘s appearance, suggest a youth who is beyond the 
ordinary run of young men. Similarly, his ‗sun-browned‘ appearance and his bearing 
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(on horseback carrying a crossbow) signal his readiness for battle.
218
 In answer to the 
peasants‘ enquiry, Dick offers the thrilling information that ‗a battle is impending‘ (The 
Black Arrow, 4). Like Lyon Hart and Sir Claude (but unlike Jim Hawkins) Dick is a 
young man whose fitness for adventure is not in question. Treasure Island begins with 
a narrator who looks back in safety at events that have already happened and spends 
several numbers merely foreshadowing these events. The narrator of The Black Arrow, 
on the other hand, takes the reader straight to the point where the adventure can begin, 
commencing, quite literally, with a call to arms. Even if direct physical conflict does 
not occur until the next number, making this opening somewhat tamer than Sir 
Claude‘s, there is at least the picturesque prospect of knights on horseback and unlike 
Treasure Island, the young hero is of their number, rather than a mere dreamer or on-
looker. 
If The Black Arrow disguises itself as a typical Young Folks serial, however, 
then it does so in order to infiltrate the generic realm in which it places itself, eventually 
subverting the very assumptions it apparently adopts. At every point, the serial 
overturns the uncomplicated dependence of these tales on the protagonist‘s (and the 
readers‘) engagement with ‗incident of an exciting character‘. With its endless 
sequences of thrilling captures and resourceful escapes and its author‘s apparent 
willingness to dispense with the inconvenience of a plot to link the various set-pieces 
together, the tale apparently fulfils to the utmost Stevenson‘s ideal of romance as a 
genre dependent upon the details of individual incidents over and above such realist 
trappings as complex psychological motivation or a focus upon the emotional 
consequence of the incidents in question. Yet, in so totally fulfilling that aim, the text is 
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also at pains to point to the danger of the moral bankruptcy involved in constructing 
such a tale. Ultimately, the serial uses the trappings of the adventure serial not only to 
provide the requisite escape into ‗a-moral‘, incident-laden romance, but also to 
interrogate the legitimacy of those incidents and of the escape they offer. At first such 
an interrogation is subtle, but as the serial progresses the undermining of the romance‘s 
dependence upon action for its own sake is so overt as to constitute an implicit 
commentary on the tales that surround it. 
Dick‘s active role in events enables readers imaginatively to participate in 
historical narrative by engaging with the protagonist‘s embroilment in war as romantic 
action. Such a move complicates the romance‘s ability to focus on the violent fact of 
combat for its own sake, by emphasising the arbitrariness of Dick‘s allegiances – of the 
cause in whose name such acts are committed. In so doing, the tale demonstrates the 
way in which action passively observed differs from action physically undertaken. 
Early in the narrative, for example, Dick is asked to declare to which house his master 
is affiliated, but is unable to do so, ‗for his guardian had changed sides continually in 
the troubles of that period, and every change had brought him some increase of 
fortune‘. Dick, ‗colouring a little‘, is clearly embarrassed by the moral dubiousness of 
his guardian‘s position and, by extension, his own (The Black Arrow, 5).  
His embarrassment is well founded – as a protagonist of an adventure serial he 
is a good deal less certain of his allegiances than that other Young Folks knight, Sir 
Claude. In Villiers‘s tale, the very fact of allegiance to the crown legitimates the young 
knight‘s engagement in conflict. For example, John Chandos, the young man whom Sir 
Claude rescues in the first number, is squire to one Sir Walter Manny. The fact that ‗Sir 
Walter Manny and the Black Prince are the closest of friends‘ makes things very simple 
for Sir Claude: ‗let my friends be your friends – your friends my friends: your foes my 
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foes – my foes your foes.‘ This is important, because the right allegiance legitimises 
much that would otherwise be beyond the moral pale. Thus, spying on those 
responsible for the attack on Chandos in order to prove their suspicions regarding the 
villains‘ treacherous involvement with a French plot, the two are able to justify their 
actions by allusion to the present circumstances: 
 
     ‗I neither like spying through keyholes or playing eavesdropper,‘ said 
Chandos, in a whisper, ‗but under the circumstances, I deem myself justified in 
doing both.‘ 
     ‗Fully so,‘ asserted Claude. 
 
In the world of Sir Claude, an innate moral virtue ensures that the ends justify the 
means. It is fortunate then, that The Black Prince is a ‗gentler prince, a more 
accomplished gentlemen, or more valiant warrior‘ than any other, who is sure to ‗cover 
himself with glory when England‘s banner is waving over the fields of France‘ – 
determining one‘s allegiance couldn‘t be easier. Moreover, the Prince‘s followers are 
similarly blessed with a worthiness that is not just innate, but visually detectable. 
Chandos, for example, is immediately recognisable as the servant of the prince, 
possessing a ‗decidedly handsome‘ and ‗frank, open countenance, in which could be 
read at a glance, ―Truth, honesty, and valour‖‘. His attackers, on the other hand, are not 
only palpably dishonourable (‗―Dastards!‖ he thundered. ―What foul play is this? 
Twelve to one! Out on you all for very shame!‖‘), but have the misfortune to be born 
with a countenance on which their negative qualities are writ large:  
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[One of the villains] was a harsh-visaged man, whose every lineament bore the 
unmistakable career of dissipation and vice […] [His] vis-à-vis was an 
individual of a different stamp altogether, being a huge, course, bloated, red-
faced man, in half-armour, whose character could be read at a single glance. 
     Blusterer, bully, poltroon!
219
 
 
Truth, honour, valour, as well as allegiance to these virtues, are highly praised qualities 
in Young Folks. The issue containing the first part of Treasure Island and Sir Claude, 
for example, contains a poem by ‗E.E.B.‘, entitled ‗The Boys We Need‘, whose final 
stanza bestows ‗honour‘ upon the boy ‗Whose legend on his shield is this: / ―Right 
always wins the day.‖‘220 The issue for the week ending 19 Nov 1881 contains another 
poem (‗Brave and True‘ by G.B. Griffith), which insists that ‗Boys love their truth and 
follow it‘.221 The same issue ends with a short motto: ‗The discovery of what is true and 
the practice of what is good are the most important objects in life.‘ This is an admirable 
enough ideology when, as in Sir Claude, allegiance to these virtues is rendered 
unproblematic by being easily legible in the personages of ‗good‘ leaders. In The Black 
Arrow, however, civil war renders the location of virtue at best problematic and at 
worst impossible in the face of necessary and inevitable pragmatism. Decisions cannot 
be merely deferred to allegiance to a particular cause or party, nor is the intrinsic virtue 
of such allegiance allowed to go unquestioned. In negotiating the protagonist‘s 
loyalties, the text subverts the easy recourse to self-righteousness so readily exploited to 
legitimate the game of battle in a text like Sir Claude and, in so doing, reveals the 
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underlying amorality of the violent action that plays so fundamental a part in a 
successful romance.  
Observing a Yorkist victory in the woods near Sir Daniel‘s stronghold, for 
example, Dick reflects on the ‗ugly choice‘ facing his guardian: ‗Had Sir Daniel joined 
and was he now a fugitive and ruined? Or had he deserted to the side of York, and was 
he forfeit to honour?‘ (The Black Arrow, 63). Because of his allegiance, however, the 
‗ugly choice‘ is also necessarily Dick‘s own: ‗by the issue of some hours of battle, at 
which many of them had not been present, they had all become punishable traitors to 
the State, outside the buckler of the law‘ (The Black Arrow, 80). As the realisation 
dawns upon Dick that his guardian and his friend, the priest Sir Oliver, were among 
those responsible for the murder of his father, the dilemma is given a personal 
inflection: ‗was Dick, also, to turn upon the man who had nourished and taught him, 
who had severely punished, indeed, but yet unwearyingly protected his youth? The 
necessity, if it should prove to be one, was cruel‘ (The Black Arrow, 84-85). Dick 
confides in his guardian, who offers him a choice: ‗fight […] for the man that fed and 
fought for your infancy; or else—the door standeth open, the woods are full of mine 
enemies—go‘ (The Black Arrow, 90). Dick‘s reluctance to choose the former option 
leads Sir Daniel to comment: ‗y‘are a fair-day friend, it seemeth, and now seek to clear 
yourself of your allegiance […] Gratitude and faith are words, Dick Shelton […] but I 
look to deeds‘ (The Black Arrow, 88).  
While the exciting prospect of exile to ‗woods […] full of mine enemies‘ hints 
at the text‘s uninhibited unfolding of further romantic incidents, the passage also 
undercuts the appeal of such incidents by establishing the villian of the text as one who 
looks to deeds in a vacuum with no consideration of their moral consequence or worth. 
The villain of The Black Arrow is revealed, therefore, to be one whose status as a 
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blackguard derives not from any villainy intrinsic in his actions, but from a conscious 
desire to view ‗deeds‘ in a certain way. In fact, he is uncomfortably comparable to 
Stevenson‘s ideal ‗purchaser‘ – one who recognises that ‗there is a vast deal in life and 
letters both which is not immoral, but simply a-moral‘ and that narratives (be they 
fictional or historical) often turn, pragmatically, ‗not upon what a man shall choose to 
do, but on how he manages to do it; not on the passionate slips and hesitations of 
conscience, but on the problems of the body and of the practical intelligence‘ 
(Memories and Portraits, 174-75). Readers who judged tales according to their ability 
to provide ‗incident of an exciting character‘, face, here, an ethical challenge – that of 
being identified with the villain of the tale. By forcing Dick to enter a world in which 
the interest turns not only on what he does but also on how and why he chooses to do it, 
the narrative demonstrates the impossibility of the romantic ideal by reintroducing an 
element of moral culpability into a narrative world whose function depends on the 
amorality of its plots. Ultimately, therefore, The Black Arrow is no more nor less than a 
fully-fledged sabotage operation – its target the adventure genre itself. 
 Immediately following Dick‘s escape from Sir Daniel, for instance, the young 
protagonist and his gang of outcasts steal a vessel belonging to one Captain Arblaster, 
with the aim of rescuing Joanna. The episode gives rise to scenes of low comedy in a 
tavern as Arblaster and his mate are plied with drink, culminating in scenes of mayhem 
on the beach as Dick‘s party are ambushed. Yet, the text returns to this earlier episode 
later on when, having escaped once more from Sir Daniel‘s clutches, Dick 
unexpectedly finds himself confronted by the vengeful Captain. Thus cornered, Dick 
finds that he is ‗not merely helpless, but, as his conscience loudly told him when it was 
too late, actually guilty – actually the bankrupt debtor of the man whose ship he had 
stolen and lost‘ (The Black Arrow, 202). Dick faces not only a reversal of fortune here, 
 181 
but also a reversal in his role as romance protagonist – from noble adventurer to thief 
and villain. The point is hammered home by a third appearance of Arblaster, who 
confronts Dick with the consequences of his earlier actions. Having fallen into the 
company of Richard Crookback, who is now about to slay the unfortunate Captain, 
Dick sees an opportunity to right the wrong that he has done Arblaster and begs the 
future Richard III to set the unfortunate seaman free. To Dick‘s dismay, Arblaster is 
less than grateful and, finding his mercy spurned, Dick is forced to watch, ‗through 
tears, the poor old man, bemused with liquor and sorrow, go shambling away […] and 
for the first time began to understand the desperate game that we play in life; and how a 
thing once done is not to be changed or remedied, by any penitence‘ (The Black Arrow, 
236).  
Similarly subversive is the way in which Dick‘s exuberance at winning his 
spurs is soon superseded by a meditation on the horrors of war which, we are reminded, 
involves not only adventure, chivalry and romance, but also ‗the blows of the sledge–
hammer on some barricaded door, and now the miserable shrieks of women‘: 
 
Dick‘s heart had just been awakened. He had just seen the cruel consequences 
of his own behaviour; and the thought of the sum of misery that was now acting 
in the whole of Shoreby filled him with despair. (The Black Arrow, 237) 
 
Dick‘s heart may have ‗just been awakened‘, but so is the reader‘s. Not only does the 
scene emphasise the amorality of romantic action – it also, by dint of its appearance in a 
Young Folks serial, undermines the whole escapist project of such fiction. Having 
rejected Sir Daniel‘s morally bankrupt idea of action as the only fixed point in an 
inherently mutable world, Dick attempts to maintain an alternative position, seeking to 
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lend a moral dimension to his active participation in events – a position in which the 
action of his adventure plot can be translated into a series of morally commendable 
deeds in opposition to the morally dubious deeds of his guardian. Gradually, however, 
this position is revealed as untenable – especially in a state of civil war. In the end, 
Dick‘s only choice is to abandon the wars completely and we eventually leave him, 
reunited with Johanna, content ‗to find the sounds [of battle] still drawing farther and 
farther away‘ (The Black Arrow, 253). The Black Arrow‘s conclusion fundamentally 
contradicts the ‗Gossip on Romance‘ insofar as it undermines its promise to provide 
amoral action. Instead, action that appears amoral is eventually revealed as anything 
but. Readers are not allowed to become ‗submerged‘ by the tale ‗as by a billow‘ and are 
forced to ‗argue‘, if not with the author, then with the other stories in the periodical.  
Like Treasure Island before it, The Black Arrow enacts a commentary on the 
genre within which it is situated. Yet, in being so closely related to the conventions of 
the other stories in Young Folks, its ethical subversion of romance emphasises the link 
between the performance of genre and the performative role of writing for a particular 
audience: the collusion of genre with the material conditions of production and 
reception. Both serials subvert the romance genre, but The Black Arrow takes particular 
care to disguise itself as a Young Folks serial. Initially begun as a novel, Treasure 
Island addresses itself to readers of romantic fiction in volume form, and fails to attune 
itself to the specific conventions of Young Folks. In volume form, its prefatory poem 
reminds the ‗hesitating purchaser‘ what they are to expect. Yet it is a series of novels 
that the poem offers as an intertext. Within the pages of Young Folks, such a preface 
would have been rendered unnecessary by the presence of an already-determined 
readership, which knew precisely the kinds of tale they might be expected to find 
therein.  
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The Black Arrow, however, critiques not only the romance genre, but also the 
kind of romance that predominated specifically in Young Folks. On the one hand, it 
addresses the issue of adherence to convention as the legitimator of action in life, which 
Stevenson had criticised in his ethical essays, by demonstrating that ideological 
allegiances were often more complex than available models (real or fictional) could 
account for. On the other hand, it maintains the insistent division between life and art 
insisted upon in Stevenson‘s literary criticism, emphasising the fact that the exhilarating 
appeal of romantic incidents could only function as long as their barbarous nature was 
presented in an aesthetically appealing way – as long as their ‗amorality‘ is maintained. 
The conventional romantic situation of virtue versus its easily-discernible opposite – 
the schematic that makes the action of Sir Claude possible – is exposed in The Black 
Arrow as deeply simplistic: ‗if that a poor gentleman fight not upon the one side, 
perforce he must fight upon the other. He may not stand alone; ‘tis not in nature‘. 
Challenged, at the end, by Joanna‘s maid Alicia, Dick is forced to reject this simple 
ethical schematic: ‗Ye that fight but for a hazard, what are ye but a butcher? War is but 
noble by the cause, and y‘ have disgraced it‘ (The Black Arrow, 243).  
In The Black Arrow, therefore, a subversive interrogation of the romance genre 
is intertwined with a metafictional emphasis upon the romance as physical commodity. 
‗To a Hesitating Purchaser‘ is designed precisely to draw attention to Treasure Island 
as a book among other books (those of Kingston, Cooper and Ballantyne). In 
enumerating the stock features of Treasure Island in conjunction with these older books 
and the comparative pleasures they offer, it turns away from the subject matter of the 
story to construct an image of the potential buyer reading that story. Stevenson‘s 
defence of reading as an escape becomes more than just an expression of a personal 
preference, and his romances more than simply an attempt to provide the potential 
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purchasers of his novels with an experience that he himself found pleasurable. Instead, 
they are fulfilments of his literary theory, designed manifestly to represent a change 
from ‗the atmosphere and tenor‘ of the reader‘s life; to enact a game that ‗so chimes 
with his fancy that he can join in it with all his heart‘; to provide a tale which he ‗loves 
to recall‘ and dwell upon ‗with entire delight‘ (Memories and Portraits, 187). Yet they 
also reveal themselves at every turn to be exactly what they really are – delightful 
constructions that only exist as printed words in the hands of the reader, ready to stand 
or fall by their capacity to delight. In both cases, Stevenson was able to offer his readers 
the pleasurable reading experience they desired in a manner that exposed the terms and 
conditions upon which that pleasure rested – an enjoyment of action for its own sake, 
which remained viable only as long as it was temporary. 
In writing Treasure Island and The Black Arrow, Stevenson came to realise that 
the success of his particular generic project – to provide readers with the perfect literary 
bolt-hole from the complexities of lived experience, whilst neutralising the deception 
inherent in simplifying that experience – depended upon the text‘s final appearance as a 
physical commodity able to attract those readers who would recognise the genre in 
which he was working and respond accordingly. Not fully resembling a Young Folks 
serial, Treasure Island risked confusing readers whose expectations it failed to meet. 
‗To the Hesitating Purchaser‘ thus becomes a necessary means of signalling the terms 
and conditions of a reading experience that the volume offers as a commodity, yet 
critiques as text. In The Black Arrow, the existence of the story paper itself becomes a 
kind of material preface for readers, similarly signalling the generic context in which 
the tale is to be read and thus empowering its subversive project. The circumstances of 
these two novels‘ production were governed by Stevenson‘s realisation that the novelist 
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is always the author of material, as well as of textual commodities – and that these were 
not always presented, physically, as books.  
In a marketplace characterised by an increasing proliferation of fictional forms 
and genres, late-nineteenth-century readers were increasingly in need of extra-textual 
information to alert them to the kind of texts whose rules their reading would need to 
abide by. In such a context, Stevenson vigorously affirmed the need, not only to give 
his readers the fictional forms they most desired, but also to ensure that customers 
would recognise what they were being offered. Aesthetically, the customer‘s search for 
textual gratification was, for Stevenson, always right. Ethically, however, his intense 
awareness of the difference between fiction and reality led him to permeate his work 
with metafictional reminders that terms and (material) conditions would always apply. 
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Chapter 3 
 
‘A Momentary Contact With Reality’: Reading and Otherness in E.M. Forster 
and M.R. James 
 
 
i. The trouble with Leonard 
In the wake of the 1870 Education Act, debates about reading – and particularly the 
reading of fiction – took a new turn. Wilde‘s defence, in his Preface to Dorian Gray, of 
what he saw as the fundamental amorality of books, demonstrates that concerns 
regarding the effect of books upon the morality of readers were ongoing. Implicit in 
such debates was an underlying acceptance that reading had a formative effect upon the 
reader‘s character and that the choice of literature was thus a matter of extreme 
moment. As well as echoing the concerns of evangelical Christianity, with its insistence 
on a personal reading of the Bible to bring one closer to God, the formative effect of 
literature was an idea that also permeated the spirit underlying the production of 
imperial romances, which Stevenson examined in his self-reflexive approach to that 
genre. In romance, the idea took on the political dimension of ‗forming‘ future subjects 
and rulers of an imperial nation. By the turn of the twentieth century, however, the 
advent of university degrees in English Literature and the passing of the Education Acts 
had brought about a situation in which an increasingly democratised print culture was 
debated in terms that foregrounded reading (even fiction reading) as an educational 
activity, both within the framework of a formal degree or school curriculum and as a 
means of auto-didactic self-improvement through the cultivation of a refined and 
beneficial literary taste.
222
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Some participants in these debates worked to defend fiction from accusations of 
frivolity, arguing that that even fictional works allowed the reader access to a store of 
knowledge about life. Such defences were predicated upon an ideal reader who wished 
to be educated as well as entertained. In 1914, for example, H.G. Wells sought to reject 
‗the theory that the novel is wholly and solely a means of relaxation‘.223 He objects to 
‗the Weary Giant theory‘, which hypothesises ‗a man, burthened, toiling, worn‘ after 
the exhausting daily activities that ‗constitute the substance of a prosperous man‘s life‘ 
(Wells, Englishman, 148-49). Such a theory delineates the activity of novel reading, to 
its ultimate detriment, as one that is always undertaken during this ‗little precious 
interval of leisure‘: 
 
He wants to forget the troubling realities of life. He wants to be taken out of 
himself, to be cheered, consoled, amused – above all, amused. He doesn‘t want 
ideas, he doesn‘t want facts; above all, he doesn‘t want – Problems. (Wells, 
Englishman, 149; Wells‘s emphasis)  
 
This conception of the fiction-reader, Wells argues, dominated the mid-Victorian period 
but, by 1914, both ‗fiction and criticism […] are in revolt against that tired giant, the 
                                                                                                                                              
is less important than the defensiveness with which writers now portrayed themselves as writing either 
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it should enshrine for the newly-literate masses – came to be seen as an issue of the utmost importance.  
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prosperous Englishman‘ and Wells places himself at the vanguard of a faction 
attempting to reclaim the activity of novel reading as a more serious pursuit (Wells, 
Englishman, 149). For Wells, the problem is that writers feel a need to serve implied 
readers who desire fiction that divert them from the complexity of human experience. 
By striving to meet this desire, argues Wells, authors succeed only in creating in reality 
the implied audience they have imagined while writing. As a result, they both 
manufacture and sustain a demand for literature devoid of anything ‗significant and 
real‘, which they then, paradoxically, feel compelled to serve. The solution, he 
suggests, is that readers be ‗trained‘ to accept the kind of literature they require, rather 
than the literature that habit has led them to desire: ‗So far from the weary reader being 
a decently tired giant, we realise that he is only an […] undertrained giant, and we are 
[…] resolved to exercise his higher ganglia in every possible way‘ (Wells, Englishman, 
150). 
As John Batchelor has pointed out, Wells‘s notion that mid-Victorian 
commentators viewed the novel as merely a means of relaxation is ‗manifestly wrong‘: 
‗it was clearly recognised from the 1840s onwards that the novel was a vehicle of moral 
judgement and social education‘.224 As such, Wells cannot claim as his own the idea 
that the novel is an ‗important and necessary‘ moral force in civilization.225 Batchelor is 
also right to point out that Wells‘s diatribe against the ‗Weary Giant‘ merely obscures 
what is the main focus of the essay – an attack on those who exercised ‗fierce 
pedantries‘ regarding the novel‘s ‗general form‘, foremost among whom was Henry 
James, with whom Wells was embroiled in a heated literary dispute (Wells, 
Englishman, 150). 
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The essay‘s concerns about the detrimental relegation of literature to the realm 
of leisurely pursuits is a reminder, however, of the way in which such anxieties were 
debated in the early years of the twentieth century. Frank Swinnerton explicitly 
references Wells‘s ‗Weary Giant‘ theory in his dismissal of Stevenson‘s romances. 
These are ‗strong enough in invention to delight that typical person called by Mr. H.G. 
Wells the ―weary giant,‖ engrossing reading to the accompaniment of cigars and 
whisky-and-soda, but not, in the way of art, quite what we require from works of 
creative imagination‘.226 Of course, to criticise Stevenson in this way is to ignore that 
author‘s own view of mass entertainment and high art as not incompatible. For 
Stevenson, the former was merely a different edition of the latter, with its own 
disciplines and its own standards of literary value and aesthetic success. In dismissing 
Stevenson‘s works as ‗not, in the way of art, quite what we require from works of 
creative imagination‘, Swinnerton fails to realise that his own conception of what can 
and should be considered ‗art‘ might be very different from Stevenson‘s, whose work is 
constructed according to alternative (rather than innately inadequate) aesthetic 
standards. Even so, Swinnerton‘s easy dismissal of the notion that literature was at its 
most valuable when it was most ‗engrossing‘ provides an idea of what, in the years 
following Stevenson‘s death, constituted that which critics ‗require[d] from works of 
creative imagination‘ – something which could educate the masses about lived 
experience, rather than facilitating an engrossing escape from it.
227
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Swinnerton‘s remarks nevertheless only cohere partially with Wells‘s argument. 
If Wells‘s essay can be read as an implicit condemnation of certain kinds of literary 
texts on the basis of the assumptions according to which they have been written, then it 
also betrays a certain attitude towards the reading of texts more generally. What Wells 
attacks is the idea that novels should ever be conceived as ‗wholly and solely‘ suitable 
for relaxation – not that they should never be designed for such an end. In fact, Wells‘s 
essay exemplifies a growing belief not only in reading as a programmatic method of 
acquiring and cultivating literary taste, but also in the inherent value of literary taste as 
part of a liberal education – not only for the educated elite, but also for the newly-
literate masses. In this sense, the essay articulates a familiar concern in the period, 
already discussed in my introductory chapter, about the uses to which board school 
pupils would put their newly-acquired literacy. In rejecting the idea of fiction reading as 
a mere leisure activity, the essay tacitly suggests the opposite – that English fiction is 
eminently suitable for programmatic study, so long as the reader can be trained to read 
the right kinds of text in the right ways.  
E.M. Forster‘s Howards End (1910) exemplifies and parodies Wells‘s ideal 
reader in the person of the clerk Leonard Bast. Leonard, by means of diligently 
perusing the canon of English literature, hopes to expand his cultural boundaries. A 
‗weary giant‘, his leisure time is spent in diligent, avocational study of English literary 
classics, not to mention a similarly attentive perambulation of London‘s concert halls 
and galleries. His aim is self-improvement – to discover something within ‗culture‘ that 
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might provide the key to raising him above his own lowly social situation. His 
description of the ‗voice‘ that speaks to him from the pages of Ruskin‘s The Stones of 
Venice (1851-53) illustrates the terms on which this auto-didactic quest is undertaken: 
 
Leonard listened to it with reverence. He felt that he was being done good to, 
and that if he kept on with Ruskin, and the Queen's Hall Concerts, and some 
pictures by Watts, he would one day push his head out of the grey waters and 
see the universe. He believed in sudden conversion […] he hoped to come to 
Culture suddenly, much as the Revivalist hopes to come to Jesus.
228
 
 
Leonard‘s determination to achieve a holistic understanding of ‗culture‘ by pursuing an 
improving programme of cultural consumption aligns him with Wells‘s ideal figure of 
the self-trained auto-didactic reader. Yet, as the passage complains, equipping oneself 
with the right books does not lead, automatically, to a more informed reading. 
Leonard‘s books remain objects which he gazes upon, even underlines, but never 
actually reads. Instead, he ‗listens‘ to the text passively and ‗with reverence‘. He 
appears to view the text as one whose meaning is firmly in place for him to uncover, 
much as Ruskin himself describes in Sesame and Lilies when he compares the reader of 
great books to an Australian miner in search of precious metal. Passive observance of 
already-designated masterpieces is, for Leonard, the means by which ‗culture‘ – the 
indefinable something that will enable one to push one‘s head ‗out of the grey waters 
and see the universe‘ – will be conveyed to the reader in the same way that a bottle 
disgorges a reviving tonic. What is criticised in this passage is precisely Wells‘s idea of 
culture as a list of prescribed masterworks. The passage contains a debilitating paradox 
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that signals the project‘s inevitable failure; tellingly, it does not reveal exactly how 
culture might allow Leonard to ‗push his head out of the grey‘. His faith in cultural 
consumption as a means of effecting his escape from lower middle-class mundanity is 
blind – it is never obvious what that escape entails, nor how cultural consumption and 
social improvement are linked as cause and effect.  
The problem is Leonard‘s implicit ‗othering‘ of the culture he hopes 
paradoxically to appropriate and which, for him, books represent. The programmatic 
approach to the kinds of works that Wells and Swinnerton ‗require‘ to be read lead to 
precisely the engrossing escape from lived experience towards which, they insist, real 
literary ‗art‘ should never strive and the absence of which Swinnerton denounces in 
Stevenson. Indeed, culture becomes aligned, for Leonard, with romance: his is ‗a gray 
life, and to brighten it he had ruled off a few corners for Romance‘. Seeing the leisured, 
educated Schlegel sisters as ‗denizens of Romance‘, he treasures their acquaintance 
whilst simultaneously working to ‗keep [them] to the corner he had assigned them, 
pictures that must not walk out of their frames‘ (Howards End, 129). Margaret 
Schlegel‘s calling card comes to symbolise, for him, ‗the life of culture‘. His insertion 
of the card into the volume of Ruskin literalises the taxonomic operation that, for him, 
constitutes cultural consumption. Not only Ruskin‘s text, but also the actual physical 
volume, into which this symbol of ‗the life of culture‘ is placed, becomes a repository 
for Leonard‘s reification of this ‗life of culture‘ as already inimical to his own 
existence. As a gesture, it figures culture as something that, for Leonard, exists in terms 
of what it obviously isn‘t, whilst never bringing him any closer to discovering what it 
actually is. Culture, for Leonard, is thus always already separate from the quotidian: 
‗He did not want Romance to collide with the Porphyrion [the insurance company for 
whom he works], still less with Jacky [his working-class wife]‘ (Howards End, 130). In 
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making culture an escape from the drabness of the quotidian ‗daily grey‘, therefore, 
Leonard in fact forecloses his own hypothetical escape route by classifying it as already 
inimical to the experiences he sees as open to him. 
Leonard reflects a difficulty identified by Chris Baldick in the arguments of 
well-meaning nineteenth-century educationalists like Matthew Arnold and H.G. 
Robinson. These championed the teaching of English literature to working men, as a 
substitute for the Greek and Latin classics, on the basis that they might ‗promote 
sympathy and fellow feeling among all classes‘.229 Arnold and Robinson believed in 
circumventing the charge of mere indoctrination by foregrounding ‗English Literature‘ 
(the subject) as ‗the fostering of a more or less independent process of reflection by the 
learner, rather than the passive swallowing of dogma‘.230 Yet, the way in which the 
‗sympathy‘ and ‗fellow feeling‘ were located in a ‗culture‘ that texts already enshrined 
in advance – and which the ‗trained‘ reader could recover through a ‗correct‘ reading – 
was in itself dangerously close to indoctrination. By highlighting the working-class 
reader‘s a priori alienation from the realm of sweetness and light, this humanistic 
approach actually ‗forces an awareness of class inferiority upon its unrefined readers‘ 
by construing them as already less sophisticated than ‗the intellectual leaders of the 
race‘. As Baldick notes, ‗Robinson‘s serene region of truth […] places itself ―above the 
smoke and stir, the din and turmoil of man‘s lower life of care and business and debate‖ 
[…] [by means of] a particular form of cultural intimidation‘.231 
Wells‘s friend and fellow-author Arnold Bennett provides an alternative idea of 
reading as a means of education. His Literary Taste: How to Form It (1909) is, in one 
sense, a manual for constructing an affordable library of improving books. Yet, where 
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Wells regards the educative ‗value‘ of reading as the discovery of something that 
resides eternally within certain texts to be ‗discovered‘ by the trained reader in one 
revelatory hermeneutic gesture, Bennett denounces such an idea as, for the educator, 
potentially counterproductive. Taking Shakespeare as an example, he claims that the 
dramatist ‗is ―taught‖ in schools […] in a determined effort to make every boy in the 
land a lifelong enemy of Shakespeare‘.232 To ‗teach‘ Shakespeare as an established 
classic of English Literature automatically separates reading for pleasure and reading 
for study, with the result that the reading of canonical literature is transformed into a 
teleological labour – the search for the thing beyond oneself: 
 
[T]he classics do not afford you a pleasure commensurate with their renown. 
You peruse them with a sense of duty, a sense of doing the right thing, a sense 
of ‗improving yourself,‘ rather than with a sense of gladness. You do not smack 
your lips; you say: ‗That is good for me.‘ (Bennett, 11) 
 
For Bennett, the problem lies in viewing culture as something that is already there to be 
attained – an attractive prize already possessed by a privileged few. ‗Literary taste,‘ he 
argues, certainly ‗serves […] as a certificate of correct culture‘, but it is also valuable as 
‗a […] charming distraction […] a private pastime‘ (Bennett, 2). While Bennett 
concedes the existence of taste as a badge conferring distinction, therefore, he also 
insists on its equal function as a means of relaxation. He rejects emphatically the idea 
that taste is something to be learned in a programme of utilitarian ‗betterment‘, saying 
disdainfully of those who propagate such a notion, ‗[t]here are certain things a man 
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ought to know, or to know about, and literature is one of them: such is their idea‘ 
(Bennett, 1).  
 Bennett insists upon the detrimental effects of presenting taste as the ability to 
detect, through a programmatic study of particular texts, exactly what one has been told 
to find. He also sets up, as the natural contrast, an implication that literary taste is as 
much about what the attentive reader brings to the text as it is about the detection of 
some special element already latent within it – and that literature, in a circular process, 
teaches readers to recognise their own experiences. Presenting an imaginative definition 
of what literature is, he says (addressing an implied heterosexual male reader): 
 
A girl cannot be called a miracle. If a girl is to be called a miracle, then you 
might call pretty nearly anything a miracle [...] That is just it: you might. You 
can. You ought. Amid all the miracles of the universe you had just wakened up 
to one. You were full of your discovery. […] The makers of literature are those 
who have seen and felt the miraculous interestingness of the universe. (Bennett, 
5, 6) 
 
Crucially, however, the awakening to the ‗miraculous interestingness of the universe‘ is 
something that can occur before any reading takes place and on an entirely subjective 
level: ‗you might call pretty nearly anything a miracle‘. What literature does, in 
Bennett‘s formulation, is present a series of interesting case studies as to what 
individuals ‗might‘ experience or might already have experienced for themselves. 
One might say Bennett locates programmatic study within the bounds of the 
school curriculum, but sees ‗culture‘ (‗literary taste‘) itself not as something attained 
through passive consumption of cultural artefacts, but as something equally marked 
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within the particular reading practices brought to bear upon those artefacts. Thus, 
‗[p]eople who regard literary taste simply as an accomplishment, and literature simply 
as a distraction, will never truly succeed either in acquiring the accomplishment or in 
using it half-acquired as a distraction‘ (Bennett, 1). Study and relaxation 
(‗accomplishment‘ and ‗distraction‘) are not inimical in Bennett‘s formulation – 
culture, as embodied in a way of reading, enriches both: 
  
The aim of literary study is not to amuse the hours of leisure; it is to awake 
oneself, [...] to intensify one‘s capacity for pleasure, for sympathy, and for 
comprehension. It is not to affect one hour, but twenty-four hours. An 
understanding appreciation of literature means an understanding appreciation of 
the world, and it means nothing else. (Bennett, 7) 
 
Leonard‘s encounter with the Schlegel sisters dramatises Bennett‘s argument by laying 
bare the dimness with which Leonard apprehends his own desires and exposing as 
flawed his conception of culture as a series of texts whose passive consumption will 
lead directly to an improvement in his mode of existence. Justifying to the sisters his 
decision to undertake an all-night ramble through London and out into the wooded 
countryside beyond Wimbledon, Leonard invokes the texts this nocturnal excursion is 
designed to emulate: E.V. Lucas‘s Open Road (1899), George Meredith‘s The Ordeal 
of Richard Feverel (1859) and Stevenson‘s Prince Otto (1885) and Virginibus 
Puerisque (1881). The sisters are overjoyed to discover, however, that Leonard has 
been disappointed in matching up, with the experience itself, the cultural construction 
of walking tours gained from his reading of these classic literary accounts: 
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‗But was the dawn wonderful?‘ asked Helen. 
    With unforgettable sincerity he replied, ‗No.‘ The word flew again like a 
pebble from the sling. Down toppled all that had seemed ignoble or literary in 
his talk[.] […] In the presence of these women Leonard had arrived, and he 
spoke with a flow, an exultation, that he had seldom known.  
 
As the conversation progresses, it becomes increasingly clear that it is not the passive 
absorption of ‗literary‘ ideas that will enable Leonard to ‗push his head out of the grey 
waters and see the universe‘, but rather the testing of those ideas for himself (Howards 
End, 126).  
Yet Leonard seems determined to cling to the books he has studied. In seeking 
to transcend his dull existence, he is adamant that this literal attempt to break out of the 
metropolitan gloom under cover of darkness is merely the enactment of ‗something of 
Richard Jefferies‘ rather than an experience uniquely his own. Helen objects, arguing 
that Leonard‘s determination to meander nocturnally actually comes ‗from something 
far greater‘, but it is no good – Leonard‘s ‗arrival‘ is short lived and he has soon 
trapped himself once more in ‗a swamp of books‘ (Howards End, 126).  
What the sisters recognise – as Leonard fails to – is that physical adventure 
itself confirms his ‗cultured‘ status in a way his list of books fails to do. At the mention 
of Otto, Helen Schlegel and her brother Tibby ‗groaned gently‘ and when Lucas is 
mentioned, Helen intercedes: ‗No doubt it‘s another beautiful book, but I‘d rather hear 
about your road‘ (Howards End, 125). Helen‘s insistence that Leonard tell them about 
his own ‗road‘ (and not about the books that inspired him to take it) indicates the 
literary metaphor at work in his night-time ramble, which represents his reluctance to 
move beyond what others have written of their own experiences, to focus instead upon 
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what he experiences himself. Ultimately, in his reading as in his walk, Leonard ‗always 
meant to go off the roads, but the worst of it is that it‘s more difficult to find one‘s way‘ 
(Howards End, 126). The metaphor of reading as a ramble is carried over into the 
narrator‘s insistence that authors ‗mean us to use [their books] for sign-posts, and are 
not to blame if […] we mistake the sign-post for the destination‘: 
 
Leonard had reached the destination. […] [H]e had troubled to go and see for 
himself. Within his cramped little mind dwelt something that was greater than 
Jefferies‘ books – the spirit that led Jefferies to write them; and his dawn, 
though revealing nothing but monotones, was part of the eternal sunrise that 
shows George Borrow Stonehenge. (Howards End, 127) 
 
What literature reveals, argues the passage, is not the specific or inherent beauty of that 
which writers have looked upon or imagined, but ‗the spirit‘ that initially ‗led‘ them to 
think them worth writing about at all – ‗something greater‘ which it behoves readers to 
carry beyond the hour of literary study to permeate the entire twenty-four hours of their 
existence. Culture is located in a way of ‗seeing‘ to which books contain the ‗sign-
posts‘, but to which the act of reading is also subordinate. Books do not reveal culture 
to the readers as a fait accompli. Rather, culture is redefined as an ongoing practice – 
the ability not only constantly to compare textual content with personal experience, but 
also to acquire sufficient experience to perform such a comparison. 
Thus, Leonard‘s rejection of the dawn‘s beauty signals his cultural ‗arrival‘ 
because it signals a realisation not only that his own experience counts but also that it 
may differ from Borrow‘s, Stevenson‘s and the rest. Cultural attainment, in this 
passage, is not correctly to apprehend something ‗great writers‘ already know – a 
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cultural standard already there to be surveyed and unearthed – but a willingness to 
follow the ‗sign-posts‘ and to ‗see‘ for oneself. As Helen argues, Leonard ‗doesn‘t want 
more books, but to read books rightly‘ (Howards End, 139) – but as long as books are 
placed on a pedestal, set apart from the very experiences they actually inflect and 
transform, they are nothing more than useless ‗husks‘ that clog up Leonard‘s brain and 
prevent him from encountering ‗the real thing‘ on his own terms (Howards End, 150). 
To ‗read books rightly‘, here, is to be inquisitive and critical, rather than passive, not 
only succumbing to culture‘s suggestive ‗sign-posts‘, but also allowing one‘s own 
experience to dictate the destination – to breathe new life into old texts.  
 
ii. Curiosities of Research: The scholarly and the literary in Forster and M.R. 
James 
It might initially seem that Forster‘s examination of Leonard‘s reading habits could not 
be further removed from the supernatural fiction of the palaeographer, Montague 
Rhodes James. Leonard is younger, less leisured and less educated than James‘s 
protagonists, the question of whose education is, quite literally, academic. His tales deal 
with men (and they are always men) who are eminent scholars, librarians, antiquaries, 
college fellows or even, in some cases, all of these. Yet, their concern with their 
protagonists‘ attitudes to the interpretation of ancient texts allows an unexpected 
connection to be drawn between James‘s academics and Leonard Bast.233  
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In 1919, James published The Wanderings and Homes of Manuscripts, a short 
volume designed to provide prospective textual scholars with an outline of some of the 
issues surrounding ‗the survival and transmission of ancient literature‘ and to provide 
‗some helps for tracing out their history‘.234 Wanderings is designed as an outline of 
good academic practice in palaeography, in contrast to Literary Taste‘s preoccupation 
with the avocational study of literary texts in modern printed editions. Yet both 
emphasise, with Howards End, the significance of individual practice in the production 
of meaning through study – the importance of ‗seeing for oneself‘. In a concluding 
section entitled ‗Curiosities of Research‘, James urges his readers:  
 
Be inquisitive. See books for yourself; do not trust that the cataloguer has told 
you everything. I am a cataloguer myself, and I know that, try as he may, a 
worker of that class cannot hope to know or to see every detail that is of 
importance. The creature is human, and on some days his mind is less alert than 
on others. (James, Wanderings, 95) 
 
As the passage illustrates, Wanderings is more than just a guide to the methodology and 
techniques of bibliographic research, just as Literary Taste is more than simply a 
manual of great works. It is a celebration not only of academic method, but of the 
scholar‘s imaginative faculty – the ‗curiosity‘ fundamental to research. ‗Curiosity‘ 
becomes the antidote to methodological traditions detailed elsewhere in the volume, a 
reminder that they are to be followed, but also critically challenged by individual 
scholars. In contrast to ‗curiosity‘, James posits the activity of cataloguers who 
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document and describe physical texts according to pre-established taxonomies. 
Likening their work to manual labourer and invoking the language of class 
discrimination (‗a worker of that class‘) James hints that the effectiveness of academic 
research depends upon a hierarchy of curiosity, at the bottom of which is the scholar 
who adheres blindly to prescribed lines, never thinking or looking beyond the physical 
details he has been trained to observe and document – familiar, in the words of 
Forster‘s Margaret Schlegel, only with ‗the outsides of books‘ (Howards End, 123).  
‗Canon Alberic‘s Scrapbook‘, the first tale in James‘s first collection Ghost 
Stories of an Antiquary (1904), dramatises the shortcomings of the cataloguer as a 
palaeographic labourer. The tale concerns Dennistoun, an antiquarian attached to the 
University of Cambridge, who arrives in the French town of St Bertrand de 
Comminges, intent on ‗fill[ing] a notebook‘ with details about the antiquities and 
architecture of its magnificent cathedral.
235
 Recognising the Englishman as an ‗amateur 
des vieux livres‘ (‗a lover of old books‘) the sacristan invites him to view a particular 
curio in his own possession – a collection of excerpts from illuminated manuscripts, 
assembled by the seventeenth-century canon, Alberic de Mauléon, including a striking 
picture of King Solomon passing judgment on a frightful, hairy demon (Count Magnus, 
4). Spotting the book‘s incalculable value at once, Dennistoun offers to purchase the 
volume. After some persuasion, the sacristan agrees. Later on, however, Dennistoun 
comes to regret his decision when the creature from the drawing appears to him as he 
peruses the book in his hotel room. Happily, he is rescued by two of the hotel‘s 
servants, allowing him to return to England in possession of his prize. 
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Upon finding the eponymous scrapbook, Dennistoun quickly identifies the 
provenance not only of the book itself, but also of the precious fragments contained 
therein, allowing him intuitively to construct a tentative catalogue (Count Magnus, 6). 
As Janet Backhouse has noted, Dennistoun‘s ‗cherished dreams of finding priceless 
manuscripts in untrodden corners of France‘ (Count Magnus, 4) reflect not merely 
‗James‘s own bibliophile‘s pipe dream, but also the abiding excitement and delight with 
which he himself explored the raw materials on which his life‘s work was based‘.236 
Yet Dennistoun‘s ‗cherished dreams‘ are also the starting point for the tale‘s meditation 
upon the disappointing limitations with which he binds himself in his failure to read the 
scrapbook as an imaginatively suggestive narrative, preferring instead to categorise it, 
according to a pre-existing set of palaeographic taxonomies, as a mere object. His 
reading is scholarly but partial, as he places a bibliographic list of the book‘s physical 
components in hierarchical ascendance above the imaginatively apprehended reality of 
that which they chronicle as text – including, damagingly the reality of the late owner‘s 
demoniacal proclivities.  
In fact, the tale presents Dennistoun‘s approach as simultaneously a rigorous, if 
hubristic, act of scholarly analysis and a catastrophically obtuse lack of imaginative 
discretion. This is emphasised by the way in which the narrative contrasts the 
protagonist‘s own attitude with the reactions of others, who view the scrapbook and its 
hideous contents with greater caution: the sacristan and his family, who handle the 
fragment (and the book containing it) with abject fear; the narrator, who recalls the 
‗despair of conveying by any words the impression which this figure makes upon 
anyone who looks at it‘ (Count Magnus, 8; my emphasis). Dennistoun‘s elision of a 
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readerly engagement with the events inscribed within the object-as-text is thus at odds 
with absolutely everyone else who sees it. As a result, his obsessive placement of the 
book-as-object within established palaeographical taxonomies, though 
methodologically efficient, proves misguided within the context of the tale itself.  
James‘s tale might be said to perform imaginative work inimical to 
palaeography: an antiquarian discipline which, by its very nature, concerns itself more 
with the history of the book as a physical artefact than with the literary quality of the 
text it carries. At the same time, however, this departure from what might 
methodologically be expected of the antiquarian scholar allows one to read the title of 
the collection in which the tale appears, Ghost Stories of an Antiquary, as suggestive 
not only of the provenance of its author, but also of an antiquary‘s particular demons. In 
staging the return of what is repressed in Dennistoun‘s reading experience – an 
imaginative engagement with the book‘s literary or narrative qualities – the tale exploits 
the liminal quality which, because of its ‗peculiar status as a material object which 
carries explicit, decodable symbolic information‘, differentiates the antiquarian book 
from other relics of historical material cultures.
237
 As John Bennet points out, the 
antiquarian book, more than any other relic, demands to be read as a text, as well as 
valued as a physical object. Ancient texts are ‗perhaps unique‘ among archaeological 
objects ‗in conveying a meaning explicitly by means of language‘. They may not be the 
only example of archaeological ‗texts‘ – as Bennet points out, all relics ‗carry a 
symbolic meaning‘ and are, thus, textual.238 Yet, in being so manifestly textual, ancient 
books emphasise the way in which all relics demand not only to be documented, but 
also to be ‗read‘ – to be engaged with imaginatively as texts that still have something to 
offer the reader in the present. Not all of James‘s stories deal with haunted books but, 
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because of the book‘s unique status as both text and object, it obtains currency as a 
metaphor for the textuality of artefacts more generally, which underpins the rest of the 
stories in the volume.
239
 
Matthew Johnson‘s recent theoretical assessment of archaeological approaches 
to prehistoric artefacts reiterates and develops Bennet‘s point, arguing that ‗reading‘ the 
past poses an epistemological problem that cannot be solved merely by a turn to 
material evidence. Objects, Johnson points out, do not signify by themselves – it 
therefore behoves archaeologists ‗to view artefacts like literary texts, to ―read‖ them as 
we would a piece of writing, and so begin to uncover the rich complexity of past 
cultural meanings‘.240 At the same time, however, it must be borne in mind that ‗[o]ur 
beloved artefacts actually belong to the present. They exist in the here and now‘.241 
Thus, one must not ‗fall into the trap of believing that the very physicality of the 
archaeological material will in itself tell us what the past was like‘.242 Yet, neither must 
we assume that to ‗read‘ objects ‗as we would a piece of writing‘ will achieve what 
formal description of the object will not – that imaginative engagement with the object 
as aesthetically engaging text will ‗in itself tell us what the past was like‘. Instead, 
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Johnson‘s suggestion that the past be ‗read‘ recommends an acknowledgement, in any 
attempt to ‗read‘ the past through its material remains, of the reader‘s necessary 
presence. ‗Reading‘ is thus a convenient contrast to the antiquarian ethos underlying 
Dennistoun‘s palaeography, because it reminds one of the inevitable textuality of 
objects. In doing so, it emphasises that the past asserts itself not directly, as a residual 
essence in historical objects, but through the imaginative connections made by the 
reader. 
In Howards End, the idea of the reader‘s complicity in the production of textual 
meaning is suggested when Leonard reads Ruskin in his flat. The narrator describes the 
author‘s voice:  
 
full of high purpose, full of beauty, full even of sympathy and the love of men, 
yet somehow eluding all that was actual and insistent in Leonard's life. For it 
was the voice of one who had never been dirty or hungry, and had not guessed 
successfully what dirt and hunger are. (Howards End, 62)  
 
Ruskin has not the key to what is ‗actual and insistent‘ in Leonard‘s situation. Leonard, 
therefore, who has known what it is to be hungry and dirty, possesses knowledge that 
Ruskin does not. Yet, he is determined to separate that knowledge – a ‗passionate‘, 
deeply felt apprehension of a reality that is his and not Ruskin‘s – from the ‗high 
purpose‘, the ‗beauty‘, the ‗sympathy and the love of men‘, which he recognises in 
Ruskin‘s text. It is an approach that entraps Leonard in the ‗daily grey‘ from which he 
hopes to escape because it ensures that, for him, Ruskin speaks only of experiences 
beyond the clerk‘s reach. Leonard‘s ‗reality‘, is never allowed to encroach on the 
cultural splendour of the book, with the inevitable result that this very splendour is 
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never allowed to encroach on what, for him, constitutes ‗reality‘. The passage implies 
not only that Ruskin and Leonard will remain inevitably and fundamentally at odds, but 
also that this continued disjunction is Leonard‘s own fault. He is all too willing to treat 
his books as relics of a reified literary culture, just as James‘s protagonists are content 
to view palaeographic sources as remnants of material cultures already reified through 
the definitive work of previous palaeographers. In both cases, that the reader‘s 
immediate situation might have any bearing upon the meaning of the text is utterly 
denied, with the result that the text itself remains inevitably ‗other‘ to the reader‘s 
experience. 
In this sense, James and Forster prefigure not only the challenges posed by 
modern archaeological theory to conventional ways of reading the past, but also 
modern reader response theory as it applies to literary texts. Wolfgang Iser, for 
example, argues that the text simply offers ‗schematized aspects‘ through which ‗the 
aesthetic object of the work can be produced‘.243 The ‗work‘, insofar as it is defined by 
its ‗meaning‘, is thus, for Iser, a virtual construction that relies on the presence not only 
of the specific text but of a specific reader before it can become an ‗aesthetic object‘. 
This is not to deny the significance, in themselves, of either reader or text – rather, it is 
simply to emphasise that ‗if one loses sight of the relationship [between text and 
reader], one loses sight of the virtual work‘: 
 
separate analysis [of either text or reader] would only be conclusive if the 
relationship were that of transmitter and receiver […] ensuring accurate 
communication since the message would only be travelling one way. In literary 
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works, however, the message is transmitting two ways, in that the reader 
‗receives‘ it by composing it.244 
 
To use Iser‘s terms, therefore, it might be argued that both Dennistoun and Leonard 
Bast share a failure to recognise that the transmission of meaning is not a one way 
process – that meaning is constructed on terms set not only by the text, but by the 
individual reader. Leonard, however, sees Ruskin‘s experiences of Venice as entirely 
incompatible with his own ‗grey‘ existence, while Dennistoun views the supernatural 
element of the Biblical snippets collected by the Canon as the superstition of a dead 
age, to be studied objectively, but which no longer retains any significance for him as a 
denizen of the present. The Stones of Venice and the Canon‘s scrapbook are never 
engaged with critically because their readers persist in asserting their irrelevance to 
their own temporal or social contexts – the perspectives unique to their situation as 
readers. In acting as if a particular kind of text might, in itself and without any 
engagement on the part of the reader, reveal the secrets of a culture either temporally or 
socially ‗other‘ to the reader‘s own, the palaeographer and the auto-didactic literary 
scholar become prey to the same pitfall.  
On the back of the drawing of the demon, for example, Canon Alberic has 
written, in Latin, a record of his conversation with the creature whom he has summoned 
(it is implied) as an aid to finding treasure. Later in the tale, the reality of the creature 
implies the unexpected validity of this unearthly conversation – at the very least, it 
upsets the notion that medieval demonology is mere folklore or, indeed, that there is 
anything ‗mere‘ about folklore. For Dennistoun, however, the fragment has little value 
when read as an aesthetic production that still speaks of the fantastic event of which it is 
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a record. As evidence of what people used to think, it elides the fear that must surely 
have obtained when those beliefs were held to be literally true. Instead, the imaginative 
currency of the text (the idea that it could be the record of a supernatural treasure-hunt 
that had indeed occurred and is thus the record of powers familiar to antiquity but lost 
to the modern world) is dismissed to the realm of fiction when Dennistoun remarks: ‗A 
good specimen of the treasure-hunter‘s record – quite reminds one of Mr. Minor-Canon 
Quatermain in Old St. Paul’s‘ (Count Magnus, 7).245 Yet, as the tale subsequently 
demonstrates, such details, apparently only fit for the realm of imaginative literature, 
would also, in this case, be wholly appropriate to the understanding of the historical 
document‘s cultural provenance. Collapsing Dennistoun‘s clean division, as a reader, 
between modern fiction and ancient texts, James‘s tale both foreshadows and 
supplements his later emphasis upon the ‗curiosity‘ that required the palaeographer to 
leave out no part of his own experience in his consideration of the ancient book; in his 
ghost stories, such experience also include his experiences as a reader of other kinds of 
texts. 
 When James‘s antiquary-protagonists are caught in the act of fiction-reading, 
the protagonist‘s sense of the heightened triviality of the fiction-reading moment and of 
the reading material itself still obtains as a contrast with the worthier and more involved 
examination of antiquarian documents. In ‗Number 13‘, for example, Anderson‘s 
nocturnal reading habits are in direct contrast to the intense study of church records that 
he undertakes during the working day. The papers he has come to Viborg to study are 
avowedly ‗far more numerous and interesting than he had at all anticipated‘ (Count 
Magnus, 54). His bedtime reading, on the other hand, is merely ‗a necessary 
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preliminary to sleep‘ and does not merit such detailed attention. There is one book 
‗which alone would satisfy him at the present moment‘, the book which he had been 
reading on the train. The particular character of the book is ultimately unimportant, 
however, the novel fulfilling only Anderson‘s desire for an anonymous ‗few pages of 
print‘. The imaginative act of reading for pleasure is portrayed as a ritualistic one, 
requiring little in the way of engagement and made up of endlessly-rehearsed actions: 
‗he had been in bed for some minutes, had read his wonted three or four pages of his 
book, blown out his light, and turned over to go to sleep‘ (Count Magnus, 53). 
During his researches, Anderson has become especially interested in a series of 
letters concerning ‗a house owned by the Bishop, but not inhabited by him, in the town 
[…] [and whose] tenant was apparently somewhat of a scandal and a stumbling-block 
to the reforming party. He was a disgrace, they wrote, to the city; he practised secret 
and wicked arts, and had sold his soul to the enemy‘ (Count Magnus, 54). Intrigued, 
Anderson is determined to discover the house‘s location and learn more about its 
mysterious former tenant. He makes enquiries of the archivist, who informs him that, 
unfortunately, ‗of the old terrier of the Bishop‘s property which was made in 1560, […] 
just the piece which had the list of the town property is missing‘. Even so, the archivist 
concludes hopefully, perhaps he will ‗some day succeed to find him‘ (‗Number 13‘, 
55).  
Anderson shares the archivist‘s optimism but in seeking to make such a 
breakthrough he searches in the wrong place. In fact the spirit of the Bishop‘s tenant 
(the Faust-like Nicholas Franken) resides not within the antiquary‘s written sources but 
in the intermittently-existent room Number 13 of the hotel at which he is staying. 
Moreover, it is during the apparently insignificant evening ritual of reading, that the 
issue of the ambiguity surrounding the existence of room Number 13 strikes the 
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scholar: ‗not before, did it occur to him that, whereas on the blackboard of the hotel 
there had been no Number 13, there was undoubtedly a room numbered 13 in the hotel‘ 
(Count Magnus, 55). Anderson comes nearer to discovering the only extant trace of 
Franken‘s habitation after a brief reading of his ‗trivial‘ railway novel than he does in a 
morning‘s research in the church archives. His willingness to allow his approach to 
reading to be governed by a too-rigid interpretative taxonomy not only prevents him 
from finding the one thing for which, in his researches, he is most ardently searching, 
but also, in blinding him to the very real dangers of Franken‘s satanic proclivities, very 
nearly ends his life.  
What is at stake in these tales is not simply the usefulness of particular kinds of 
text to the discovery of a manuscript or of new historical data. Rather, it is the kind of 
reading habitually regarded by antiquaries as most suited to the task at hand. A useful 
terminology for the distinctions incumbent on this ethos is established in another 
‗antiquarian‘ ghost story from the period – John Meade Falkner‘s The Lost Stradivarius 
(1895). Falkner‘s novel involves an Oxford student, Sir John Maltravers, who becomes 
possessed by the spirit of Adrian Temple, the debauched former owner of the 
eponymous violin, which he finds lodged in a hidden compartment in the walls of his 
university accommodation. Alongside the violin is a diary in which Temple has 
chronicled his licentious activities – activities that Sir John finds himself compelled to 
re-enact. This new enthusiasm for ancient texts not as the relics of a long-dead age, but 
as works that still speak to the imaginative life of the reader in the present, also extends 
to Sir John‘s appreciation of the remnants, both material and textual, of classical 
antiquity. Sir John‘s friend Gaskell is scandalised to find his companion devouring 
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‗classical literature […] no longer from the scholarly but the literary standpoint‘.246 
This ‗literary‘ engagement with classical texts also permeates Sir John‘s obsession with 
the past‘s material remains. He purchases a villa near Baia in Italy, the ‗most luxurious 
and wanton of all sites of antiquity‘. The town was sacked in the fifteenth century, but 
an intense desire to experience for himself the seamier side of classical culture allows 
Sir John to appreciate that ‗a continuity of wickedness‘ between past and present ‗is not 
so easily broken‘. For Sir John, who has abandoned the ‗scholarly‘ for the ‗literary‘, the 
events of antiquity are as resonant in and for the nineteenth-century context in which 
they are recalled as they were in the century in which they were originally committed 
and, indeed, committed to paper – so much so that, for Gaskell, his friend‘s re-
enactment of the licentious past reveals an Italian coast ‗haunted‘ by ‗a spirit of 
corruption and debasement actually sensible and oppressive‘ (Falkner, 140).  
A ‗spirit‘ (even more ‗sensible and oppressive‘) also pervades the books read by 
James‘s protagonists. The Jamesian spectre, erupting upon the scene of protagonists‘ 
reading, represents the return of a repressed spirit of ‗literary‘ engagement, elided in the 
antiquary‘s determination to regard historical relics as ‗scholarly‘ materials which make 
the past visible but which fail to facilitate an imaginative grasp upon its once visceral 
reality. The threatened eruption of the past upon the present – a staple of the ghost story 
– thus attains a special significance in James‘s tales, which differ from Falkner‘s novel 
in their implication that properly to approach a text as ‗literary‘ is also imaginatively to 
re-enact it as ‗literal‘: to reconcile it with the reader‘s personal situation and experience, 
rather than simply to regard it as fundamentally and irretrievably ‗other‘ to that 
experience.  
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This placement of the ‗literary‘ engagement as entwined with – rather than 
necessarily contrary to – the more obviously ‗scholarly‘ aspects of the antiquary‘s work 
is evidenced in the nightly ranging over ‗a few pages of print‘ undertaken by Anderson 
in ‗Number 13‘. This apparently inconsequential bed-time activity actually announces 
an acquaintance with the past far more tangible than that provided by his fruitless 
researches amongst the nominally more valuable texts in the town archives – the latter 
unexpectedly blinds while the former just as unexpectedly enlightens, so that ‗literary‘ 
engagement, so conspicuously avoided during the academic‘s working hours, yields 
precisely the results a ‗scholarly‘ engagement fails to elicit. Similarly unwilling to bring 
his experiences as a reader of popular fiction to bear, Dennistoun entertains, only to 
reject, a ‗literary‘ engagement with Alberic‘s scrapbook, preferring to rely exclusively 
on established ‗scholarly‘ methodologies. What both tales point to, therefore, is the 
unhelpful demarcation their protagonists make between a scholarly engagement that 
constitutes antiquarianism as a profession and a literary engagement consigned 
exclusively to the purview of the hours of leisure. In failing to comply with this 
demarcation, the spectres signal its falsity. The ghost of Nicholas Franken is present (in 
different ways) in the church papers researched by Anderson and in the hotel to which 
he retires after his day‘s research; in ‗Canon Alberic‘, the imaginary demons that haunt 
Dennistoun‘s leisure reading are unexpectedly paralleled by the real demon that haunts 
the book he investigates professionally.  
Of course, the circumstances of the tales‘ composition would seem to give the 
lie to this thesis, indicating, as they do, their author‘s own easy demarcation of the 
spheres of work and leisure, of vocation and avocation. A palaeographer by profession, 
James dismissed his stories as insignificant fictions, designed purely to make the reader 
‗feel pleasantly uncomfortable when walking along a solitary road at nightfall, or sitting 
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over a dying fire in the small hours‘.247 His first collection was only submitted for 
publication at all as a posthumous tribute to its illustrator, James McBryde.
248
 Yet, 
while it is certainly true, as Julia Briggs has noted, that James‘s tales were ‗simply the 
bagatelle for an idle hour, […] a delicate edifice of suspense with which to entertain the 
young people whose company he so much enjoyed‘, it would be mistaken to claim, as 
Peter Penzoldt does, that James‘s fictional output consists merely of ‗straightforward 
tales of terror and the supernatural, utterly devoid of any deeper meaning‘.249 In fact, 
the deployment of the supernatural in the tales works to destabilise the very taxonomy 
that allows Briggs (and, implicitly in his preface, James himself) to dismiss them as the 
work of an ‗idle hour‘. It is highly significant, for example, that the situations 
engendered in James‘s preface describe moments at which readers are likely to find 
themselves in a position of liminality – ‗a solitary road at nightfall‘, ‗a dying fire in the 
small hours‘ – caught between one‘s home and one‘s destination, between night and 
day. Indeed, ghosts are themselves figures of liminality – incongruous mixtures of the 
seen and the unseen, the living and the dead, that challenge accepted systems of 
classification. Ultimately, the tales themselves are caught between the realms of 
James‘s own authorial avocation and his academic vocation, produced according to the 
‗literary‘ engagement with his subject that characterised the former, whilst enacting a 
commentary on the ‗scholarly‘ engagement that characterised the latter.  
Indeed, ‗Number 13‘ provides a pre-echo of Frank Swinnerton‘s linking of 
whisky and soda with Wells‘s ‗weary giant‘ theory to signal the leisure hour as the 
proper domain of the ‗literary‘ engagement with text. When, in ‗Number 13‘, Anderson 
finishes his ‗scholarly‘ perusal of the archives, the first thing he does is order ‗a whisky 
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and soda‘ (Count Magnus, 61), a mind-numbing drink that ushers in the trivial 
pleasures of the leisure hour and the end of the work period, but which also demarcates 
both as the respective realms to which the trivial and the serious are separately 
confined. It also signals the first appearance of Nicholas Franken‘s spirit, as the figure 
around which Anderson‘s researches have failed to yield results now appears to him as 
a fully-formed image, whose silhouette is projected from the adjacent room onto the 
wall opposite his window. The search for Franken being so much the purview of 
Anderson‘s scholarly work, he is no longer on the lookout for that elusive figure. It is 
not that Anderson displays a lack of imagination – on the contrary, his thoughts turn to 
Ann Radcliffe‘s romances and he is inspired by the poetic efforts of The Mysteries of 
Udolpho‘s heroine to compose an impromptu ditty on the strange activities of the 
occupant of the room next door (Count Magnus, 61).
250
 A turn to the imaginative state 
of mind associated with ‗literary‘ texts like Radcliffe‘s allows him to ‗see for himself‘ 
the very thing that eludes him in the scholarly perusal of the accepted sources; but his 
inability to associate Franken with the literary realm of gothic terror means that he fails 
to recognise that the object of his literary imaginings is also the object of his scholarly 
research. The two spheres remain incompatible, and Franken stands here for the liminal 
space between the scholarly and the literary approaches to the past as text, literally 
residing within a void between two firmly demarcated spaces. 
The use of whisky and soda to signal a particular kind of reading is also 
deployed in ‗The Mezzotint‘, another story from James‘s first collection, the central 
device of which – an art object that continually changes its appearance – is entirely in 
keeping with the recurring theme of academics whose scholarly endeavours invite 
supernatural reprisals by threatening to close off the textual (or ‗literary‘) signification 
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of material relics. Williams, the tale‘s antiquary-protagonist, fails to notice the third 
change in the picture because he is ‗just then busy giving whisky-and-soda to others of 
the company, and was unable to come across the room to look at the view again‘ 
(Count Magnus, 29). Once more, the drink signals not only the approach of the leisure 
hour, but also the dulling of the critical faculties that comes with the demarcation of the 
scholarly from the literary. This particular mezzotint requires more detailed attention 
than Williams, now at leisure, is prepared to give it, challenging his readiness to revoke 
the scholarly at the end of the working day.   
The differentiation between ‗literary‘ and ‗scholarly‘ engagement is also 
explicitly foregrounded in ‗Mr Humphreys and His Inheritance‘, the final tale in 
James‘s More Ghost Stories of an Antiquary (1911). On his first night in residence at 
his newly-inherited country house, Humphreys‘s neighbour Mr Cooper suggests that he 
might want to spend it relaxing with a book: ‗Hardly anything to my mind can compare 
with a good hour‘s reading after a hard day‘s work; far better than wasting the whole 
evening at a friend‘s house‘. Unfortunately, Humphreys is denied this opportunity, 
since his butler, Carlton, ‗was evidently inclined for occasional conversation‘. 
Otherwise, ‗he would have finished the novel he had bought for his journey‘ (Count 
Magnus, 227). Instead, he makes a perusal of the library, a chamber in which he ‗had 
all the predisposition to take [an] interest‘. Yet, ‗interest‘ is quickly replaced by the 
‗systematic acquaintance‘ of scholarly description: 
 
[H]e had learned from Cooper that there was no catalogue save the very 
superficial one made for purposes of probate. The drawing up of a catalogue 
raisonné would be a delicious occupation for winter. There were probably 
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treasures to be found, too: even manuscripts, if Cooper might be trusted. (Count 
Magnus, 228) 
 
While novels are for reading, Humphreys‘s first inclination when he finds himself in a 
library of antiquarian volumes is to survey and catalogue the books as objects. The 
reference to the library‘s ‗treasures‘ – like Dennistoun‘s dreams of literary discovery – 
hint at the promise of material acquisition rather than literary engagement, since 
scholarly engagement is, here, the process by which the cataloguer makes ‗systematic 
acquaintance‘ with texts in a collection. It is, in short, in direct contrast to the ‗good 
hour‘s reading after a hard day‘s work‘ that makes up the ‗literary‘ engagement that 
novels invite. Later, the tale implies more explicitly the dangerous hauntings 
encouraged by this too systematic approach as a terrifying spectre emerges from the 
centre of a plan that Humphreys has been constructing of the maze in the grounds, 
disrupting his impulse to catalogue and document rather than imaginatively to engage 
with the relics around him – a reluctance already marked by his earlier rejection of a 
literary in favour of a scholarly perusal of books.  
 The linking of the scholarly with work and the literary with leisure has an 
impact on reading in both spheres, which recalls Bennett‘s anxieties about the way in 
which the ‗attainment‘ of ‗literary taste‘ was predicated upon avoiding a reductive view 
of reading as merely the ‗distraction‘ of the ‗leisure hour‘. In James‘s fiction, scholarly 
method is itself an ‗accomplishment‘, which renders literature a mere ‗distraction‘ in 
comparison. Scholarly reading sets up the text-as-historical-document as the other of 
the text-as-literature, and thus sets the scene for the return of that repressed other. At 
the same time, this process means that readings of texts traditionally reserved 
exclusively for literary perusal – Radcliffe, Ainsworth, railway novels – are just as 
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persistently haunted by the scholarly ends of the antiquary, whose academic 
‗accomplishments‘ intrude upon these apparently literary encounters. If James‘s stories 
utilise supernatural motifs to metonymise the haunting presence of the literary within 
the scholarly, therefore, they also emphasise the abiding presence of the scholarly 
within the literary. Their determination to uphold a strict delineation between the 
scholarly and the literary means that interpretation can never ‗truly succeed‘, for the 
Jamesian protagonist, as either a scholarly accomplishment or as a literary distraction 
(Bennett, 3). Thus, the haunted book becomes a metonym for reading as an experience 
that, because of an appropriated taxonomy of ‗appropriate‘ practices, is always haunted.  
So it is in Forster‘s fiction. The tendency to separate the literary from the 
scholarly in reading and to foreground the latter over the former characterises, for 
example, the behaviour of the studious Mr Bons in ‗The Celestial Omnibus‘ (1908). 
The story concerns a boy (never named) who is intrigued by a mysterious signpost that 
has appeared on a street near his middle-class suburban home. Pointing up ‗a blank 
alley‘, the words ‗To Heaven‘ are ‗painted on it, in faded characters‘.251 Following the 
sign, the boy is intrigued to discover an advertisement for an omnibus service, leaving 
at sunset and sunrise each day. His parents and neighbours ridicule him for taking the 
notice seriously – but the omnibus not only turns up as advertised, but also has as its 
driver the author Sir Thomas Browne and its destination is a literary heaven peopled by 
characters from literature. Upon returning, the boy is dismayed that no one believes his 
tale. Eventually Mr Bons, a scholarly neighbour, agrees to go with the boy at sunset to 
test his account and is amazed to find the omnibus just as the boy described it. Finding 
the driver of the coach to be the poet Dante, Bons is initially awe-struck, then terrified. 
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Stepping out of the omnibus onto the mountainside where the entrance to the literary 
heaven is guarded by Achilles, Bons falls straight through the rock as though it were 
water, crashing to his death on the London street far below. 
As Nicole duPlessis points out in a recent analysis, Forster‘s tale delivers an 
allegory of reading, which ‗subverts the position of the educated reader, substituting 
instead instinctive, spiritual response and emotional investment in reading‘. Her 
analysis overlaps with my own reading of the figure of the scholarly reader in James‘s 
fiction. She points to the tale‘s presentation of Mr Bons as one who ‗values books as 
much (if not more) for their costliness as objects […] [as for] their content‘.252 Bons 
boasts about his possession of no less than ‗seven Shelleys‘ – and, confronted with the 
apparition of Dante, identifies him as the man who wrote ‗those vellum books in my 
library‘ (Short Stories, 57). The physical books are fetishised at the expense of an 
engagement with their contents as material possession stands in for textual engagement 
as a sign of cultural attainment. Indeed, it is objectification of texts as the signifiers of 
an already-determined cultural ‗value‘ that marks the tale‘s negative account of the 
‗educated reader‘ and of ‗educated reading‘ as a practice. 
When he realises that the boy‘s story is true, Bons is disgusted by the lad‘s 
inappropriate response to the characters and authors he has met. Faced with Dante, the 
boy notes that he liked Browne more and expresses a hope that they will meet Mrs 
Gamp when they reach the literary heaven. Bons is aghast: 
 
   ‗Out there sits the man who wrote my vellum books!‘ thundered Mr Bons, 
‗and you talk to me of Dickens and of Mrs Gamp?‘ 
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   ‗I know Mrs Gamp so well,‘ he apologized. ‗I could not help being glad to see 
her.[…‘] (Short Stories, 58) 
 
The vellum books stand for the reverence with which Bons treats certain texts as agents 
of culture at the expense of the trivialities that characterise apparently lesser works. The 
boy, however, knows no such boundaries. His pleasure has been excited by Mrs Gamp, 
whom he knows ‗so well‘ and cannot ‗help‘ preferring. He mixes up Achilles and Tom 
Jones – both of whom he has met on his previous visit, and the latter of whom he 
affectionately recalls playfully challenging in a race. Mr Bons is again frustrated. As a 
cultured man, not only would he have disdained the company of novelistic creations 
like Tom Jones in favour of the ‗creations of Homer, of Shakespeare, and of Him who 
drives us now‘, but he ‗would not have raced. He would have asked intelligent 
questions‘ (Short Stories, 58).  
The passage obviously reflects concerns about the uses of literacy, as Bons 
locates culture unproblematically within a series of texts of which ‗intelligent 
questions‘ can be asked, but with which the direct engagement implied by the idea of 
personally competing with literary characters, is not considered. This recalls the cultural 
programme on which Leonard Bast is engaged, but it also recalls the way in which 
James‘s academic protagonists pursue their researches. Reading is also, for them, the 
means by which the ‗culture‘ of the past can be reclaimed as a stable entity by asking 
‗intelligent questions‘ of particular kinds of texts within an established methodological 
framework. In contrast, the boy‘s linking of Achilles and Tom Jones as figures 
affording equal pleasure signals his lack of education, whilst simultaneously signalling 
an idea of education as a series of cultural judgement calls that curb the more subjective 
pleasures of personal enjoyment. As duPlessis puts it, the contrasting attitudes to 
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literature exhibited by the boy and Bons emphasise ‗the reader‘s choice either to 
experience literature as an adventure – something to be explored, internalised and liked 
[…] – or to experience literature as an object to be ‗―appreciated,‖ ―studied‖ or 
displayed‘.253 
Mr Bons, who ‗presided over the Literary Society‘, believes himself the arbiter 
of ‗the essential truth of Poetry‘. Yet despite his faith in Poetry‘s ability to enshrine 
‗essential truth‘, his position as one who ‗presides‘ over the discussion of texts within a 
specialised ‗Society‘ betrays the arbitrary codification of literary study that his reign 
entails. The boy, on the other hand, despairs at Mr Bons‘s belief in Poetry‘s ‗essential 
truth‘. Returning from the literary heaven, he reads Keats in tears for, as he tells Mr 
Bons, ‗all these words that only rhymed before, now that I‘ve come back they‘re me‘ 
(Short Stories, 55). Literature is situated as a real place that anyone can visit – just as a 
book offers precisely the same material for anyone‘s perusal – but the boy‘s sudden 
awakening to literature also constitutes a realisation that it is entirely possible to 
experience a book‘s contents on his own entirely personal terms, as opposed to the 
objective assessment of conventional stylistic features like rhyme. Bons‘s attitude, on 
the other hand, renders imagination redundant in the reading of literary texts – a 
distraction from the ‗essential truth‘ that great works already contain. He responds to 
the presence of Dante ‗as if he were in church‘ – as if, that is, he is receiving the logos, 
the word as pure signifier unmediated by the subjectivity of a reader (Short Stories, 57).  
It is a perspective explicitly denied by Dante in the story, who proclaims: ‗I am the 
means and not the end. I am the food and not the life. Stand by yourself, as this boy has 
stood. I cannot save you. For poetry is a spirit; and they that would worship it must 
worship in spirit and in truth‘ (Short Stories, 61). Dante‘s words recall the narrator of 
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Howards End, who similarly argues that literature is merely the signpost towards a 
personal epiphany which, in Iser‘s terms, gives rise to a ‗virtual work‘ – an 
amalgamation of the reader‘s spirit and textual content as the former works upon the 
latter.  
Thus, for Bast, Bons and the Jamesian protagonist, the scholarly fetishisation of 
the book as object also involves the objectification of particular kinds of texts as the 
harbingers of ‗essential truth‘. It overlooks what I have termed the ‗literary‘ impulse – 
the recognition that textual ‗truth‘ must involve an imaginative leap on the part of the 
reader who assimilates it. In ‗The Celestial Omnibus‘, the carriage piloted by the author 
is an obvious metaphor for reading, and the magical rainbow that allows the carriage to 
ascend to the literary heaven is an equally obvious metaphor for the imaginative leap 
that allows the reader to interact with, rather than passively to read about, the contents 
of texts, physically transporting the reader to a space in which active interaction with 
authors and literary characters becomes possible. Implicitly, the story emphasises 
reading as the means by which meaning is produced through active participation with 
texts, rather than discovered within it and passively absorbed. 
Just as James‘s protagonists undergo horrific physical encounters through their 
tendency to view literary and scholarly approaches as somehow already pre-ascribed to 
different kinds of text, Forster‘s characters also suffer physically in a way that 
emphasises their dedication to books as mere objects to be studied. Both Leonard and 
Bons render the texts they read as already other to their own personal experience. While 
the young boy is able to make the imaginative leap that allows him literally to interact 
with the characters on his own terms – expressing, with a ludicity that terrifies Bons, an 
arbitrary preference for Dickens over Dante – Bons is unable to accept the leap, both 
figuratively and literally. The land to which he has journeyed, in which Achilles dallies 
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with Tom Jones and Dante leads one to Mrs Gamp, is totally beyond his 
compartmentalised, commodified and, through education, fundamentally inherited, idea 
of what ‗literature‘ is or could ever be.  
The boy, lacking education, lacks this idea. If he has not inherited Mr Bons‘s 
physical library – his home is conspicuously deficient of ‗Shelleys‘ for example – then 
neither has he inherited the standard assumptions which Bons automatically applies to 
the volumes‘ contents. What Bons does – what the boy does not do – is to unite the 
literary text and the physical book into one scholarly object, one material unit of 
‗essential truth‘. Reading is, for the boy – figuratively, if not literally, since the boy‘s 
‗reading‘ is present only in a metonymic journey – an imaginative dalliance with 
characters whom he likes according to a taste entirely his own. Books are not, as they 
are for Bons and Bast, the end of the journey: they are only its beginning – indeed, so is 
reading itself, since the journey to the literary heaven is seen to be less important than 
what one does when one gets there. Unable to adapt to this new conception of reading, 
Bons resembles Leonard Bast in his inability to conceive of himself as compatible with 
this other land. Indeed, his inability to think of himself on equal terms with its 
inhabitants is implied in the way he acts as if ‗in church‘. In the end, literature, as a land 
with which one might personally interact, literally disappears from under his feet and he 
falls to his death. Tellingly, he lands ‗in the vicinity of the Bermondsey gas-works‘ 
(Short Stories, 61) – unable to transcend the materiality of literature and unable to 
imagine anything but its intrinsic ‗otherness‘ from the quotidian mundanity of his 
suburban existence, it is entirely appropriate that Bons is flung to earth in one of the 
‗greyest‘ locations imaginable. 
I emphasise Bons‘s objectification of text – the way in which his view of 
literature as ‗essential truth‘ combines text and physical volume in one reified whole – 
 223 
because it foreshadows the symbolic quality of Leonard‘s death in the later novel. The 
scene is set before Leonard‘s fateful arrival at Howards End, where the Schlegels‘ 
possessions have been deposited: ‗the bookcases filled the wall opposite the fireplace, 
and [their] father's sword […] had been drawn from its scabbard and hung naked 
amongst the sober volumes‘ (Howards End, 266). The volumes are anonymous, 
presenting a contrast to the sword, which lies ‗naked‘ and bare, its edge exposed, 
amongst the closed books, contrasting symbols of vital action and ‗sober‘ study. 
Leonard, unable finally to bring to his reading the imaginative openness with which he 
approaches his experiences of the road, ensures that books remain closed to him, 
figuratively if not literally. Their ‗nakedness‘ is covered up, not because he doesn‘t 
open the covers, but because he fails to appreciate texts as objects that invite interaction 
as well as passive admiration. It is surely not unreasonable to see a sexual metaphor 
here. The shining nakedness of the sword can be seen as representing precisely the 
invitation that is always before Leonard but which he cannot perceive – an invitation to 
copulate, procreate, to impregnate the ‗truth‘ with his ‗spirit‘, to father the ‗virtual 
work‘ that is the product of interaction between text and reader. As with James‘s 
protagonists, the figurative elision of imaginative literary appreciation in favour of 
scholarly passivity forcefully recurs, as the ‗swamp of books‘ in which his reading had 
submerged him figuratively, becomes tragically literal and he is forcibly and literally 
struck by the books as physical objects – as mere ‗husks‘: ‗Books fell over him in a 
shower. Nothing had sense‘ (Howards End, 315).  
John D. Cox and David Scott Kastan‘s New History of Early English Drama 
contains an essay by Paul Werstine on the study of late-medieval and early-modern 
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dramatic works in manuscript.
254
 Essentially an introduction to a particular branch of 
palaeographic study, the essay is valuable in the context of the present discussion 
because it serves to highlight in a little more detail the bibliographic pitfalls outlined by 
James at the end of his Wanderings and Homes of Manuscripts in a manner that also 
helps to connect his tales to Forster‘s. According to Werstine, the study of plays in 
manuscript came into its own in the first half of the twentieth century. In particular, the 
work of Sir Walter Wilson Greg ‗may be credited with having established the study of 
early modern drama in manuscript as a field of rigorous scholarly inquiry‘.255 Yet while 
Greg‘s Dramatic Documents from the Elizabethan Playhouses (1931) is, by modern 
researchers, ‗easily mistaken for an objective and inclusive survey of its field‘, not only 
was its author ‗attractively modest about the scope of his undertaking‘ but, Werstine 
argues, he neglects many important manuscript holdings – the contents of the Folger 
Shakespeare Library in Washington, for example, the Huntington Library in San 
Marino, California, and ‗Alnwick Castle, north of Newcastle, where John of Bordeaux 
and The Wasp are to be found‘.256 In short, Greg constitutes a practical example of 
James‘s insistence upon seeing ‗books for yourself‘, in order to rectify the gaps that, 
one must assume, might plague even the most respected and trusted survey. 
More serious, however, are the flaws inherent in the theory of the production 
and reproduction of early modern plays in manuscript Greg evolves in his article 
‗Prompt Copies, Private Transcripts, and the ―Playhouse Scrivener‖‘ (1926). According 
to Werstine, Greg‘s theory ‗is still accepted by many present editors as the general 
theory‘ of its kind, yet it is ‗both logically a priori […] to any survey of the manuscripts 
and chronologically prior to his own limited survey of them in Dramatic 
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Manuscripts‘.257 Werstine stresses that Greg‘s work can be approached as useful to 
present scholars only on the important understanding that it is only a theory: a useful 
framework for the palaeographic study of early English manuscript drama, but one 
whose usefulness must accommodate a full and frank appreciation of the theory‘s 
always-tentative nature. In simply applying, without due scepticism and question, a 
theory developed in particular, temporally localised intellectual conditions, modern 
scholars not only risk repeating some of Greg‘s omissions, but also risk ‗reproduc[ing] 
under the guise of general theory the ad hoc rhetorical strategies developed by Greg to 
counter equally ephemeral observations by his contemporaries‘: 
 
Present-day scholars thus face an important choice. On the one hand, there is 
what I have called Greg‘s ‗general theory,‘ which reduces a dispersed 
heterogeneity of manuscripts to the linear simplicity of his narrative, colonizing 
the manuscripts to make them serve as the sites of clues to the nature of the lost 
manuscripts that once lay behind plays now available only in printed texts […] 
On the other hand, there is the irreducible historical messiness of the actual 
manuscripts, and the economy of hypothesis that Greg so successfully 
championed.
258
 
 
In Forster‘s and James‘s fiction, protagonists face a similar choice. In the case of Bons, 
literary texts‘ heterogeneities are elided in favour of a reading that presses them into the 
service of an ‗essential truth‘ which, in a circular process reminiscent of Wilde‘s 
‗Decay of Lying‘, they actually only enshrine hypothetically. Like Greg‘s, Bons‘s 
theory, as it is pressed upon the boy, precedes any actual perusal of the books 
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themselves. Bons, like Leonard Bast, reads his books according to a theory of culture as 
an ‗essential truth‘ that conveniently sidesteps the ‗messiness‘ of the undisciplined 
heterogeneity embraced by the boy in favour of a theory whose ‗economy‘ renders it 
expedient for study.  
It is this insistence on an expedient economy of interpretation that Forster would 
later ascribe damningly to the ‗pseudo-scholar‘, who ‗classes books before he has 
understood or read them‘ – who practises, for example, ‗[c]lassification by 
chronology‘:259  
 
Everything [the pseudo-scholar] says may be accurate but all is useless because 
he is moving round books instead of through them, he either has not read them 
or cannot read them properly. Books have to be read (worse luck, for it takes a 
long time); it is the only way of discovering what they contain. […] He would 
rather relate a book to the history of its time […] to some tendency. As soon as 
he can use the word ‗tendency‘ his spirits rise, and though those of his audience 
may sink, they often pull out their pencils at this point and make a note, under 
the belief that a tendency is portable. (Aspects of the Novel, 13-14) 
 
The conveniently ‗portable‘ nature of Greg‘s findings – their availability as an 
expedient reference point for later researchers – finds its echo in Forster. Yet, the 
passage also echoes James‘s contention that books ‗have to be read‘ anew by every 
scholar, who must never simply defer to previously-published surveys. Presumably 
Forster does not mean to imply that ‗scholars‘ literally avoid opening the cover and 
reading the words on the pages: how else would one assess ‗the events it describes‘? 
                                                 
259
 Forster, Aspects of the Novel (1927) (NY: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1954), p. 11. Further references 
are to this edition and appear in the body of the text. 
 227 
What is actually at stake here is precisely what is at stake in the anxieties about 
palaeographic research in James‘s fiction and in Werstine‘s essay. James and Werstine 
both worry that the way in which a tendency to classify books ‗before he has 
understood them‘ or, in Werstine‘s estimation, to trust to the classificatory systems of 
others as a substitute for the critical interaction between text and reader negates the 
need for a literary reading. Too rigid a demarcation is thus erected between the text as a 
stable object examined subject to equally stable description by the scholar and the fluid, 
contingent text whose meanings fluctuate under the gaze of the engaged reader. For 
Werstine, an unquestioning acceptance of Greg‘s theory neglects the specificity of the 
socio-historical conditions that governed Greg‘s apparently objective analysis. It 
neglects the role of a specific reader, whose inevitable presence is as necessary for the 
recovery of the ‗essential truth‘ it just as inevitably mediates; readers, the entire 
particularity of whose experience (including the experience of other kinds of text) must 
be brought into play if the ‗curiosity‘ so essential to research and, indeed, to ‗reading 
books rightly‘, is to be maintained. 
Both James and Forster share, therefore, a concern regarding the inevitable 
limitations that methodologies place upon the production of meaning – especially 
within the context of approaches to cultural artefacts – and both use books as 
emblematic of this process by having them challenge their readers in extraordinary 
ways. Forster‘s fiction concerns itself with the problems that present themselves when 
the idea of culture as an ‗essential truth‘ enshrined in particular texts is faithfully 
believed to be directly available to the educated reader through reading – and, in the 
process, dramatises his own anxieties that reading is now seen primarily as a tool for 
the discovery of a truth already other to the specific reader. James‘s fiction betrays 
similar anxieties, but does so in a manner that foregrounds concerns about the way in 
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which the past can be reconstructed through its material remnants and rendered 
intelligible to ‗readers‘ in the present. In the rest of this chapter, I will argue that such 
epistemological anxieties give way, in Forster‘s work, to a wider preoccupation with 
books as the means by which the cultural ‗other‘ is, paradoxically, both exorcised and 
understood – anxieties that parallel concerns in James‘s fiction with the way in which 
the inevitable ‗otherness‘ of the past is dealt with by the disciplines that arose, by the 
turn of the twentieth century, to govern its study. While these concerns remain, for 
James, purely methodological, they lead, in Forster‘s works, to a conception of the 
book as the site of an unsettling, but liberating, revelation of the reading subject‘s 
inevitable ‗otherness‘. 
 
iii. ‘The cow is there’: John Addington Symonds and The Longest Journey (1907) 
The memoirs of the poet, historian and homosexual campaigner John Addington 
Symonds (written in 1889, but not published until 1984) contain the following account 
of a revelatory reading experience: 
 
It so happened that I stumbled on the Phaedrus. I read on and on, till I reached 
the end. Then I began the Symposium; and the sun was shining on the shrubs 
outside the ground-floor room in which I slept, before I shut the book up. […] It 
was just as though the voice of my own soul spoke to me through Plato, as 
though in some antenatal experience I had lived the life of a philosophical 
Greek lover. 
 
This textual encounter took place shortly before Symonds‘s final year at Harrow. 
Whilst attending that institution, Symonds had been shocked at the rampant homoerotic 
 229 
lust that reigned amongst its all-male attendees. Having come to recognise that his own 
sexual inclinations were entirely directed towards members of his own sex, he was 
troubled by the crudity of his fellow students, whose desires appeared only to find 
expression in behaviour that Symonds could not help but regard as base. His encounter 
with the Platonic text, however, enacts ‗the consecration of a long-cherished idealism‘: 
‗I perceived that masculine love had its virtue as well as its vice, and stood in this 
respect upon the same ground as normal sexual appetite. I understood […] the relation 
which […] the brutalities of vulgar lust at Harrow bore to my higher aspiration after 
noble passion‘.260 
Later in his career, Plato‘s writing formed the basis of a dispute between 
Symonds and Benjamin Jowett, whose English translations of the texts had become 
standard. Symonds had asked Jowett whether, in his opinion, the texts posed a danger 
for any young men who might come into contact with them. Jowett answered in the 
negative, dismissing the homoerotic strains in Plato as ‗mainly a figure of speech‘. On 
the contrary, argued Symonds, no doubt drawing on his own experience of the text, for 
many young readers Plato‘s writing represented nothing less than ‗a revelation‘ of the 
‗throbbing […] realism of Greek life‘ – especially if the reader shares the homoerotic 
impulses Plato expresses. For such students, ‗there is no question of ―figures of speech‖ 
but of concrete facts, facts in the social experience of Athens‘:  
 
They discover that what they had been blindly groping after was once an 
admitted possibility – not in a mean hole or corner – but that the race whose 
literature forms the basis of their higher culture lived in that way, aspired in that 
way. (Memoirs, 100) 
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The danger, for Symonds, does not arise from the desires actually expressed in the text, 
but from the way in which books chronicling desires utterly taboo for nineteenth-
century students are nevertheless presented to them in texts legitimised by their place in 
a sanctioned curriculum. The result is a ‗contest in the soul [which] is terrible‘: 
 
Educators, when they diagnose the disease, denounce it. […] [L]aw and social 
taste are with them, and […] the person incriminated […] has nothing to urge in 
self-defence – except his inborn instinct, and the fact that those very men who 
condemn him have placed the most electrical literature of the world in his 
hands, pregnant with the stuff that damns him.  
 
As the passage argues, the problem arises from the insoluble difference in the educators 
and a section of those being educated – a difference arising from the fact that 
‗conventional‘ ways of reading these texts are legitimated by the assumption that every 
reader will react to them in precisely the same way and that ‗the lads in question are as 
impervious as they themselves are to the magnetism of the books they bid them study 
and digest‘. In fact, some of their young charges are anything but ‗impervious‘ to the 
‗magnetism‘ of the works, and cannot help but find it ‗personally and intensely 
interesting‘. For these, ‗Greek love was for Plato, no ―figure of speech‖, but a present, 
poignant reality‘ precisely because ‗Greek love is for modern students of Plato no 
―figure of speech‖ and no anachronism, but a present poignant reality‘ (Memoirs, 102). 
Symonds‘s reading of Plato was avocational – despite what he says in the letter 
to Jowett, the texts were not part of Harrow‘s curriculum. Yet, this letter offers a potent 
critique of curricula that police how the past is to be approached by carefully 
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controlling the ways in which its remains are to be read: a curriculum that tacitly 
reconciles its veneration of Plato with the contemporary mores he actually transgresses. 
In pointing out that Plato expresses for many readers desires they, in the present, also 
feel, Symonds exposes what Jowett‘s socially legitimate reading elides: not only that 
interpretations of the past always involve the sanctification of certain ideas about the 
present, but that there are as many ideas of the present as there are readers and, 
consequently, as many ideas of the past as there are readers to read its extant remains. 
The present, as much as the past, becomes a matter of how its denizens react to books – 
and of the strategies employed by ‗educators‘ in ensuring that textual interpretations 
remain rigidly conventional. 
In the introduction to Anglo-Saxon Poetry (1982), the modern antiquary S.A.J. 
Bradley sets out precisely the point of view that Symonds‘s letter works against: 
 
[T]he surviving poetry of the Anglo-Saxons, along with their prose […] 
constitutes a legacy yet more precious for its antiquity. The poems are voices 
carrying over moral values, thought and sentiment from a period of English 
history[...]
261
 
 
Obviously, it would be foolish to argue that antiquaries (including James) would be 
mistaken in attending to the texts of the past as useful historical documents – as 
material for scholarly as well as literary perusal, to use Falkner‘s terms. Symonds‘s 
letter combats, however, the assumption that ‗moral values, thoughts and sentiments‘ 
can be ‗carried over‘ directly from the past to the present merely by reading: he rejects 
the idea that readers in the present will be able to grasp them without the inevitable 
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mediation of the ‗moral values, thought and sentiment‘ that constitute the reader‘s own 
situation within the complex networks of socio-political conditions that make up the 
present. The reality of Greek life for Symonds is fundamentally different from the 
reality of Greek life for ‗educators‘ – precisely because their expectations and 
experiences of life in the present are also different.
262
 
Similar concerns about education as the perpetuation of a particular kind of 
status quo permeate Forster‘s The Longest Journey (1907). Following the progress of 
Rickie, a young student at Cambridge, the novel‘s first line sets the tone with a cryptic 
assertion by Rickie‘s friend Ansell, who announces: ‗the cow is there‘.263 Ansell is 
speaking at a gathering of undergraduates in Rickie‘s rooms, where they discuss a 
philosophical dilemma: do objects ‗exist only when there is someone to look at them?‘ 
For the purposes of the discussion, ‗seeing‘ is not a question of ‗objectivity and 
subjectivity‘. Instead, the processes that govern the identity, nature and ontological 
status of both sentient and inanimate objects becomes a matter of what definitely is, or 
definitely is not, ‗there‘ for the individual self. For Ansell, the fact that he has proved 
the cow‘s existence for himself is quite enough: ‗―She‘s there for me,‖ he declared. ―I 
don‘t care whether she‘s there for you or not. Whether I‘m in Cambridge or Iceland or 
dead, the cow will be there‖‘ (The Longest Journey, 7). Rickie, on the other hand, has 
not only failed to come to any conclusion in the matter, but worries that he ‗had missed 
the whole point, and was overlaying philosophy with gross and senseless details‘ (The 
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Longest Journey, 9). To a large extent, the novel is the story of how he grapples with 
the problem of whether ‗the cow is there‘. 
Like Ansell, Symonds seems to have grasped an intuitive understanding of the 
problem posed by the cow, which Rickie finds so problematic. Like that bovine 
creature, homoerotic attraction is ‗there‘ for Symonds, because he has proved it for 
himself. This reading of Plato is not a revelation of Symonds‘s own proclivities, of 
which he had always been aware, but of the deceptive fetters put in place by the 
educators who teach the classics with an eye to legitimating their own socio-political 
agenda. Against this, his reading experience portends the subversion of any 
interpretative system that denies the legitimacy of his own personal identification with 
the text, because it emphasises how intensely subjective the mediation of textual 
meaning – and with it, the interpretation of extinct cultures of which they are the trace – 
can be: ‗My mental and moral evolution proceeded now upon a path which had no 
contact with the prescribed systems of education. […] Masters and schools and 
methods of acquiring knowledge lay outside me, to be used or neglected as I judged 
best‘ (Memoirs, 107). Symonds differs from Bast in his study of ‗higher culture‘ 
because, unlike that clerk, he is able to make the connection for himself between his 
own life and others who ‗lived in that way, aspired in that way‘. In doing so, however, 
he also exposes the mechanisms of antiquarian reading as grounded in a study that, 
although designed to communicate verifiable facts about the culture of which it speaks, 
actually succeeds in policing the kind of ‗life‘ to which one might legitimately ‗aspire‘ 
in the present (Memoirs, 100). 
Symonds‘s letter makes implicitly the point that Adam Stout‘s study of the 
history of archaeology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries makes 
explicitly when he complains about the ‗epistemic benchmark‘ established by inter-war 
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archaeologists whose outlook was ‗[h]ighly reductionist, (literally) materialist, hostile 
to speculation and suspicious of theory‘.264 Stout‘s problem with archaeological 
interpretation is akin to Symonds‘s objection to the educational establishment‘s official 
stance on Plato: it denies the otherness of the past, making it comply with those power 
structures that still regulate experience in the present. Stout draws on Joan Hegardt‘s 
argument that the elision of the past‘s intrinsic ‗otherness‘ implicitly politicises the way 
in which the past is studied:  
 
Every time we get a brief glimpse of the Other we look away because we know 
that the presence of the Other will problematize our self-sufficient 
understanding of history. We want archaeology to be ‗Our Archaeology‘; an 
archaeology that must not be disturbed by the presence of a metaphysical 
Other.
265
  
 
Hergardt‘s point again recalls Symonds‘s argument that late-Victorian educators are 
unable to countenance, in Plato, a continuity between the past of which they read and 
the experience of sexuality in the present precisely because they are unable to conceive 
of the ‗ideal‘ civilization as being so profoundly ‗other‘, in this respect, from their own. 
Symonds‘s reading exposes and rejects this approach to the past by bringing his 
experiences of homoerotic attraction in the present to bear upon Greek texts, producing 
a reading of Greek culture that validates his own experiences. In doing so, however, he 
also validates those experiences in the face of his own uncongenial socio-political 
climate. In offering his own experiences as evidence for a Greek past whose 
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relationship to present-day ideals is more complex than the curriculum is prepared to 
allow, Symonds‘s exposition of the rich complexity of the relationship between past 
and present – neither of which truly mirrors the other – also reveals the ‗rich 
complexity‘ of ‗cultural meanings‘ within the present; a complexity which the 
educators‘ official reading had denied. Ultimately, his argument resembles Stout‘s 
conclusion: 
 
‗The ethical task of archaeology is thus to bear witness to the past other‘, says 
[Julian] Thomas. To which I would only add that we can best do this by 
honouring the ‗present other‘. We could be encouraging new ideas about 
antiquity, from whatever quarter and however outrageous. Accepting that the 
past is fluid, we need to be as inventive with it as we need to be with the 
future.
266
 
 
To argue a connection between Stout‘s radical conclusion and James‘s cautious 
suggestion that established taxonomies might not be entirely above criticism is itself 
something of an imaginative leap: yet Stout‘s and James‘s conclusions are underscored 
by the same essential concerns. As Matthew Johnson notes, the study of the past often 
resembles – indeed, often involves – the study of texts, with the result that the past is 
always inescapably approached from the vantage point of a present in which it is 
‗read‘.267 If James‘s scholarly writings eschew such a radical epistemology, then his 
tales at least remind us that the search for meaning in past material cultures relies on the 
recognition of the past as an open-ended text. Indeed, the use of the book (manifestly a 
textual object) as a symbol for the way in which antiquarian objects demand to be read 
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in the present metonomises Johnson‘s idea. In James‘s stories, one might say, 
supernatural phenomena surrounding books emphasise the idea that the meaning, even 
of historical texts, is itself phenomenological. Their preoccupation with the 
reconstruction of the material history of books thus provides a parallel to concerns 
about the reconstruction of textual meaning by readers in the present that underscores 
Symonds‘s overtly political concerns. Written at a time when the study of the material 
culture of the past was palpably in a state of flux, the cultural work of the antiquary-
reader in James‘s tales facilitates a fascinating connection between early-twentieth-
century ideas of the book and ideas of the past as a ‗readable‘ narrative. As I will argue, 
their insistence on the literariness of the historical artefact-as-text allows us to consider 
late-Victorian and Edwardian ideas about the study of the past as symptomatic of a 
wider epistemological crisis that, in Forster‘s and James‘s texts, books come to 
symbolise.  
 
iv. Resurrecting the past: the cultural work of antiquarianism 
The impulse of James‘s protagonists to catalogue rather than imaginatively engage with 
antiquarian artefacts recalls an accusation levelled at the London Society of Antiquaries 
in the eighteenth century. In 1770, the Society‘s journal, Archaeologia, began 
publication, its stated aim being to restore antiquarianism‘s academic credibility by 
‗explod[ing] the vanity of inventors and propagators of fantasies‘.268 The journal was 
thus calculated to combat a long-standing stereotype that portrayed antiquarianism as 
nothing more than the fetishisation of objects on the basis of their great age. In John 
Earle‘s Micro-Cosmographie (1628), for example, the antiquary is characterised as one 
‗that hath that unnaturall disease to bee enamour‘d of […] all things (as Dutchmen doe 
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Cheese) the better for being mouldy and worme-eaten‘.269 For the antiquary, Earle 
implies, the interest lies neither in the object‘s historical significance nor even, 
necessarily, in its financial value. Rather, ‗a Saint‘s Well‘, ‗a ruin‘d Abbey‘, ‗a Crosse 
or a stone footstoole‘270 are prized for their ability to make the past available as a 
commodity – to allow the antiquary, as Brain M. Fagan puts it, to ‗possess the past, to 
keep a piece of antiquity on the mantel‘.271  
Archaeologia combated this concept of the antiquary as a glorified historical 
magpie who snatched indiscriminately at antiquated relics in order to preserve them 
under glass. Instead, it sought to make its objects of study the basis of wider historical 
enquiry by restoring the objects accurately into their proper historical contexts. For 
Horace Walpole, however, this was to miss the point about the deficiencies of the 
antiquary‘s approach. Perusing the second issue of Archaeologia, he was moved to 
complain that  
 
The antiquaries will be as ridiculous as they used to be; and since it is 
impossible to infuse taste in them, they will be dry and dull as their 
predecessors. One may revive what is perished, but it will perish again, if more 
life is not breathed into it than it enjoyed originally.
272
 
 
Walpole makes the same complaint about antiquarianism as Matthew Johnson would 
make about archaeology two-and-a-half-centuries later, urging the need to acknowledge 
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that the study of historical artefacts involves, at least partly, an act of creation on the 
part of the observer, whose study brings ‗more life‘ to the object that it may even have 
‗enjoyed originally‘. Both argue that a scholarly determination of historical provenance 
is useless without a literary apprehension of its continued, even personal, relevance – 
that to study objectively is not, fully and comprehensibly, to ‗read‘ the object as text. 
Walpole‘s attack came less than a decade after he himself had placed just such an 
impulse towards the imaginative reconstruction of antiquarian objects at the heart of the 
gothic genre, with the publication of The Castle of Otranto (1764). Passing its first 
edition off as a newly discovered Italian manuscript, the novel‘s tale of ghostly knights 
and the nefarious doings of the medieval aristocracy seems, as James‘s tales do, to put 
into practice the kind of imaginative engagement with antiquarian texts that he himself 
would advocate. Rather than presenting the work as simply a scholarly edition, he 
presents the manuscript as a story that breathes ‗new life‘ into the text (and its historical 
context) in the form of a tale that can still raise a pleasing terror.  
Like Walpole, James‘s own approach to the text as historical artefact 
emphasises its status as still appropriate for literary perusal, a necessary adjunct to the 
rigorous scholarly appraisal of the object, which is nevertheless not entirely dispensed 
with. Introducing his edition of ‗Twelve Medieval Ghost Stories‘ (1922), for instance, 
James writes that they came to his attention through an entry in a recent catalogue 
which, he notes, immediately excited his curiosity. Taking ‗an early opportunity of 
transcribing‘ the stories, James is pleased to note that he ‗did not find them 
disappointing‘.273 There proceeds a formal description of the manuscript and some 
hypotheses regarding the provenance of the tales themselves, but these scholarly details 
are mere adjuncts to James‘s wish to read the stories and to print them in order that 
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they may be read by others – precisely the opposite of the acquisitive impulse displayed 
by his fictional protagonists. The nature of the disappointment he doesn‘t experience in 
reading the tales is ambiguous and is just as likely to stem from his literary perusal of 
the stories as from the scholar‘s pleasure at the survival of the object itself.  
The same melding of the literary and the scholarly is on display in James‘s 
introduction to the anthology Ghosts & Marvels (1924, edited by V.H. Collins). James 
presents himself as a scholar of the ghost story, providing details of the numerous 
editions of Sheridan LeFanu‘s ‗Schalken the Painter‘ (1839). Indeed, James himself 
numbers among his many publications an edition of rare stories by LeFanu, which he 
edited as Madam Crowl’s Ghost (1923). In short, James himself avoids the staunch 
separation of literary and scholarly approaches to books, taking a scholarly approach to 
the history of the ghost story in order to further its enjoyment as literature. He does not 
adhere to his own protagonists‘ tendency to view modern genre fiction as automatically 
excluded from the methodological rigour of the scholarly gaze. In James, the ‗literary‘ 
invades the scholarly at every turn, and woe betide those scholars who view it as the 
trivial, imaginative counterpart to the objectifying facticity of the scholar‘s vocation. 
A lecture delivered at Oxford University by Montagu Burrows in 1884 makes 
this distinction between the scholarly cataloguer and the imaginative ‗literary‘ 
interpreter even more explicit. Comparing the relative merits of the disciplines of 
antiquarianism and history, Burrows cited the antiquary‘s penchant for ‗naked, 
unadorned facts‘ as a grievous defect.274 Against this he formulates an idea of the 
historian as the antiquary‘s opposite. The historian, he argues, ‗strongly prefers what 
may be called the literary aspect of the subject‘: he ‗revels in the inquisitive search for 
motives, the comparisons suggested, the arts of illustration, the adjuncts of effect, the 
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balance of composition, the faculty of catching the stray lights which glance over the 
landscape‘.275 Antiquarians, in short, simply gather raw materials, which require the 
imaginative intervention of a historian to weave a story out of them and give them 
meaning.  
In the light of such commentary, it might be tempting to view James‘s tales as 
the work of an antiquary who recognised the need to reconcile the contrasting impulses 
of history and antiquarianism. This is to ignore, however, the wider implications of 
such a recognition in the context of the changing status of antiquarianism. At the turn of 
the twentieth century, the ways in which the material cultures of the past were studied 
in the present were the subject of ongoing methodological debates. Focus upon the 
relative merits of object-focused antiquarianism and the narrative tendencies of history 
began to seem inadequate as the discovery of prehistory necessitated the transformation 
of traditional antiquarianism into new disciplines designed to take into account the vast 
expanse of geological time. Early antiquarians had a working idea of prehistory, whose 
limitations are exemplified by the widespread acceptance of the Anglican Archbishop 
of Armagh‘s pronouncement, in 1654, that the Earth‘s creation could be categorically 
dated to 4004 BC, a date inserted into the marginalia of the Authorised Version and 
quickly established as tantamount to a doctrinal tenet as sacred as the word of the Bible 
itself.
276
 Glyn Daniel emphasises just how radical the propositions of uniformitarian 
geologists regarding the Earth‘s immense antiquity must have been, by pointing out that 
 
the striking and oft-quoted phrase ‗a rose-red city, half as old as time‘ which 
John William Burgon wrote in 1845, was not […] a flight of poetic fancy. To 
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Burgon and to many early Victorians time was only six thousand years old, and 
he literally meant Petra to be half that time in age.
277
  
 
The opening words of Percy Lubbock‘s best-selling Prehistoric Times illustrates how 
drastically the situation had changed by 1865: ‗The first appearance of man in Europe 
dates from a period so remote that neither history nor tradition can throw any light on 
his origin or mode of life.‘278 Early antiquaries had been accustomed to the idea that 
written records could not shed light on the whole of human history, but the totality of 
that literally unwritten history now appeared increasingly beyond measure.  
Lubbock argued that ‗[a]rchaeology forms the link between geology and 
history‘.279 Indeed, by the end of the nineteenth century, the emergent disciplines of 
archaeology and anthropology began to supplement the findings of history in ways that 
fundamentally modified the antiquary‘s task, shifting the focus of debate from the 
materials themselves (the domain of the fetishistic antiquary) to the kinds of methods 
available for processing those materials in the present (the historian‘s narrative impulse 
and the archaeologist‘s obsession with classificatory systems). This shift implies a new 
recognition that the process of making the past meaningful in the present depended on 
the way one ‗read‘ the objects under consideration. Antiquarianism was itself becoming 
antique as hermeneutic practices took precedence over the collection and display of 
objects. 
If James‘s decision to describe his stories as those of an ‗antiquary‘ can be seen 
as an attempt to signpost the tales as performing a particular kind of cultural work 
within a methodological debate, however, it should be noted that the debate was still 
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very much ongoing and the distinction between antiquarianism and archaeology was far 
from clear at the time James‘s stories were being written. In 1891, for example, the 
historian Thomas Hodgkin reiterates the stance already taken by Burrows in his earlier 
lecture. Significantly, however, Hodgkin assigns to archaeology the role Burrows had 
assigned to antiquarianism only seven years before: ‗the Archaeologist collects facts 
relating to the past and the Historian arranges them‘.280 The congruence of Burrows‘s 
account of antiquarianism with Hodgkin‘s of archaeology illustrates how deceptive 
clear distinctions between the two can be when retrospectively imposed. Colin Renfrew 
and Paul Bahn‘s definition of archaeology as a discipline which approaches the material 
remnants of the past with a view to ‗understand[ing] what these things mean for the 
human story‘, for example, might imply that archaeology moved beyond the 
antiquary‘s obsession with the fetishisation of decontextualised relics, finally bringing 
the historian‘s ‗literary‘ impulse to bear upon the non-literary objects of prehistory.281 
Yet Michael Johnson makes, in 2010, essentially the same complaint about archaeology 
as Walpole had about antiquarianism two hundred years earlier when he chastises the 
lack of a ‗literary‘ apprehension on the part of its practitioners. Clearly, despite the one 
having apparently superseded the other, archaeology and antiquarianism have more in 
common with each other than either has in common with the ‗literary‘ dispositions of 
history.  
James‘s antiquaries reflect this overlap between the archaeologist and the 
antiquary. On the face of it, Dennistoun of ‗Canon Alberic‘s Scrapbook‘ is no 
archaeologist – his varied interests, encompassing medieval history, architecture and 
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textual scholarship, mean that he more closely resembles the antiquarian polymath 
described by Phillippa Levine:  
 
Few antiquaries before the advent of a specifically archaeological method would 
have seen any need to treat exhumed burial remains differently than a town 
charter or a church font. They were as comfortable editing medieval poetry as 
they were inspecting Roman remains.
282
  
 
As Levine implies, the conflation of text and object in the reconstruction of the past 
only acquired an ethos of transgressive promiscuity when the gradual canonisation of 
archaeology and history as professional academic disciplines had the effect of 
ostracising antiquarianism from the professional sphere and led to the study of the past 
becoming taxonomised as either textual or material: antiquarian or archaeological but 
never both at once. Despite this, no better description could be found for the 
deficiencies of Dennistoun‘s reductive approach to the physical traces contained in the 
Canon‘s scrapbook than Stout‘s description of mid-century archaeologists. As with 
Dennistoun, the narrow ‗epistemic bench-mark‘, which these archaeologists employed, 
led to a view of the past that was, in part, merely the product of the pre-determined ‗set 
of technical skills and techniques‘ brought to bear upon it. Placing his faith 
complacently in established taxonomies, Dennistoun subjects the scrapbook-fragments 
to an analysis that merely places them within an already extant palaeographic 
framework, thereby wholly missing the horrific significance at least one of those 
fragments retains. Moreover, the failure properly to ‗read‘ the object as a still-resonant 
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imaginative text means that Dennistoun shares the archaeologist‘s damaging ‗fixation 
with material culture‘ at the expense of the object as ‗literary‘ text.283 
Rather than debating the relative merits either of archaeology or antiquarianism 
as means of assessing material and textual remains, however, James‘s tales criticise the 
a priori taxonomisation of reading practices that goes hand in hand with the taxonomy 
that professionalisation enacts. The tales do not call attention to the deficiencies of any 
one established methodological approach. Rather, they criticise the rigid demarcations 
that disciplinary professionalisation instigates in the reading of texts – the pre-
conceptions it legitimates in order to prescribe the ‗reading‘ in advance. 
It is in this respect Leonard Bast‘s deficiencies as a reader not only connect him 
with James‘s antiquary-protagonists but with a wider debate concerning the 
epistemological baggage that plagued the late-Victorian and Edwardian antiquary. A 
wide social gulf separates James‘s academics from Forster‘s clerk, yet they resemble 
each other in their susceptibility to what Shane McCorristine identifies as the ‗ludic 
terrorism‘ that results from the disturbing blur between avocational and vocational 
study.
284
 As Levine observes, even when antiquarian investigations were pursued 
outside of the antiquary‘s nominal profession, the ‗determination and single 
mindedness with which these men pursued the interests of their leisure hours‘ was 
astonishing: an intense, auto-didactic urge that allowed the antiquary to define himself 
by consuming certain texts in a certain way. To illustrate the point, Levine quotes from 
mid-nineteenth-century antiquary William Baker: 
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I get up before five o‘clock, and read Ancient History till six, my time to go to 
work; at breakfast time I read the Spectator for a quarter of an hour; after dinner 
I have three-quarters of an hour, which I employ in reading Blair‘s Lectures; 
after work I read Ancient History from eight till nine o‘clock; from nine till 
half-past ten or eleven, I study Euclid, and on Sundays before and after dinner, I 
practice drawing.
285
  
 
McCorristine defines the ‗ludic‘ as ‗an intrinsically motivated phenomenon engaged in 
by individuals or groups of individuals for its own sake, that is, regardless of any 
utilitarian or profiting purpose‘.286 Baker‘s and Bast‘s attempts at autodidacticism 
resemble the academics of James‘s tales in their determination to banish the ludic 
impulse from reading undertaken with a ‗utilitarian or profiting purpose‘. For 
McCorristine, there is a relationship ‗between avocation and the ludic impulse inherent 
in debates revolving around the transvaluation of work‘,287 which emerges through  
 
that special dissonance in James‘s ghost stories created by the clash of the a 
priori vocationalism of the academic figure with the rapturous imposition of the 
terrorist ludicity of the ghost, resulting in a shocking realisation of the 
avocational nature of these scholarly activities.
288
  
 
McCorristine‘s suggestion is that the academic protagonists of James‘s tales suppress 
the ludicity of their scholarly work precisely in order to bring their activities into the 
arena of ‗the scholarly‘, and to bring the scholarly into the arena of a viable profession 
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or vocation: a demarcation that automatically rejects the labelling of other kinds of 
reading as either scholarly or professional.
289
 It is an act of disciplinary containment, 
designed to ensure that their research has a point beyond the mere killing of time: 
 
James‘s tales […] seem to suggest that the integration of work with play and a 
repression of the awareness of the ludicity of scholarly work, of the avocational 
nature of the knowledge industry, produces the ambient basis for the 
supernatural situation.
290
 
 
Bast‘s reading of Ruskin shares with Dennistoun‘s reading of the scrapbook and 
Anderson‘s reading of the town archives a determination to deny the exercise of any 
ludic impulse – any attempt to enjoy the writings on the basis of what they still have to 
offer ‗in themselves‘ to the individual reader. According to McCorristine, the presence 
of such an impulse frees the exercise from the need to satisfy the overdetermined 
vocational criteria of either the autodidact‘s search for ‗culture‘ or the antiquary‘s 
search for ‗naked, unadorned‘ facts. In the absence of  ‗ludicity‘, Leonard‘s industrious 
studies simply imprison him within that ‗daily grey‘ with which, as the object of a 
determinedly vocational reading experience, his canonical texts imbricate.  
McCorristine‘s reference to the ‗knowledge industry‘ is telling, therefore, 
because it relates so closely to James‘s point in Wanderings: namely, that not only the 
methodological process but also the knowledge thus unearthed is the result of industry 
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on the reader‘s part. Industry, blindly vocational or programmatic, will simply breed 
familiarity with the materiality of manuscripts or the ‗outside‘ of books; the reader will 
know them only as ‗husks‘ of a culture already determined by someone else. In this 
sense, he joins Symonds in his implication that new knowledge depends on being aware 
of the kind of industry that is being applied: there are many ways of reading a text 
beyond the institutionally legitimate.  
 
v. ‘Honouring the present other’ 
It is important to note that pre-archaeological antiquaries were awake to the 
interpretative challenges posed by prehistory‘s material relics, recognising their 
important status as clues to a silent tract of ‗eternity‘ beyond the written record. The 
difference between the antiquarian and archaeological ideas of prehistory before the 
development of archaeological approaches was simply that, with only the Biblical 
record to fall back on, ‗eternity‘ was conceived as being only six thousand years long. 
Daniel cites the seventeenth-century antiquarianism‘s obsession with Druidism as a 
symptom of another widespread problem amongst pre-archaeological antiquarianism: 
 
Everything had to belong to something and to something clearly named and 
historical. One could not confess failure with the early past of man. It had to be 
peopled by someone [and] […] they had to be named people to whom one could 
turn confidently. Here was no time for the innominate uncertainties of modern 
prehistory.
291
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As ‗modern prehistory‘ developed and the sheer immensity of unrecorded time became 
apparent, the ‗innominate uncertainties‘ became more and more a cause of ontological 
anxiety. In this respect, Lubbock‘s choice of words in the title of Prehistoric Times is 
very telling. According to Daniel, the book did much to popularise the term 
‗prehistory‘, even though other terms, including ‗antehistory‘ had been suggested: 
Lubbock ‗wisely decided against this word, and, although it was of course spelt with an 
e and not an i, it is fortunate that the name was dropped‘.292  
In archaeological terms, Lubbock‘s decision might well have been a wise one, 
but the unsettling idea of pre-history as ‗anti-history‘ is useful in understanding some of 
the imaginative effects of its immensity upon the literary imagination of late-
nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century authors. As Mark Twain pointed out in 1903, 
the exponential extension of history enlightened to the precise degree that it unsettled: 
 
Man has been here 32,000 years. That it took a hundred million years to prepare 
the world for him is proof that that is what it was done for. I suppose it is, I 
dunno. If the Eiffel Tower were now representing the world‘s age, the skin of 
paint on the pinnacle-nob at its summit would represent man‘s share of that age; 
and anybody would perceive that that skin was what the tower was built for. I 
reckon they would. I dunno.
293
  
 
Twain‘s ironic formulation presents prehistory not only as a lacuna at the very origin of 
the human history, but as an abyss over which mankind is precariously perched, as at 
the apex of a narrowing tower. As Gillian Beer has written: ‗no historical period 
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consists only of its present. Evidence of this is provided […] by past writing when read 
within and read into the present‘.294 The same is true of archaeological remains which, 
when ‗read‘ often serve only to reveal their irretrievably alien nature: the total absence 
of a context in which these can be made intelligible. For Beer, ‗the study of past writing 
and past reading can disturb any autocratic emphasis on the self and the present, as if 
they were stable entities‘. The way the period‘s literature represents communication 
with the ‗other‘, as the means by which the present‘s sudden plunge into silence, 
incoherence or illiteracy is precipitated, demonstrates the profound anxiety aroused by 
the elision of the written record – and by geological time as an abyss into which that 
record disappeared, rendering meaning dependent on a teleology whose endpoint was 
so vastly distant as to be unknowable. 
Joseph Conrad‘s Heart of Darkness (1899), with its paranoid insistence on 
‗civilized‘ man‘s proximity to ‗the night of first ages‘, is an example (Heart of 
Darkness, 63). The narrator, Marlow comments on the way in which the sound of 
native African drumming, divorced from any familiar frame of reference, is rendered 
meaningless to the Westerners who hear it even though, for those doing the drumming, 
the noise contains ‗as profound a meaning as the sound of bells in a Christian country‘ 
(Heart of Darkness, 39). What is at stake in Marlow‘s comparison (savage drums vs 
‗Christian bells‘) is the implied levelling of the cultures thus compared. For Marlow‘s 
ears, not only is the meaning of the drumming not immediately comprehensible, so is 
the culture that produced it as potentially unknowable and other as the Christian society 
that makes itself known by means of bell-ringing and other signifying rituals, sounds, 
languages and customs. Both cultures depend, for their significance, upon their being 
recognised, understood, reciprocated. It is little wonder that, for Marlow, conversation 
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is deemed valuable insofar as it offers ‗a sense of real presence‘. Without anyone to 
recognise the communication, meaning disappears (Heart of Darkness, 79). Such 
reciprocation is impossible, within the meaningless void of the jungle, for Marlow and 
the other ivory hunters, who find themselves ‗cut off from the comprehension of our 
surroundings‘ (Heart of Darkness, 63). To the natives, the invaders‘ systems of 
signification are similarly alien – to them, white, ‗civilized‘ man is the ‗other‘. The 
same/other dichotomy that justifies the invaders‘ presence as a civilising influence is 
thus inverted.  
As a symbol of the mutual otherness of ‗civilised‘ and ‗savage‘, the silence of 
the wilderness, like the communicative blank spot contained within the drumming, not 
only poses a challenge to the savage/civilised dichotomy, but also reveals the potential 
‗otherness‘ latent in all communication. If the wilderness contains ‗truth stripped of its 
cloak of time‘, then the nature of this ‗truth‘ is, like the signification of the natives‘ 
drums, ultimately characterised by an absence. This is the paradoxical ‗meaning‘ that 
Marlow cites when he hears the whoops and shouts that emanate from the human 
inhabitants of the riverbanks: ‗a dim suspicion of there being a meaning in it which you 
– you so remote from the night of first ages – could comprehend‘ (Heart of Darkness, 
63). For Marlow, the silence itself has an agency, in that it communicates not just 
‗nothing‘, but ‗nothingness‘: a blank, all-encompassing ‗darkness‘ always already at the 
heart of all signifying systems, that threatens not only the specific civilization which 
has given rise to Marlow‘s expedition, but the very concept of civilization as an 
improving or progressive force. As Marlow notes at the beginning of his tale, the shore 
of the Thames was once also a place of darkness, equally appalling for the Roman 
invaders. Such a comparison places the intersection of the known and the unknown at 
the precise point that prehistory gives way to history with the arrival on British shores 
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of literate Roman forces. Yet this distinction implies not only that civilisation rests on 
the silencing of Celtic others, but also that ‗civilizing‘ forces overwrite, but never 
destroy, the vast silence which, in the absence of extant written sources, inevitably 
predates them. 
As Beer argues and the Conradian text exemplifies, the appearance of prehistory 
destabilised late-Victorian faith not only in the evolutionary scheme of things, but also 
in the socio-political certainties of Western ‗civilization‘. In Howards End, for instance, 
the socio-political certainties of the society to which the Wilcoxes belong and to which 
the Basts aspire rests on very shaky foundations: ‗I felt for a moment that the whole 
Wilcox family was a fraud, just a wall of newspapers and motor-cars and golf-clubs, 
and that if it fell I should find nothing behind it but panic and emptiness‘ (Howards 
End, 40-41). Helen Schlegel echoes Marlow here, in her diagnosis of a capitalist society 
obsessed with an outer life of displayable symbols. The Wilcoxes have plenty of ‗coin‘ 
yet they, like Bast, harbour a preoccupation with the outer life: the outward expression 
of gentility, and the ‗outside‘ of everything, including books. ‗Personal relations‘, it 
would appear, extend to the relationship not only between people, but between readers 
and books. Hence Leonard‘s difficulty in forming a ‗personal relation‘ with culture – 
the very kind of relationship whose formation was so revelatory for Symonds. Leonard, 
whose fear of falling into an ‗abyss‘ where nothing ‗counted‘ (Howards End, 58) might 
be based on a horror of poverty, but it also resembles Paul Wilcox‘s ‗panic and 
emptiness‘, a fear of the lacuna that lies behind the outward expressions of what, in 
capitalist society, constitutes social status.  
Thus, in Howards End, the abyss constitutes an epistemological gap at the heart 
of characters‘ experiences, threatening an ultimate loss of meaning by reminding them 
of the contingencies of their own socialised existence. In fact, the novel bestows on the 
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‗abyss‘ the troubling cultural currency retained by prehistory in the period, as the 
harbinger of a pervasive ‗otherness‘ as potentially disruptive as James‘s spectres. When 
Helen brings the Basts to Charles Wilcox‘s wedding, for example, Jacky is a literal 
beggar at the feast, a disturbing influence not because of her actions but because of her 
very presence: ‗there was no malice in Jacky. There she sat, a piece of cake in one 
hand, an empty champagne glass in the other, doing no harm to anybody‘ (Howards 
End, 229). She resembles the spectre that taunts Parkins at the end of James‘s ‗Oh, 
Whistle, and I‘ll Come to You‘. Like Margaret, who cannot bring herself to shake 
hands with Jacky, the professor ‗could not have borne – he didn‘t know why – to touch 
it‘ (Count Magnus, 99). Yet this horror of physical contact is unaccountable – as with 
Jacky, ‗it is not so evident what more the creature that came in answer to the whistle 
could have done than frighten‘ (Count Magnus, 100). In fact, Jacky‘s presence, like the 
spectre‘s, is disruptive because it mixes two realms (one of social, the other of 
ontological status) the protagonists would prefer to have kept separate, threatening to 
render protagonists‘ ‗views on certain points […] less clear cut than they used to be‘ 
(Count Magnus, 100).
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 Likening Bast‘s precarious position on the edge of the middle classes to his 
being precariously balanced on the edge of an abyss, the narrator comments that his 
story is ‗not concerned with the very poor. They are unthinkable, and only to be 
approached by the statistician or the poet‘ (Howards End, 58). Of course, in so 
ostentatiously drawing attention to its exclusion of the ‗very poor‘ from the narrative, 
the text is concerned with the very poor to the extent that it comments on their 
consignment, by society and its chroniclers, to an obscure abyss – an action that is 
repeatedly enacted by the novel‘s characters, who are determined to ensure that the 
denizens of the abyss remain at arm‘s length, part of a different world. It draws 
attention to the characters‘ constant elision of the otherness that threatens the stability 
of their own socio-political situation. Earlier, for example, Mrs Munt encounters a 
member of the ‗lower orders‘ when Charles Wilcox, driving her to Howards End, stops 
at a garage: 
 
‗Esprit de classe‘ – if one may coin the phrase – was strong in Mrs. Munt.  She 
sat quivering while a member of the lower orders deposited a metal funnel, a 
saucepan, and a garden squirt beside the roll of oilcloth. 
    ‗Right behind?‘ 
    ‗Yes, sir.‘ And the lower orders vanished in a cloud of dust. (Howards End, 
34) 
 
What is ironically characterised by the narrator, in his description of abject poverty, as 
an abyss into which the very poor disappear, is literally enacted here. Mrs Munt‘s 
‗quivering‘ fear of the garage staff arises from an ‗esprit de classe‘ that taxonomises 
social strata, setting up the ‗lower orders‘ as creatures from a realm beyond her own – 
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the inhabitants of an abyssal lacuna, the ‗otherness‘ of whose denizens her taxonomic 
operation maintains as such. The lower orders vanish ‗in a cloud of dust‘ only because 
of the speed with which the higher orders flee. What such episodes acknowledge is that 
‗panic and emptiness‘ is not only a by-product of the capitalist system, but also a very 
necessary way of maintaining it, since it allows those within it to castigate anything 
outside themselves as terrifyingly other.  
 Whilst acknowledging that her moneyed position is, paradoxically, what allows 
her the privilege of doing so, Margaret Schlegel posits a faith in ‗personal relationships‘ 
as a way of overcoming this ontological panic by sidestepping apparently ‗given‘ social 
divisions in favour of a negotiation between a society of individuals. The ‗prose‘ and 
the ‗passion‘ have their collorary in Margaret and Helen‘s debate regarding the ‗outer‘ 
and the ‗inner‘ life: the Schlegels champion the latter, with the Wilcoxes championing 
the former. The problem, for Leonard as for the Wilcoxes, is an overabundance of the 
prosaic ‗outer life‘, in which gentility is all-important, but in which gentility is also a 
product of a correctly expressed ‗assertion‘ – of props. The text acknowledges the 
arbitrary nature of the capitalist system – the emptiness that lies behind it – but eschews 
the panic felt by Paul at its dissolution. In establishing the infinite variety of ‗personal 
relations‘ in its stead, the text not only embraces the otherness that capitalism makes 
monstrous, but embraces the very inevitability of each individual‘s a priori otherness 
from each other. Acknowledging civilisation as always underscored by a tabula rasa on 
which new ‗connections‘ are possible, the text champions ‗personal relationships‘, 
including, here as in ‗The Celestial Omnibus‘, a personal relationship with texts – the 
very kind of relationship whose formation was so revelatory for Symonds.
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 With Beer, therefore, Symonds underlines the point that implicitly connects the 
reading of ancient artefacts in James and the reading of present text in Forster, 
suggesting that to ‗read‘ any text is always to be drawn into confrontation with the 
other, and thus to realise the potential otherness of one‘s own subject position: 
 
The outsider‘s eye, across space or time, makes observations which do not 
simply supplement but may transform the questions to be asked. We are those 
outsiders; but then so also are the books we study.
297
 
 
In this way, Symonds draws attention to the same potential distance between present-
day reader and ancient artefact which prehistory, with its decontextualisation of 
antiquarian objects, had accentuated. One sees – but only ever ‗for oneself‘.298 It is 
significant, therefore, that the one point at which Leonard comes closest to finding 
himself on an equal footing with the Schlegels (his nocturnal ramble into Wimbledon) 
is directly associated with prehistory as a liberating wiping of the ontological slate: ‗He 
had visited the county of Surrey when darkness covered its amenities, and its cosy 
villas had re-entered ancient night‘ (Howards End, 127). Looking squarely into a blank, 
empty void in which no significance obtains save for that which onlookers are able to 
assert for themselves, Leonard is forced to establish a ‗personal‘ impression with which 
he can inflect the presentation of walking tours in the books he has hitherto merely 
passively consumed.  
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vi. ‘Truth does matter’: living with the other 
In Aspects of the Novel, Forster suggests that an ideal approach to the literary canon 
would be not only historically conscious but also, in being resolutely subjective, 
fundamentally ahistorical at the same time. While the pseudo-scholar classifies books 
according to pre-assigned taxonomies, new insights can only be gained if one imagines 
all novelists ‗seated together in a room […] all writing their novels simultaneously‘ 
(Aspects of the Novel, 8). While many frameworks exist for establishing literary-
historical ‗tendencies‘, argues Forster, in practice readers themselves inevitably become 
the locus for new relationships between the various kinds of texts they read – there will 
always be a reader-specific framework inescapably other to established modes of 
understanding:  
 
It is part of [the reader‘s] business to see literature steadily and to see it whole; 
and this is eminently to see it not as consecrated by time, but to see it beyond 
time. (Aspects of the Novel, 23) 
 
For Symonds, as with Forster, to see literature as ‗beyond time‘ emerges from a 
recognition, not necessarily of literature‘s ability to enshrine transcendent meanings and 
‗timeless‘ values, but of the production of textual meaning as something that goes on 
between the reader and the text. In both conceptualisations, ‗reading‘ has little to do 
with what has been done to the text in the past, and everything to do with the reading 
subject in the present. This, according to Stout, is the epistemological principle that 
must fundamentally underlie any study of unlettered prehistory, whose intrinsic 
‗otherness‘ emphasises the inescapably contingent nature of the socio-political present 
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in which it is read. Forster‘s fictions reflect this. They are peopled with readers whose 
connection with texts occurs at the precise point that their readings reveal their own 
inevitable otherness from the dominant socio-political forms of the present.  
The second of The Longest Journey‘s three sections, culminating in a visit to 
Rickie‘s school by his Cambridge friend Ansell, is an example. While waiting for 
Rickie to meet him, Ansell encounters Stephen Wonham, Rickie‘s illegitimate half-
brother. Stephen has come to beg assistance from Rickie, having been abandoned by his 
one-time patron, Mrs Failing. Under the influence of his wife, Agnes, Rickie had 
previously disowned Stephen, ashamed of this blood connection with the lower orders 
and of the stain on the character of the dead mother whose memory he venerates. The 
section ends with Ansell, disgusted at his friend‘s prejudice, revealing Stephen‘s 
existence to the whole school, who are gathered in the great hall – much to Rickie and 
Agnes‘s horror. The initial confrontation between Ansell and Stephen, of whose 
identity the former is at this point unaware, involves the symbolic use of a book of 
socialist essays entitled What We Want, written by Rickie‘s uncle (Mrs Failing‘s 
husband). Stephen and Ansell fight, flinging the book at each other in a manner that 
literalises the underlying conflict, as both parties attempt to classify the other as a 
representative of their social class. After the fight is concluded, Ansell demands of 
Stephen: ‗What are you? […] Who are you—your name—I don't care about that. But it 
interests me to class people, and up to now I have failed with you‘ (The Longest 
Journey, 217). 
Denying Stephen an individual identity, Ansell initially thinks of him not in 
terms of ‗who‘ but of ‗what‘. Stephen‘s answer reveals his liminal social position: 
related by blood to ‗old money‘, but disgraced by his illegitimacy, and abandoned by 
his respectable patron, he claims really not to ‗know what I am‘, much less what he 
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‗wants‘. Stephen‘s response to Ansell‘s enquiry regarding ‗what‘ he is, reflects the 
impossibility of answering that question without recourse to any existing social 
taxonomy, involuntarily emerging as a statement of purely personal identity: ‗―I—‖ He 
stopped.‘ Not knowing how to classify himself, Stephen is reduced to a personal 
pronoun. Ansell is impressed, turning back on his previous desire to classify and 
concluding: ‗One belongs to the place one sleeps in and to the people one eats with‘. 
Having come to this conclusion, a ‗silence, akin to poetry, invaded Ansell‘ (The 
Longest Journey, 217). The book of socialist essays, with which they have literally 
beaten each other, now lies ‗a good deal shattered […] between them‘, representing a 
barrier that has been physically and metaphorically broken down. Control over his own 
identity – over the ‗I‘ – is thus restored to Stephen, and ‗silence‘ replaces Ansell‘s 
impulse to classify.  
The narrator describes Ansell‘s encounter with Stephen as ‗a momentary 
encounter with reality‘ (The Longest Journey, 226); yet that ‗reality‘ appears to be 
simply the reality of the absence – the ‗silence akin to poetry‘ – that invariably 
underlies the attempt to enslave lived experience to existing taxonomies, which What 
We Want (however well intentioned) represents. As with Leonard‘s move away from 
books to experience at first hand a walk through the woods, Ansell‘s fight with Stephen 
is another example of ‗seeing for oneself‘ the things about which one has, hitherto, only 
read. As with Forster‘s comments in Aspects of the Novel, the episode figures the socio-
historical ‗reality‘ of the text as ultimately less relevant than the personal response of 
readers – in the face of a complex living example of the unfortunates it champions, the 
socio-political generalisations of What We Want dissolve into a ‗silence akin to poetry‘.  
The episode foregrounds both the poverty and value of books in Forster‘s 
narratives, in which written texts – be they The Stones of Venice, Virginibus Puerisque 
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or What We Want – come to symbolise, like Ansell‘s cow, contrasting accounts of what 
is or is not really ‗there‘. Like all pupils, the scholarly reader is in danger of becoming a 
subject, of seeing only what books tell him is ‗there‘. Thus, in The Longest Journey, 
What We Want becomes a symbolic site upon which the book‘s sweeping 
generalisations about social ‗realities‘, though not necessarily inhumane, are reduced to 
a literal conflict between two individuals, reflecting metonymically the way in which 
the meaning of the book itself represents a dynamic relationship between reader and 
text. The novel prefigures Howards End‘s injunction to ‗see for oneself‘, challenging 
the idea that there is, in the book, anything really ‗there‘ at all – that ideas written down 
betray an inevitable poverty when contrasted with the inescapable plurality of readerly 
experience. 
Where Angels Fear to Tread (1905) and A Room with a View (1908) put 
guidebooks to a similar symbolic use, demonstrating the way in which pre-written 
accounts destroy the tourist‘s ability to connect personally with Italy. Philip Herriton, 
we are told, ‗could never read ―The view from the Rocca (small gratuity) is finest at 
sunset‖ without a catching at the heart‘, while Lucy Honeychurch ‗commit[s] to 
memory the most important dates of Florentine History‘ in order to ensure ‗enjoy[ment] 
[…] on the morrow‘.299 Such passages reflect their fetishisation of Italy as a country 
described not only by someone else, but also for a reader who will inevitably 
experience it in a manner carefully regulated by the apparatus of a tourist industry that 
presents countries as sites of a reified history, culture and geography, viewable for a 
‗small gratuity‘. Conversely, the ordeals that beset both of them when they abandon 
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their Baedekers illustrate precisely the horrors that such works are designed to shield 
them from in the first place. 
This is not to argue a simplistic assertion, on the novels‘ part, that abandoning 
Baedeker will magically precipitate a revelation of the ‗real Italy‘. As James Buzard 
notes, guidebook-assisted tourism is the means through which Forster‘s Italian novels 
illustrate ‗that the approach to ―the real‖ in culture or history proceeds through some 
―prior textualisation‖, and that the urge for a new start, a reform that would sweep away 
all previous texts […] finds utterance in only another text‘.300 In Lucy‘s case, this might 
be most obviously exemplified in the presentation of her passionate embrace with 
George Emerson. Initially, this would seem to bear out Buzard‘s assertion that Lucy is 
‗a powerless and sexually naïve protagonist […] [who] lurks behind the screen of 
custom, class, and sex that guards the tourist from contact with indigenous life‘, so that 
the ‗boundary dividing that phoney culture which is tailored to tourists‘ needs from ―the 
authentic‖ is identified with the hymen locking Lucy in aloof virginity‘.301 According to 
such a reading, Forster‘s novel is itself guilty of pandering to cultural stereotypes by 
enlisting ‗an image of violent penetration to shatter the boundaries of touristic 
proprieties‘ in the incident where Lucy goes off the beaten tourist track and sees the 
murder in the square.
302
 On the one hand, this signals the presence of the common 
Forsterian discrepancy between reading and personal experience: 
 
In this scheme, the tourist is the public image of the sexually uninitiated or even 
maladjusted individual, the virgin or voyeur, who has never learned to ‗really 
live‘. The association of sexual and cultural roles helps to sustain an extensive 
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symbolic opposition between images reflecting deep involvement in the 
elemental and images reflecting the merely spectatorial relation of tourism and 
sightseeing.
303
 
 
At the same time, argues Buzard, the use of ‗the stereotypical image of the male Italian 
as a fount of uncontrollable passions‘ means that Forster ‗appears to participate in the 
same kind of exploitation of Italian life and culture he was elsewhere so concerned to 
criticise […] [by transforming] his own symbol of authenticity, the Italian male body, 
into an instrument entirely subsumed in its function within an English plot‘.304  
According to such a reading, the sudden embrace with George Emerson merely 
represents the culmination of a trajectory in which the stereotypical association of 
passion with the Mediterranean south simply validates a very English idea of what it 
means to ‗really live‘. Buzard echoes John Carey‘s argument that the scene in the 
piazza ‗is designed to tell us that the world of passion and casual violence in which the 
Italian masses live was the world that produced the great artworks that Lucy buys her 
emasculated photographic replicas of‘.305 That is, the postcards, like Baedeker‘s 
account, simply elide the ‗real‘ passion that the physical brawl restores, in a manner 
that insultingly fixes the Italian population as a hotbed of passion and vice – the 
extreme ‗other‘ of English gentility and restraint. 
In this sense the argument might also be applied to ‗Count Magnus‘, in M.R. 
James‘s first story collection, whose protagonist, visiting a Scandinavian town with a 
view to writing a book of travels, is unable to comprehend the visceral horror of the 
legend he dilutes for the pleasure of his audience. The Swedish innkeeper who tells him 
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the horrific story of the aftermath of Magnus‘s death is cannier, however, 
comprehending only too well the abject abhorrence of the count‘s actions. For him, it is 
not a folktale, nor the stuff of picturesque tourism – it is a horror as real and tangible 
now as it was then: ‗his face was not there, because the flesh of it was sucked away off 
the bones. You understand that?‘ (Count Magnus, 75). The question implicitly casts 
doubt, however, on Wraxall‘s ability to ‗understand‘, on anything other than the most 
prosaic of levels, the terrible reality of the event. It not only reveals an imaginative 
obtuseness which, in typical Jamesian fashion, is Wraxall‘s downfall, but also the 
dangerous distortions that guidebooks can enact. Accepting Buzard‘s reading, one 
could also argue that James‘s protagonists resemble, like Forster‘s tourists, the ‗virgin 
or the voyeur‘, on whom the rich viscerality of what it means to ‗really live‘ rebounds 
in the most gruesome ways.
306
  
There is, undeniably, a conflict between A Room With a View‘s differentiation 
of the foreign other‘s passionate ‗authenticity‘ and the prosaic dilution of sanctioned 
textual representations, which Lucy finally breaches when she succumbs to George 
Emerson‘s advances. Yet it is nevertheless doubtful whether this conflict endorses, in 
the novel, a straightforward transition from the ‗phoney culture‘ of the guidebook to the 
transcendent reality of Italian passion. Ultimately, while Lucy‘s emotional and sexual 
awakenings are shown to be more ‗authentic‘ than the sanctions of the middle-class 
tourism they transgress, they are never allowed to seem the embodiment of a reality so 
‗authentic‘ that it transcends the subjective textual ‗view‘ of Lucy the reader. 
In the second half of the novel, Lucy unexpectedly finds that her encounter with 
George has been used by fellow tourist Eleanor Lavish for the plot of a badly-written 
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romantic novel. Yet, her reaction to this revelation that ‗Miss Lavish […] had printed 
the past in draggled prose, for Cecil to read and for George to hear‘ is ambivalent 
(Room With a View, 157). The prose is certainly terrible and the narrative convoluted. 
In fact, the book validates Cecil‘s flippant dismissal of modern novels on the grounds 
that ‗[e]very one writes for money in these days‘ (Room With a View, 155). At the same 
time, however, Cecil is mistaken in seeing in the novel only the barely literate 
melodrama of the romantic bestseller. As the narrator describes, even this drivel is 
capable of eliciting an emotional conflict in Lucy, whose experiences mean that the text 
has, for her, a terrible personal significance: 
 
Love felt and returned, love which our bodies exact and our hearts have 
transfigured, love which is the most real thing that we shall ever meet, 
reappeared now as the world's enemy, and she must stifle it. […] The contest 
[…] lay between the real and the pretended, and Lucy's first aim was to defeat 
herself. […] Tampering with the truth, she forgot that the truth had ever been. 
(Room With a View, 159) 
 
This ‗truth‘ that the novel recalls is most emphatically not something already enshrined 
within Miss Lavish‘s story, nor in Italy itself: the novel does not, that is, enshrine a 
‗real‘ Italian experience that Cecil fails to grasp. Rather, it represents an emotional 
experience which, for Lucy, is authentic, but which Cecil fails to imagine – which 
Lucy, indeed, perceives as a passion quite the reverse of Cecil‘s prosaic reaction to the 
novel as simply a collection of grammatical errors. The sheer badness of the writing 
demonstrates the way in which the events that took place in Italy are not ‗authentic‘ in 
themselves, but require Lucy emotionally to apprehend the ‗authenticity‘ of those 
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experiences. That this is a truth that only the individual reader is capable of admitting or 
repressing demonstrates the subjectivity of such ‗authenticity‘, locating it within the 
observer‘s reactions and not within that which is observed – not within the view 
glimpsed from a hotel room, but within the gaze of the individual that inevitably comes 
between the room and the view. Cecil‘s failure to anticipate the validity of the emotions 
Miss Lavish describes demonstrates that there is no ‗authentic‘ meaning already 
enshrined within the book in advance, without a reader to reciprocate it. However, it 
also demonstrates Cecil‘s inability to imagine anything other than the most surface 
reading of the novel, which leads him to characterise it as a production that would 
inevitably strike every possible reader as woefully ‗inauthentic‘. Through Cecil‘s 
obtuse dismissal of the novel on the grounds that fiction is either authentic or not, 
regardless of who reads it, A Room With a View denies any attempt on its own part to 
present itself as an authentic portrait of Italy or even of the Italian experience, settling 
instead for a metatextual point about the way in which books simply reflect (or fail to 
reflect) the reader‘s own ‗view‘. Buzard and Carey argue that Forster posits a fantasy of 
an authentic Italy against the inauthentic Italy of guidebooks while, in fact, the episode 
of Miss Lavish‘s novel emphasises not only that the real Italy never emerges in a novel, 
but also that it is, in A Room With a View, never really meant to.  
While the novel disparages the reliance on Baedeker‘s Italy, it ends by 
presenting the reader not with the real Italy, but with what might be called ‗Lucy‘s 
Italy‘. In fact, Forster is far more concerned with the way in which the emergence of 
that abstraction mirrors the emergence of the ‗real Lucy‘. As with Symonds‘s use of 
Plato to work through his own troubling erotic impulses, Lucy‘s recollections of Italy 
establish, only to repress, a personal response to her experiences there which Mr 
Emerson senior anxiously urges her to acknowledge: ‗―Now it is all dark. Now Beauty 
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and Passion seem never to have existed. I know. But remember the mountains over 
Florence and the view […] for we fight for more than Love or Pleasure; there is Truth. 
Truth counts, Truth does count‖‘ (Room With a View, 203). The ‗Truth‘ here is the 
emotional one that Lucy loves George: an intensely personal truth at the heart, not of 
Italy, but of Lucy‘s personal associations with it.  
Lucy mistakenly attributes Emerson‘s insistence on her affections for George to 
precisely the kind of stereotyping that Buzard and Carey attribute to Forster himself: 
‗Oh, how like a man […] to suppose that a woman is always thinking about a man.‘ 
Yet, as Emerson points out to Lucy, his judgement has little to do with universal truths 
and more to do with an observation on one particular ‗personal relation‘ which, in this 
instance, happens to be true: ‗But you are‘, he points out (Room With a View, 201). As 
he explains, he is not attempting to teach Lucy about the authenticity of one model for 
male-female relations, but about a specific emotional truth that she herself resolutely 
represses: not one view of what the world is ‗really‘ like, but a way of ‗seeing‘ in which 
the plurality of experiences – a multitude of ‗views‘, including one‘s own – can be 
confronted and engaged with dynamically.  
In A Room With a View, therefore, Emerson‘s faith in the imaginative sympathy 
of ‗personal relations‘ comes to the protagonist‘s rescue in a manner that underlines 
precisely the point about the politics of reading that Symonds makes. The clergyman‘s 
study, in which Emerson and Lucy meet, is lined with imposing volumes: ‗She looked 
at the books again—black, brown, and that acrid theological blue. They surrounded the 
visitors on every side; they were piled on the tables, they pressed against the very 
ceiling‘ (Room With a View, 198). When Emerson begins to talk about Italy, Lucy hides 
herself behind a volume of Old Testament commentaries: ‗Holding it up to her eyes, 
she said: ―I have no wish to discuss Italy or any subject connected with your son.‖ […] 
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Feeling a little steadier, she put the book back and turned round to him‘ (Room With a 
View, 195-96). If, earlier in the novel, Baedeker signifies the commodification of 
tourism along stultifying philistine grounds, then here the association of Old Testament 
morality with Lucy‘s recollections demonstrates the way in which books function as 
talismanic symbols, guarding against the subjective emotional reality of dissident 
experience – and of dissident reading. Forster thus harbours a fundamentally different 
attitude to Wilde. Both reject the book as a site of reified textual meaning, but Forster 
also formulates, in contrast, an idea of the individual self as a collection of emotions 
and views which, like Ansell‘s cow, are really ‗there‘ – if only they could be 
consciously acknowledged, embraced and expressed. By associating Lucy‘s awakening 
apprehension of the authenticity of her own ‗views‘ with an injunction to win ‗a 
victory‘ over books, A Room With a View draws out the political implications of what, 
in M.R. James, represents a purely academic dilemma regarding the recovery of 
meaning from a past that remains resolutely other. This most optimistic of Forster‘s 
novels is allied with Symonds‘s reading of Plato and anticipates Stout‘s critique of 
archaeological ‗reading‘ by presenting the book as a site on which the validity of the 
individual‘s own experiences – as a reader and as a human being – can be asserted as a 
‗truth‘ that does, indeed, ‗count‘. 
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Conclusion 
‘No More Literary Works and No More Readers’ 
 
Characterising an underlying anxiety in late-nineteenth-century literature, Kate Flint 
points to a developing realisation that would come obviously to fruition in the growth 
of modernism: ‗perhaps there is no truth, no centre at all, only different angles of 
vision‘:307 
 
By the end of the [nineteenth] century, the notion of what constituted a ‗centre‘, 
what a periphery, could no longer be voiced with unquestioned confidence. […] 
If powerful social groupings attempted to invest certain types of writing, music, 
or theatrical entertainment with particular values, they were doing so in the light 
of expanding literacy, and a multiplicity of new voices expressing themselves in 
print.
308
 
 
As Flint implies, and as I have emphasised in my introductory chapter, the notion of an 
increasingly multivalent print culture raised concerns in the late nineteenth century, 
because it seemed to represent both the cause and the symptom of a dramatically 
fractured socio-political ‗centre‘.  
In this thesis, I have argued that, in the fiction of a number of late-nineteenth-
century writers, books symbolise the fragmentation of the ‗centre‘, by revealing, as 
anything but ‗peripheral‘, the position of the reader in the recovery of textual meaning. 
These fictions deploy books as symbols of different kinds of ‗centres‘ – generic, social, 
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gendered, racial and even academic – only to expose their vulnerability as sites on 
which their authority is contested in the face of an advancing modernity and the 
reader‘s uniquely individualistic position within it. Books, in these works, represent the 
social and moral accoutrements of a vanished age of certainty. Yet, the dominant idea 
of books as purveyors of certainties also empowers an alternative semiotics of the book. 
For, by emphasising the pivotal role of the reading subject in the recovery of meaning 
from texts, books are presented not only as facilitators of knowledge external to the 
self, but also as opportunities to bring into new and transitory coherences the particular 
nexus of experiences, beliefs and attitudes that make up the unique and complex entity 
of the self-as-reader.  
Wilde‘s decadent ideas about the self‘s completely autonomous relationship 
with art of all kinds leads him to make a clean break not only with the idea of literature 
as a reflection of a coherent ‗real‘, but also from any school of thought that posits an 
authentic ‗reality‘ outside of textual representation. Stevenson, James and Forster do 
not go so far, yet they express – in different ways – the suggestion that the authenticity 
of experience itself must consist partly of what readers bring to books, rather than of 
that which is already immanent within the literary text. A Ruskinian model of books as 
passive storehouses for gaining either useful knowledge or an elevating insight into 
eternal ‗truths‘ is rejected in their work. Hence, in an affecting passage from In the 
South Seas (1896), Stevenson inverts Wells‘s idea of humanity‘s future relationship 
with books. Stevenson is moved, by the stoicism with which a young Beretani mother 
imagines the prospect of her race‘s impending extinction, to contemplate the end of 
humanity itself: 
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[I]n a perspective of centuries I saw their case as ours, death coming in like a 
tide, and the day already numbered when there should be no more Beretani, and 
no more of any race whatever, and (what oddly touched me) no more literary 
works and no more readers.
309
 
 
Clare Harman sees the ‗utter oblivion of ―no more literary works and no more 
readers‖‘ as an ‗appalling prospect for this childless man […] truly a fate worse than 
death‘.310 Harman‘s biographical account of Stevenson as a ‗childless man‘ with only a 
literary issue is convincing and moving, but it misses the wider pathos envisaged in this 
world of books without readers. Wells‘s Time Traveller is shocked to discover that the 
world of the far future contains potential readers who have simply neglected this vast 
storehouse of knowledge and have degenerated as a result. In Stevenson‘s conception, 
however, the end of ‗literary works‘ is not a ‗fate worse than death‘, it is death – not 
only for humanity, but also for ‗literary works‘. For Wells, to imagine a world of books 
without readers is to imagine the degeneration of readers in the face of the splendour of 
that which books always already contain – and, therefore, always will contain. In 
Stevenson‘s vision, however, literary works and readers die together, since the one 
cannot really exist without the other. In this sense, the death of the Beretani people and 
their oral culture has its imaginative equivalent in the death of readers in Western print 
culture. In both cases, the meaning of a particular culture is located not within one 
central repository but within the conditions governing the encounter.  
Accordingly, Stevenson‘s emphasis on the material conditions of textual 
production not only throws into relief the particular physicality of the finished product, 
but also serves to emphasise the appropriate performance (on the reader‘s and the 
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writer‘s part) demanded by the market conditions in which the product is sold. It 
endorses the plurality of forms the physical book can take, but ultimately it is the 
market itself that, in tying certain generic and stylistic expectations to certain kinds of 
physical forms, shapes ideas about how the book is written and read. James‘s stories 
have little, if anything, to say about the literary marketplace. Yet their emphasis on the 
way in which the expectations that frame a particular reading experience threaten to rob 
the reader of autonomy and stifle new and equally significant readings links them with 
Wilde‘s and Stevenson‘s outputs. In James‘s tales, as in Forster‘s, the encounter with 
the book is proscribed by particular kinds of academic reading practices, just as, for 
Stevenson, they are proscribed in advance by the market and just as, for Wilde, they are 
proscribed in advance by a dominant utilitarian insistence on books as the agents of 
truth about the world. In all these cases, readers are urged to be aware of the 
proscriptions that govern their reading in advance – to be aware of the book as an object 
an encounter with which serves to emphasise not only themselves as readers, but also 
themselves as ‗selves‘.  
This inescapable relationship between the book and the self is, as the above 
quotation from Stevenson demonstrates, given a pathetic inflection when the death of 
both is imagined in conjunction with each other. A further touching example occurs in a 
speech given by James, as Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge University, to mark the 
beginning of the new academic year. The speech was delivered on 1 October 1914, not 
long after the outbreak of the First World War. In it, James considers movingly the role 
of academic pursuits in the midst of a global military conflict: 
 
The University meets in such circumstances as it has never known. […] Yet 
there is no doubt that we are bound to carry on our work; for by it we can render 
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definite service to the nation. Our part […] [is] to keep alive that fire of 
‗education, religion, learning, and research‘ which will in God‘s good time 
outburn the flame of war. Let us devote ourselves to making useful men of the 
new generation. Let us confine our own controversies within the narrowest 
limits, and be ready if necessary to postpone them altogether. Let our advanced 
work – however irrelevant it may seem to the needs of the moment – be 
unremittingly and faithfully pursued.
311
 
 
Like fin de siècle debates about the book, which frame the writing of all the texts 
studied in this thesis, James‘s rallying call recognises the need to find and express an 
anchoring certainty in the face of apparently cataclysmic dissolution, whilst also 
recognising the need for compromise and individual expression. It is a speech that 
attempts to cling to old practices in a climate that appears to call for their complete 
abandonment or to emphasise their obsolescence. Hence, it offers, simultaneously, a 
spirited defence of academic endeavours for their own sake and an equal readiness to 
‗postpone them altogether‘ should that become necessary. It also concedes that the 
work of ‗our medical schools‘ would be especially useful – more useful, ultimately, 
than the hours of antiquarian research in which he himself was engaged.
312
 It implies a 
truth beyond the horrors of the present reality which diligent research, ‗unremittingly 
and faithfully pursued‘ might finally unearth. Yet it fails to offer any concrete outline of 
the kind of useful truth that might be found by poking about in old books. In a circular 
argument, only the transcendence of this sought-for logos – its status as finally and 
eternally ‗true‘ – can be insisted upon with certainty. 
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Its ambiguity helps us to connect the speech with James‘s tales, which he also 
continued ‗unremittingly‘ to compose. In these, James implies with Forster that if truth 
‗does count‘ it is not to be found in a ‗scholarly‘ reading of the books that surround 
their protagonists at every point. Rather, they join Wilde and Stevenson in suggesting 
that the ‗truth‘ that emerges from reading is conditional upon the particular experiences 
of the self-as-reader – something books always end up reflecting: that books ‗count‘ 
only insofar as they reflect the reader who encounters them and the circumstances in 
which that reading takes place. In James‘s fiction as in Forster‘s, Stevenson‘s and 
Wilde‘s, a book‘s capacity to reveal the ‗truth‘ exists in direct proportion to the reader‘s 
ability to inflect it with individual nuance. It is a truth about ‗truth‘, revealing that 
intangible commodity to be not a matter of absolute value, but of material realities 
variously expressed in texts susceptible to an equal number of individual readings.  
This has obvious resonance in late-nineteenth-century formulations that saw the 
expanding and increasing plurality of print culture as – for better or worse – a reflection 
of an authoritative centre‘s disintegration into a multiplicity of competing voices. Yet, 
at the outset of a catastrophic war in which a reified patriotism and imperialism – a 
worship of the national ‗centre‘ wilfully embraced and brutally enforced – led to the 
deaths of countless millions, the idea that readers should look to books not as 
repositories of eternal ‗values‘, but as opportunities to bring their own experiences to 
bear upon the amassed certainties that books appear to enshrine, takes on an almost 
unbearable poignancy. Ultimately, what is perhaps most moving about James‘s speech 
is the way in which its guarded endorsement of the military encounter is coupled with 
an equally guarded endorsement of the literary encounter that constitutes academic 
research. Read alongside his stories, it seems to assert that a recognition of reading as 
the scene of an encounter between the self and the ‗other‘ might ‗in God‘s good time 
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outburn the flame of war‘ – but it also devastatingly implies its failure, to date, to have 
done just that. Meanwhile, Stevenson‘s melancholic prediction of death washing over 
Western culture ‗like a tide‘ was horribly borne out as a whole generation of readers 
perished in the melee of battle: a horrifying spectacle in which ‗truths‘ that really did 
‗count‘, were silenced prematurely in the ‗dazzle and confusion‘ of brutally assertive 
‗reality‘. 
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